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LAWYERS, JUDGES, AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST
John M. Payne*
SUBURBS UNDER SIEGE: RACE, SPACE, AND AUDACIOUS JUDGES.

By CharlesHaar. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1996. Pp.
xiv, 256. $29.95.
Charles Haar, the Louis D. Brandeis Professor of Law Emeritus
at the Harvard Law School and a certified elder statesman of the
housing and land-use community, was one of those scholarpoliticians of the 1960s who spun out innovative theories in law reviews and then moved into government to see them applied. His
generation inspired mine to pursue law as a means to serve the publie interest. But the days of the Kennedy brothers' Camelot are
long past. Today, big government and "big courts" alike are seen as
parts of the problem. In the more austere political climate of the
1990s, however, Charles Haar is not the least bit repentant, and he
has found a magnificent topic around which to reaffirm his faith in
the capacity of big government and, particularly, big courts to move
us collectively toward the just society. In Suburbs Under Siege:
Race, Space, and Audacious Judges, Professor Haar dissects New
Jersey's famous Mount Laurel cases,1 finding in them not only a
compelling demonstration of judicial success in the arduous task of
law reform, but confirmation that courts can be better than legislatures at such a task.
Suburbs Under Siege is a very Welcome book. For too long,
commentary on the Mount Laurel doctrine, one of the most important social initiatives of our time, has been left in the hands of people like myself who are day-to-day players at the grassroots level,
and who therefore inevitably risk commenting with an advocate's
bias.2 Charles Haar brings into the conversation not only his wealth
* Professor of Law and Justice Frederick Hall Scholar, Rutgers, Newark. B.A. 1963,
Yale; J.D. 1970, Harvard. - Ed.
1. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713
(NJ. 1975) (Mount Laurel I); Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount
Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (NJ. 1983) (Mount Laurel II).
2. Of course, I am now going to comment on Professor Haar's book from my perspective
as a day-to-day player, and so it is only fair that I summarize briefly my involvement with this
issue. I had no lawyer's role whatsoever in the first and second Mount Laurel cases themselves, but from 1983 onwards, I served as co-counsel to the public-interest plaintiffs in Urban
League of GreaterNew Brunswick,see infra note 27. Urban League was one of the first fully
litigated cases under the Mount Laurel II rules and it therefore became the laboratory for
distilling into workable form many of the bold but untested remedies that had been author-
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of experience and formidable analytic skill, but also his fresh perspective. He renewed my faith in what I have been doing for the
past two decades. There was an unmistakable goodness about the
best of the 1960s commitment to social reform through law, and
that goodness pervades Suburbs Under Siege. If Professor Haar's
vision sometimes exceeds his grasp, then as now, his unshakable
conviction that humankind is perfectible and that lawsuits can lead
the way reminds me of why I decided to become a public-interest
lawyer in the first place. The book is about late-century land-use
law, but it should be read by anyone who wishes to understand the
heart and soul of postwar legal liberalism.
Despite my enthusiasm for Suburbs Under Siege, however, I
have two fundamental disagreements with Professor Haar's approach to the Mount Laurel saga. Our differences are important,
because the Mount Laurel doctrine has not traveled well beyond
New Jersey, and it is important to understand why.3 He and I are in
complete agreement that there is a legitimate role for courts in
breaking the political stalemate that has brought us exclusionary
zoning, racial discrimination, and an unacceptable degree of social
distress in sheltering our people. But our different takes on the
Mount Laurel cases may explain why those cases have not sparked
a land-use revolution. Specifically, it is my view that Professor
Haar overvalues the importance of co-opting the private sector as a
key element in the success of the Mount Laurel process. I also believe that he overstates the case for the legitimacy of the New
Jersey Supreme Court's intervention into land-use policymaking by
not inquiring closely enough into the precise nature of the constitutional violation at hand and the possibility of different paths to the
goal of land-use equity.
THE MOUNT LAUREL STORY

In all likelihood, the reader whose attention has been drawn to
Suburbs Under Siege is already familiar with the New Jersey
ized in principle by the New Jersey Supreme Court. In January 1986, I argued (unsuccessfully) the Urban League portion of the so-called Mount LaurelIII case, described infra note
13 and accompanying text, before the supreme court, and in 1993 I represented the New
Jersey affiliate of the ACLU amicus curiae in the Warren Township case, described infra text

accompanying note 53. I was during this same period a founding member and President of
the Alliance for Affordable Housing, a coalition of public-interest groups that successfully
coordinated opposition to a proposed constitutional amendment that would (as its proponents urged on their bumper stickers) "Undo Mount Laurel Two." The Alliance also conducted the first major study of Mount Laurel compliance, see infra note 21. At present, I am
representing a statewide advocacy organization, New Jersey Future, in as yet unpublished
litigation against the Council on Affordable Housing that challenges approval of an inclusionary development on the basis that it violates the "sound planning" language in the second Mount Laurel case, see 456 A.2d at 430-31.

3. It has been expressly followed, and then only in a limited way, in New Hampshire. See
Britton v. Town of Chester, 595 A.2d 492 (N.H. 1991).

Mount Laurel

May 1998]

1687

Supreme Court's bold experiment in law reform, the Mount Laurel
doctrine, and it is not my intention to retell the story here under the
guise of reviewing the book. Nor, in all frankness, would I send the
reader to Professor Haar's account solely for the purpose of acquiring the narrative details of the events in question; while his telling
of the tale is serviceable, his real interest in telling it - and mine in
his telling - is so that he can then use the story as a case study in
judicial activism. 4
The Mount Laurel Litigation

Let this skeletal summary suffice, then. In 1971, 5 a team of
young legal services lawyers in Camden, New Jersey came to the aid
of black residents of Mount Laurel Township, a once-rural community that was rapidly developing as a bedroom suburb of
Philadelphia. Their goal was to break the municipality's exclusionary land use system, which consisted of zoning laws and habitability
codes operating in tandem to force demolition of the poor, rundown housing that was all the plaintiffs could afford - a chicken
coop in one notorious example - and to preclude the construction
of modest new homes and subsidized public housing that could
have given them safe, sanitary, and affordable alternatives. When
the case reached the New Jersey Supreme Court, it was welcomed
by Justice Frederick Hall, who had been campaigning within the
court for years to reform its excessive, deference to municipal autonomy in land-use matters.6 Justice Hall's opinion gave voice to
what is now known as the Mount Laurel doctrine:
We conclude that every such [developing] municipality must, by its
land use regulations, presumptively make realistically possible an appropriate variety and choice of housing.... at least to the extent of
the municipality's
fair share of the present and prospective regional
7

need therefor.

4. For an exhilarating recounting of the Mount Laurel story that fills in the bare outlines I
have sketched here, the reader will want to seek out DAVID L. KI'

Fr AL., OUR TowN:

RACE, HousING, AND THr SOUL OF SUBURBIA (1995).

5. Professor Haar erroneously dates the original lawsuit to 1974. Pp. 1, 17. The papers
were actually filed in May 1971; the trial court opinion was issued on May 1, 1972, see Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 290 A.2d 465 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1972), and the Supreme Court opinion on March 24, 1975, see Mt. Laurel 1, 336
A.2d 713.
6. Justice Hall's dissent in Vickers v. Gloucester Township, 181 A.2d 129, 140, 145 (N.J.
1962) (Hall, J., dissenting), is commonly regarded as the opening judicial salvo in the campaign that eventually resulted in the Mount Laurel doctrine.
7. Mount Laurel 1, 336 A.2d at 724. The "regional fair share" obligation of Mount Laurel
I was originally interpreted to apply only to "developing" municipalities such as Mount Laurel Township. See Mount LaurelIf, 456 A.2d at 422-23. This interpretation was modified in
Mount Laurel II to apply to all municipalities throughout the state, insofar as they had "in-

digenous" housing need. Municipalities that encompassed land that was identified on state
plans as appropriate for "growth" had further "fair share" obligations beyond their indige-

nous need. See 456 A.2d at 430.
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This first Mount Laurel opinion prompted furious political opposition, municipal intransigence, and a flood of lawsuits, but very little
actual progress toward breaking the back, of exclusionary zoning.
Then, in 1983, under the vigorous leadership of new chief justice
Robert Wilentz, the court issued a second major decision, Mount
Laurel 11,8 in which it reaffirmed the holding of the first Mount
Laurel case and outlined a sweeping set of remedial steps designed
to ensure that municipalities obeyed their obligations under the
New Jersey Constitution. Three specially assigned trial judges were
given responsibility for all Mount Laurel-related litigation throughout the state. They were told to develop a formula that would assign specific numerical "fair share" obligations to individual
municipalities, and they were authorized to grant "builder's remedies" to plaintiffs who successfully demonstrated that a municipality's land use ordinances were exclusionary. Pursuant to a
"builder's remedy," the successful developer-litigant could bypass
the local zoning and win a court order permitting its project to be
built, so long as the builder proposed an "inclusionary development" - that is, one in which at least twenty percent of the units
were made affordable to low- and moderate-income households. 9
The Legislative Response
When the Mount Laurel trial judges began implementing their
Mount Laurel II powers vigorously in 1984 and 1985, the legislature
finally responded, as the court had been urging it to do since 1975.
It enacted the Fair Housing Act of 1985,10 arguably the most progressive piece of state housing legislation anywhere in the country.
The Act's centerpiece was a new agency, the Council on Affordable
Housing (COAH), which was authorized to take over from the
courts the task of calculating housing obligations and certifying
compliance plans for any municipality that voluntarily submitted to
the Council's jurisdiction. The bait for doing so was that "substantively certified" municipalities were effectively immunized from
Mount Laurel litigation.1 1 The Act also authorized municipalities
to transfer up to fifty percent of their fair share obligations to other
municipalities pursuant to so-called Regional Contribution Agreements (RCAs), so long as the "sending" municipality also financed
the housing activity in the "receiving" municipality. 12 In practice,
8. 456 A.2d at 390. Justice Hall, the author of Mount Laurel I, retired from the court
shortly after that decision was announced and had died by the time Mount Laurel II was
decided.

9. See Mt. Laurel 11, 456 A.2d at 452. On inclusionary zoning generally, see ALAN
MALLAcH, INCLUSIONARY Housn~G PROGRAMS: POUcIES AND PRACrICES (1984).

10. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-301 to -329 (West 1986 & Supp. 1997).
11. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-322.
12. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-312.
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this permitted a reallocation of fair share housing obligations and the low-income housing itself - from all-White middle-class
suburbs to ,poorer and non-White urban centers.
In 1986, in Hills Development Co. v. Township of Bernards,13 the
New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act,
even while acknowledging that in some respects it diluted the methods of compliance that had been developed judicially. Since then,
the supreme court has largely withdrawn from the field. It has
tinkered at the edges, generally in ways that are helpful to the proponents of housing equity, 14 but has not revisited first principles, as
it did in Mount Laurel II. The process remains controversial, but
not at the white-heat level of a decade ago - when the governor
points by denouncing Mount Laurel II as
could score political
"communistic."'1 5 The Council on Affordable Housing has bent
over backward to accommodate municipal interests and concerns,
and while housing advocates have decried the slow pace of progress, they have lacked the political power to control the process to
the extent that they did in the courts.
In recounting all of this, Suburbs Under Siege takes an understated approach, but Professor Haar leaves no doubt about his admiration for the Mount Laurel doctrine and the judges that
produced it. He has a deft way of capturing points of the story in a
phrase that is just right; he describes the odious RCAs, for example,
as a "safety valve" (p. 114), the kind of messy compromise that politicians regularly craft and that judges must learn to accept if they
are to infiltrate the politician's turf in law reform cases. His characterization of the internal division between "the infantry of the trial
courts and the strategic headquarters of the supreme court" (p. 32)
puts into clear perspective a problem that bedeviled administration
of the first Mount Laurel opinion. Cases under the Mount Laurel
doctrine prior to 1983 were so numerous, so complex, and so never13. 510 A.2d 621 (NJ. 1986). Hills is often erroneously referred to as Mount Laurel III,
though Mount Laurel township was then no longer a party to any exclusionary zoning
litigation.
14. In addition to the two major cases discussed later in the text, Holmdel BuildersAssn.
v. Township of Holmdel, 583 A2d 277 (NJ. 1990) (upholding municipal authority to levy
development impact fees to support Mount Laurel compliance) and In re Warren Township,
622 A.2d 1257 (N.J. 1993) (limiting residency preferences in compliance plans), see, e.g.,
Prowitz v. Ridgefield Park Village, 584 A.2d 782 (N.J. 1991) (Mount Laurel units to be assessed for property tax purposes at controlled, rather than market, price). For a less helpful,
although arguably correct, decision, see Alexander's Department Stores, Inc. v. Borough of
Paramus,592 A.2d 1168 (N.J. 1991) (COAH does not have ancillary jurisdiction to resolve
conventional zoning disputes that derive from a municipality's certified fair share plan).
15. See KiP Er AL, supra note 4, at 121. The authors attribute the quote to an interview
in the New York 7imes but do not provide a citation. For one version of the remark, see
Robert Hanley, Some Jersey Towns, Giving in to Courts, Let in Modest Homes, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 29, 1984, at Al, reporting that Governor Kean, in an interview, described forced economic mixing as "a 'communist' concept."
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ending that the lower courts at times all but subverted Justice Hall's
mandate in order to make them go away. This explains why the
second Mount Laurel decision concentrated all implementing
power in three specially assigned trial judges, who would have primary loyalty to the Mount Laurel opinion and the process it mandated, without any other docket pressures. He also points out, with
just the right touch of irony, that a success of the Mount Laurel
doctrine was to force the breakdown of stereotypes about poverty
and race in the sensitive area of land use, where an instinctive defense of home can blind otherwise fair-minded people to the callousness of their attitudes: "Whenever a town absorbs new lowand moderate-income housing and the sky does not come tumbling
down, other communities will be that much more likely to take the
leap themselves" (p. 191).
Understanding the Mount Laurel Story
But I do not mean to suggest that the success of Suburbs Under
Siege is solely one of style, although the readable text and wellpaced eloquence are certainly welcome. Professor Haar also offers
a number of thoughtful insights into the Mount Laurel process itself. He notes, correctly, that Mount Laurel II does little to explicate the moral and ethical basis of the doctrine, a crucial judicial
mistake attributable, at least in part, to "hubris" on the part of the
chief justice (p. 48). He then continues with this summary passage,

which reveals the central problem of politics and judicial legitimacy:
With the wisdom born of the litigation that followed Mount Laurel II,
it is clear that the court should have focused more intensely on educating the public.... Mount Laurel II appears unwilling to stoop to
the concerns and queries of the average citizen. Indeed, the most resounding chord in the opinion is not the court's desire to explain the
necessity for, or the limited or temporary nature of, the judicial intervention, but a determination to put steel into its Mount Laurel Doctrine. [p. 50]
Other useful insights abound. Haar correctly notes that New
Jersey's Fair Housing Act and the ensuing COAH regulations codified the core, although not always the details, of the Mount Laurel
doctrine (p. 71) - a view quite unlike the more conventional view
of the Act, and of the Hills decision sustaining the Act, as a
"sellout." He points out that there is a strong parallel between the
role of the court-appointed "expert" or master in Mount Laurel
cases and the conventional role of a planner in advising governments as they make land-use decisions, 16 although he does not pursue the implications of this by also pointing out that the more the
court's work looks like conventional planning activity, the more it
16. P. 79.; see also p. 82 (emphasizing the political skills of the masters).
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appears to the average citizen to be encroaching on political terrain.
Haar provides a good, balanced summary and critique of the Fair

Housing Act and the Hills decision, in which he largely avoids the
winners-osers trap 17 -

if the municipalities won, then the good

guys must have lost. Haar also gets the Holmdel decision right,
pointing out that by essentially writing into the Act an authoriza-

tion for development fees to subsidize lower-income housing that
nowhere appears explicitly in the legislative text, the decision con-

the court's pre-Fair Housing Act pattern of
tinues and reaffirms
8
making policy.'
Inevitably, I have a number of small- and medium-sized cavils
about Professor Haar's recounting of the Mount Laurel story, many
of which are explainable by the different vantage points he and I
have on the case. Eventually, it would be good to have a Mount
Laurel memoir written by one of the original legal team, but I do
not want to detract from Professor Haar's accomplishment by
nitpicking. Rather, I see his book as the start of a dialogue about

the courts and land-use policy, and to that end I turn to two major
themes, the public-private balance and the legitimacy issue, about

which I do have serious reservations.
PROFITING IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST

A recurring, and somewhat surprising, theme of Professor
Haar's book is that the court wisely entrusted the prosecution of
exclusionary zoning cases to private developer-plaintiffs, rather
than to public-interest groups. The central compliance technique of
Mount Laurel 11, the builder's remedy, provided a huge profit incentive for private developers. Equally important, the case not only
shifted the initiative in Mount Laurel litigation from public-interest
plaintiffs to the private sector, it also dramatically reduced the risk
of litigation. The court simplified and objectified the Mount Laurel
rules so much that, in the infamous comment of one developer's
attorney, defeating a municipality "is as simple as clubbing baby
17. Pp. 96-98. He does miss a subtle, but key, point, however. To the extent that there
were clear winners and losers in Hills, the losers were those builders and public-interest
plaintiffs who were unable to prevent courts from transferring their cases to the newly created Council on Affordable Housing, so as to avoid a long hiatus while the COAH drafted its
substantive rules. This delay was not mandated by the Act, which permitted the courts to
retain cases where there would be a "manifest injustice" in transferring them, see N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 52:27D-316[a], a standard that easily could have been met by cases that had been in
litigation for a decade or more and were, in some instances, literally within days of final
judicial resolution. See Hills, 510 A.2d at 635 (noting that the final Cranbury Township hearing was scheduled for December 2, 1985, 35 days before oral argument in Hills). By the time
the transferred cases began emerging from COAH in 1988 and 1989, the huge building boom
of the 1980s was deflating rapidly, and a great deal of affordable housing that could have
been built in inclusionary developments was lost or seriously delayed.
18. P. 120 (analyzing Holmdel, 583 A.2d 277 (N.J. 1990)).
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seals." 19 Prior to Mount Laurel II, there had been a mixture of
public and private plaintiffs; the actual Mount Laurel case had no
private developers participating as parties until after the decision in
Mount Laurel I in 1975. Between 1983 and 1986, more than a hundred private developer suits were filed against some seventy municipalities, and no new public interest suits were filed. 20
The "Builder's Remedy"
Commentators have generally applauded the court's endorsement of the builder's remedy, and with some justification; co-opting
the private housing market in an era of declining public subsidies
for low- and moderate-income housing produced results in the early
years after Mount Laurel II that would have been otherwise unobtainable. 21 But Professor Haar warns us that these results came at a
price - "the builder's remedy narrowed the scope of latent solutions, and once unleashed, it was potentially powerful enough to
distort the impact of the Mount Laurel Doctrine" (p. 45). He is
certainly right about that. As I have explained elsewhere, the ability to provide land to build "inclusionary developments" in satisfaction of the builder's remedy became the be-all and end-all of the
compliance process, so much so that inclusionary zoning is now
welded permanently into the fair share rules of the Council on Affordable Housing.22 Through a "vacant land adjustment"2 3 and a
fair-share calculation based on the concept of the "reasonable development potential" 24 of the municipality, the COAH rules essentially exclude Mount Laurel compliance where large, new
inclusionary developments are not feasible, such as in most of the
older, built-up parts of the state. This is certainly, in Professor
Haar's language, a "distortion" of the intent of Mount Laurel II (p.
45).
Haar also recognizes the broader implications of the reliance on
private sector builder-plaintiffs:
[I]t became clearer, as lawsuits accumulated, that the builders were in
there for their own profit, and that this was not an unalloyed good.
Adam Smith (or perhaps Hobbes) was proven right again. Most
builders were ready to make any kind of agreement with a municipality - even where the outcome fed the exclusionary quality of the
19. The quotation in the text is a paraphrase. Not surprisingly for a remark so flamboy-

ant, it can be found in KIRP ET AL., supra note 4, at 105, rather than Suburbs Under Siege.
20. See Alan Mallach, The Tortured Reality of Suburban Exclusion: Zoning, Economics,
and the Future of the Berenson Doctrine, 4 PACE ENVT.. L. Rpv. 37, 119 (1986).
21. See Martha Lamar et al., Mount Laurel at Work: Affordable Housing in New Jersey,
1983-1988, 41 RUTGERS L. Rnv. 1197, 1210 (1989).
22. See statutes cited infra notes 23-24.
23. See N.J. ADMiN. CODE tit. 5 § 93-4.2 (1998).
24. N.J. ADMIn. CODE tit. 5 § 93-4.2(e)-(g).
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zoning ordinance - as long as they obtained the zoning changes that
"I had less uneasiness about the
would enhance their own profit ....

whole litigation process when a public interest group was the plaintiff,
rather than a builder. Therefore I felt less of a need for the court
appointed master in the public interest cases," explained one of the
Mount Laurel judges. [pp. 63-64]

Professor Haar quickly puts this trenchant criticism aside, however. He describes the builder's remedy at one point as "the grand
strategy for achieving social reform without dependence on the

political actors within the executive and administrative branches
who might have resisted the Mount Laurel Doctrine or imple-

mented it in a hostile spirit." 25 Results count, in other words; the
end justifies the means. He was right in his initial skepticism, however. There were other "latent solutions" to the problem of providing lower-income housing in the suburbs, and he not only misses an

opportunity to explore why they remained "latent," he falls into
what I regard as the most serious error in his overall telling of the
Mount Laurel story. To understand why this is so, I need to drop
back for a moment and introduce a specific example. 26
Private Remedies, in Action: Cranbury Township

Cranbury Township, which Haar mentions only in passing (p.
111), was a defendant in the Urban League litigation, one of the six
cases that composed Mount Laurel 11.27 Cranbury Township

presented a picture far different from the Mount Laurel Township
25. P. 146; see'also p. 134 ("[T]he courts cleverly buttressed themselves by enlisting the
business sector").
26. I note here in passing that Suburbs Under Siege does not dig into the storytelling of
post-1983 events with the same thoroughness that it applies to telling the story of Mount
Laurel Township. By the time of the Hills decision in 1986, Mount Laurel Township had
settled its litigation and was no longer a significant player in the Mount Laurel story, and this
leaves the storytelling without a focus. As a result, Professor Haar's discussion of the consequences of Mount Laurel II through implementation, legislation, and finally administrative
procedures lacks the strong anchor in practical reality that informs the earlier part of the
book. Much more attention needs to be given to the day-to-day implementation of the doctrine in the cases that became prominent after 1983. These cases can be told as stories, just as
the Mount Laurel Township story is told, so that they are not known only from the slender
evidence of the published judicial decisions. The lack of a strong, specific storytelling focus
may be what leads Professor Haar astray in his enthusiasm for the market solution to the
Mount Laurel problem, as I shall try to show by telling a bit more of the post-1983 Mount
Laurel story.
27. Urban League of Greater New Brunswick v. Mayor of Carteret, 359 A.2d 526 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976), revd., 406 A.2d 1322 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979), modified,
336 A.2d 713 (NJ. 1975). The narrative that follows in the text is based on my personal
experiences during the UrbanLeague litigation. I became co-counsel to the Urban League of
Greater New Brunswick - it later changed its name to the Civic League of Greater New
Brunswick - at the time of the remand and participated extensively in the subsequent proceedings. Documentation is available in the author's voluminous but unpublished litigation
files in the case, which are available at Rutgers Law School for inspection by interested
readers.
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of 1970. Although Cranbury's land-use ordinances were hopelessly
exclusionary - at least as Justice Hall would have understood the
term - the town had better reasons to regret growth than did
Mount Laurel. A small farming village surrounded by actively
worked fields, its Main Street and adjacent residential district, dating from the turn of the nineteenth century, were listed on the National Register of Historic Places. "Preserving" Cranbury was an
instantly marketable idea, the value of which could be understood
readily by the average citizen of goodwill. Unfortunately for
Cranbury, however, holding back time was not really an option: it
was served by an adjacent exit on the New Jersey Thrnpike, it was
five miles or so due east of the burgeoning Route One Corridor
area of office and research parks centered on Princeton University,
and its elegant older homes made it a favorite for upper-level bureaucrats and private-sector lobbyists working in Trenton, the state
capital, just a few miles to the south. Nor did Cranbury Township
totally resist change, so long as it was in the form of tax-paying
commercial development or upscale, large-lot subdivisions.
Cranbury was, in short, an exclusionary community whose land-use
ordinances stood in violation of the New Jersey Constitution, but in
remedying that wrong there was a significant risk that the courts
would do more harm than good by creating yet another example of
a nice community ruined by sprawl development.
Prior to the decision in Mount Laurel II, Cranbury Township
was in litigation on two fronts, against the Urban League plaintiffs
- a public-interest group acting directly on behalf of lower-income
people - and against a private builder's-remedy plaintiff whose
principals included Carl Bisgaier, the lawyer who had brought the
original Mount Laurel suit in 1970. Bisgaier and his colleagues,
who remained committed to the social goals of the Mount Laurel
doctrine, were out to prove that those goals could be combined with
profitmaking in what might be seen as a form of socially responsible
capitalism. Cranbury fought both plaintiffs fiercely.
After Mount Laurel 11, however, it did not require rocket science to realize the profit potential of a builder's remedy. Cranbury,
with its historic district, sylvan fields, and access to high-end employment, became a magnet for Mount Laurel lawsuits. Within a
few months of the Mount Laurel II decision, eight additional developers sued Cranbury, offering a total of more than three thousand
acres for development. 28 Had all of this land been developed as
proposed, some 12,223 dwelling units would have been built at
gross densities ranging from 4.8 to 10 dwelling units per acre; of
28. See Cranbury Township Comm. & Planning Bd., Mount Laurel II Compliance Pro-

gram 1-2 (maps), tbl. 6 (Dec. 1984) (unpublished document on fie with author) [hereinafter
Compliance Program].
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these, 2444 units would have been set aside for low- and moderateincome -

that is, Mount Laurel -

households, 2 9 more than the

total number of Mount Laurelunits that were eventually built statewide in the five years after 1983.30 Cranbury, at the time of the
of 1927 people and approximately
1980 Census, had a population
31
750 occupied dwelling units.
The Urban League plaintiffs did not disagree that this amount
of development was much more than a small community could realistically absorb over a short period of time, nor did they disagree
that this amount of development would present potentially serious
planning problems - including the destruction of valuable farmland. Had the Urban League been in the lawsuit by itself, these
concerns would have been addressed with a view not only to building affordable housing but to the larger public interest as well.
Each proffered site, and perhaps others, would have been examined
by the plaintiff's experts for compliance purposes. But because
none of the landowners or developers would have had a preemptive
builder's-remedy claim in this alternative scenario, any one site
could have been passed over had the Urban League and Cranbury
chosen to do so in proposing a settlement to the court. Indeed, the
Urban League would have been free 'to discuss with the township
alternate ways of encouraging low- and moderate-income housing
that did not involve inclusionary zoning at all.
This is exactly what happened in the neighboring township,
Plainsboro, where for idiosyncratic reasons, the Urban League litigated by itself, without a single builder's-remedy claimant. 32 Plainsboro informed the Urban League that it would settle quickly to
reduce litigation costs, so long as it could settle without a major
infusion of new inclusionary developments. The town had grown
rapidly from an agricultural village to a sprawl of garden apartments during the 1970s, and it had learned its planning lesson, even
if a bit belatedly. An innovative settlement was concluded in due
course that involved only 200 units in an inclusionary development
-

forty of which were for Mount Laurel households. The remain-

der of Plainsboro's fair share was to be met partly in a subsidized
development consisting of 413 Mount Laurel rental units with no
market rate units, and partly by taking development fees from new
commercial developments in the Route One corridor and applying
the money to buy down the cost of 120 rental units already in place
29. Id. at tbl.6, col. 7.
30. See Lamar et al., supra note 21, at 1210.
31. Compliance Program,supra note 28, at 4.
32. As with Cranbury, the Plainsboro narrative is drawn from my personal experience
during the litigation and is documented in litigation files as explained supra note 27.
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from the earlier phases of Plainsboro's
growth - a kind of home33
grown housing voucher program.
In Cranbury, however, the builder-plaintiff sites drove out all
strategies other than inclusionary zoning. No one could stop the
builder plaintiffs from suing, and once they did, the supreme court
had decreed, in effect, that at least one of them had valuable
"rights." Worse, the glut of would-be builder's-remedy claimants
made it impossible for the Urban League and any single builder
plaintiff to settle with the township, because the losers were virtually guaranteed to challenge the settlement in court, eliminating any
time-and-money incentive to settle in the first place. The Urban
League had no choice but to sit by in frustration while the feeding
frenzy proceeded apace, knowing that the defendant municipality
was also sitting by, not in frustration, but in the enviable position of
being able to avoid serious talk about settling a case that it could
not win on the merits, hoping that the various plaintiffs would eventually exhaust themselves. In the end, it was not exhaustion but
passage of time that mattered most, and Cranbury eventually did
emerge as the winner. Cranbury was still in the midst of the courtsupervised remedial process -

violation of the Mount Laurel doc-

trine had already been determined by Judge Serpentelli - when
the Fair Housing Act and the Hills decision transferred the whole
mess to COAH.3 4 COAH reduced the township's fair share
number from 816 to 153, and most of the builder plaintiffs got nothing - including the Bisgaier group, which had borne the expense of
litigation for years and which sold its site for development of expensive single-family homes on large lots when it became clear that it
35
could not prevail with its inclusionary plan.
33. See Urban League of GreaterNew Brunswick v. Mayor of Carteret,Consent OrderRe:
PlainsboroTownship, No. C-4122-73 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Apr. 22, 1985). This settle-

ment later collapsed because the key subsidy for the 100% Mount Laurel development, taxsheltered depreciation write-offs, was eliminated by Congress in the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
See Tracy A. Kaye, Sheltering Social Policy in the Tax Code: The Low-Income Housing

Credi4 38 VILL. L. Rnv. 871, 883 nn.62-64 (1993). But the principle behind the settlement
remains sound: without a clutter of builder plaintiffs, a broader range of strategies can be
considered seriously. The Plainsboro settlement could be roughly replicated today using the
Low Income Housing Tax Credits that Congress eventually provided to replace the traditional tax-sheltering schemes. See id.
34. See Hills Dev. Co. v. Township of Bernards, 510 A.2d 621, 635 (N.J. 1986).
35. COAH eventually certified Cranbury's Mount Laurel compliance plan in 1987. See
COAH, Mediation Report-Cranbury Township/Middlesex County, Audrey M. Winkler, Me-

diator, Aug. 24, 1987. The plan included an RCA transfer of 76 units to Perth Amboy, New
Jersey, an old and poor port town at the mouth of the Raritan River; rehabilitation of 10

units of substandard existing housing; and two developments totaling 58 units. One was a
senior citizen development, 100% low and moderate units, tucked in behind the historic
Main Street shops and houses, adjacent to the public school and athletic field, and barely
encroaching on the farm fields that stretched west from the village. The other was an inclu-

sionary development of large, single-family homes on large lots, also sited as an extension of
the existing village, and in this instance moving toward the highways that had already obliterated the rural character of the village in that direction. Most significant, the inclusionary

-
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The Urban League plaintiffs did try at one point to unclog the
Cranbury litigation by supporting the township in a motion to strike
the largest builder's remedy claimant on the ground that the developer, Lawrence Zirinsky, had used Mount Laurel as a "threat" to
obtain other favorable, non-Mount Laurel development approvals
before intervening as a Mount Laurel plaintiff. Professor Haar
speaks favorably of the "threat" language in Mount Laurel II as a
"further hedge[ ] about a remedy so powerful" (p. 45), but he does
not connect it to the Cranbury experience. If he had, he might not
have been so approving. To the astonishment of the other builderplaintiffs, who thought that a public-interest party would, by definition, support them uncritically since they were offering to build
lower-income housing, the Urban League argued that the court
should define the "threat" exception to eliminate plaintiffs who did
not come to the court "clean" - that is, whose first offer to the
town was not for Mount Laurel housing. Unless the court adopted
such a rule, the Urban League argued, the exact kind of tangle that
was strangling the Cranbury litigation would result. Judge
Serpentelli, perhaps understanding the supreme court's preference
for private litigants better than the Urban League did, denied the
motion. The "hedge," in other words, was flimsy and has not, so far
as I am aware, had any significant use in the years since Mount
Laurel II.
The Limits of Privatization
As for Professor Haar, there is no guessing about his admiration
for the use of private litigants as the primary moving force in the
Mount Laurel story, and this is the least successful theme of Suburbs Under Siege. Although Haar makes a gesture toward the
public-interest bar by describing the "unusual combination of energies" that resulted when both public and private parties were bringing cases, he proceeds immediately to praise "[t]he rare coincidence
of private- and public-sector interests [that] testifies to the ingenuity of Mount Laurel II in harnessing the expertise and profit drive
of the private sector -

the developer -

in order to achieve a pub-

lic end" (p. 63). It is the private sector, in other words, that he sees
as essential to making the Mount Laurel doctrine a success. Nor is
it simply that he sees the private sector as a useful addition to the
mix; he appears to be deeply skeptical about the capacity of the
public-interest bar to sustain this type of litigation. Thus, in a pasMount Laurel -

units in this latter project are four-family units fitted into structures that

have the scale and massing of the adjacent single-family homes, so that they do not appear

incongruous in context. Except for the RCA and the smaller fair share, Cranbury's compliance plan easily could have been accepted by the Urban League plaintiffs in 1984. But the
hammerlock of the builder's remedy made that kind of negotiation impossible.
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sage soon after the words quoted above, he criticizes public-interest
plaintiffs for delaying compliance in one unnamed case for six years
because "they were not.., equipped to monitor the development
process" (p. 64). He is certainly correct that compliance dragged on
for years in many cases, but it did so for a variety of reasons including municipal creativity in finding ways to slow the process and these problems were not confined to the public interest cases.36
Moreover, as the Cranbury experience demonstrates, the "unusual
combination of energies" that Professor Haar applauds at least
nominally - the mix of public-interest and developer plaintiffs has at least as much potential for slowing down the process as it
does for benefiting from the enforcement capacity of the private
sector.
Professor Haar's enthusiasm for private remedies leads him to
several debatable conclusions. He is much too generous, for example, in appraising the work of COAH. I doubt that there is any
public-interest housing advocate in the state of New Jersey who
would agree with him that COAH has adopted an "aggressive posture in pursuing the Mount Laurel doctrine" (p. 104). As Professor
Haar recognizes and describes accurately elsewhere in his book (pp.
92-93), the Fair Housing Act was adopted only grudgingly by a legislature in a political bind: home rule notwithstanding, it had to do
something to get the courts off the back of outraged municipalities.
COAH was set up to dissipate constitutional pressure, not to further expand constitutional confrontation by pursuing aggressive
new policies. As I have explained, however, 37 COAH incorporated
into its rules a single-minded focus on measuring compliance
through large-scale inclusionary developments constructed by private developers, and this is apparently what Professor Haar sees as
COAH's "aggressive" stance. Maybe so, but only to the extent that
the public's interest in affordable housing coincides with the private
interest of large-scale developers. Suburbs UnderSiege does not do
36. For one example, see Urban League of GreaterNew Brunswick v. Mayor of Carteret,
RestrainingOrder re: Old Bridge Township, No. C-4122-73 (N.J. May 31, 1985) (Serpentelli,
J.). The builder was Oakwood at Madison, which had won the first builder's remedy that the
New Jersey Supreme Court approved, see Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of
Madison, 371 A.2d 1192 (NJ. 1977). The development could not be built in the housing

recession of the late 1970s, and the Urban League, investigating the status of the township's
compliance in 1984 after Mount Laurel II, found that the township, whose name had since
been changed to Old Bridge, already had approved a market rate "phase" of the Oakwood
development, without making any provision for the required Mount Laurel units. Because
the normal rule in Mount Laurel development is that the lower-income units must be phased
with the market units, to prevent the developer from walking away at the end with the subsidized units unbuilt, the Urban League had little difficulty persuading Judge Serpentelli that

stem measures were in order. But the episode demonstrates that in proving "Adam Smith
(or perhaps Hobbes) ... right again," as Professor Haar puts it (p. 63), there is no obvious
reason to prefer private to public litigants in Mount Laurel cases.

37. See supra text accompanying notes 23-24.
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much to identify, let along explicate, the inherent tension between
these two interests.
Later, in commenting on the court's willingness to uphold the
Fair Housing Act, which undercuts some of the remedies developed
by the Mount Laurel judges, Professor Haar offers the astonishing
comment that "[h]ad there been more visible support from public
interest groups, the court might have struggled harder [in Hills] to
make the actions of the three trial judges more broadly applicable
and to elaborate still further the principles of its doctrine" (p. 98).
What Professor Haar overlooks is that by embracing the builder's
remedy, the private-sector remedy, so wholeheartedly, the court, in
effect, drove the public-interest bar out of the Mount Laurel area.
Although public-interest litigation often depends heavily on the unpaid labors of volunteer attorneys, planning experts, and others, it
still is not free; the Urban League litigation was supported by a
substantial grant from a New Jersey foundation to pay for depositions, travel expenses of witnesses, and so forth. Furthermore,
volunteerism has its limits. To be done well, public-interest litigation requires paid counsel that can devote adequate time to the
case, just as any private-interest litigant would prefer. Thus, it remains a total mystery to me why the supreme court was so willing
to award private-sector Mount Laurel litigants a substantial financial "bonus" in the form of a builder's remedy, while at the same
time explicitly denying civil rights attorney's fees to public-interest
plaintiffs. 38
The baneful results of this tilt toward privatization include some
of those that Professor Haar himself notes, but which he ultimately
seems willing to disregard in his admiration for the court's genius in
co-opting the private sector. Criticizing the standard 4:1 ratio of
market rate to Mount Laurel units as too rigid, he observes that
"[a]s time passed, it became clear that the court's formula had not
squeezed the developers hard enough" (p. 166). But if the builders
are the only parties before the courts, who is to do the squeezing?
Certainly not the builders, whose profit margins are at stake. Haar
points out that the emphasis on the builder's remedy shrinks the
range of possible solutions, which in turn exacerbates the publicrelations problem that he criticizes the court for not dealing with
effectively. Because the builder's remedy gobbles up land - four
units of market-rate housing to build each Mount Laurel unit inclusionary zoning is a fat target for anyone who is concerned
about overdevelopment and sprawl. This in turn provides a conve38. The New Jersey Rules of Court, NJ. R. Cr. 4:42-9, lists all of those cases in which fees

are recoverable, without including Mount Laurel. The unavailability of state fees is implicit
in Urban League v. Mayor of the Borough of Carteret,559 A.2d 1369 (NJ. 1989) (denying a
fee claim under federal attorney's fee law).
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nient cover for those whose exclusionary motives are less admirable. As Haar correctly notes, the Mount Laurel process "may be
faulted for failing to stress rental housing" (p. 166). This is of critical importance to low-income families, because they often lack the
cash reserves and credit history to qualify for even a subsidized
home purchase. But this dearth of rental housing results not because, as Professor Haar suggests, the trial judges and masters
failed to require it; it results because the private sector did not want
to build it and would not participate - even for the reward of a
builder's remedy - if rental was a condition.3 9
Moreover, reliance on the private sector causes some of the disinterest among public-interest groups that Professor Haar decries.
It is true that many of those whose advocacy is on behalf of the
seriously poor have lost interest in the Mount Laurel process, but
the overemphasis on the builder's remedy bears a significant share
of the blame. The typical builder's willingness to subsidize Mount
Laurel units ceases at about the point where a household earns less
than forty percent of the regional median income. Even though
techniques are available to adjust the mix in an inclusionary development so that families below this income level can be made eligible, most developers simply balk. So Mount Laurel is left open to
the criticism that it does not serve the interests of the "poorest of
the poor," those whose plight makes the most appealing case for
changing public policy. The criticism is at least in part justified, but
Professor Haar misses an opportunity to explain how the court
missed an opportunity to make things better by thinking harder
about the role of public-interest agencies in the process.
A Role for Public-InterestPlaintiffs
The supreme court got it exactly backward, I would argue, and
in applauding the court's approach, so does Professor Haar. Because "Adam Smith (or Hobbes)" is alive and well in the spirit of
the business community, the court should have recognized that the
natural seat of public-interest law reform is in the public-interest
community (p. 63). The court should have taken steps to bolster
the ability of civil rights organizations, legal services offices, and
other civic groups to investigate, sue, and then monitor compliance
with Mount Laurel orders, through the simple device of civil rights
attorney's fees on the model of federal law.4 0 In the extreme, one
could argue that the builder's remedy, the most celebrated feature
39. Note, for example, that in the Urban League settlement with Plainsboro Township,

supra note 33, the public-interest plaintiffs bargained for 413 of 453 new construction units to

be rental rather than sales units, by relying on not-for-profit and public sponsorship and
avoiding private market developers.

40. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1994).
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of the Mount Laurel doctrine, was unnecessary. All the court
needed to do was to endorse the concept of inclusionary zoning.
Public-interest plaintiffs then would have looked for appropriate inclusionary sites and cooperated with willing developers, retaining,
along with the courts, some greater measure of discretion to avoid
having to approve a development just because a builder had a
"remedy."
But a court did not need to go as far as to take this extreme
position. Public-interest and builder's-remedy claims could both
have been allowed, had the court recognized that the builder's remedy -

the inducement to sue -

was unnecessary when there was

already a competent public-interest litigant handling the case. In
Cranbury, for example, the Urban League plaintiffs had been in the
litigation for years; it was ludicrous even to consider rewarding the
late-coming builders as if they were the ones responsible for proving Cranbury's ordinance unconstitutional. 41 Had it retained control of the litigation, the Urban League would have considered the
various builder sites and proposed the best ones to the town for
settlement, and Cranbury likely would have had affordable housing
in the ground years earlier than actually occurred.
That the model I am describing would have worked is not just
speculation - it did work. Piscataway Township, another township
included in the Urban League suit, had experienced rapid growth
because of a new interstate highway across its northern edge, and it
was therefore suitable for inclusionary zoning solutions. Initially,
however, no builder's-remedy plaintiffs were involved in the case
because Piscataway, unlike Cranbury, was open to development.
Developers did not need the Hobbesian Mount Laurel wedge to
gain access to the community. Instead, the public-interest plaintiffs
spent an agonizing period of discovery, poring over township tax
maps with their planning expert, and eventually taking three full
days of deposition testimony from the township's planner, to identify and evaluate every significant piece of vacant, developable land
for possible inclusion in the court-ordered compliance plan. Only
then did inclusionary developers begin to pay attention, but on the
public-interest plaintiffs' terms - which included genuine concern
for sound planning solutions. 42
41. Judge Serpentelli did deny some would-be builder's-remedy plaintiffs the right to intervene, but on the kind of old-fashioned civil procedure ground that Professor Haar decries

elsewhere, see p. 137, namely, that the intervention came on the eve of trial and would disrupt the discovery schedule.

42. See Urban League of Greater New Brunswick v. Carteret, Letter-Opinion, No. C4122-73, July 23,1985 (unpublished); Urban League of Greater New Brunswick v. Mayor and
Council of Borough of Carteret, Judgment as to Piscatawy, No. C-4122-73, Sept. 17, 1985. It
is also interesting to note in this regard that the largest inclusionary developer in New Jersey,
the K. Hovnanian Company of Red Bank, has seldom if ever, so far as I am aware, been a
builder's-remedy plaintiff in a Mount Laurel case. Rather than assuming an adversarial role
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If I am critical of Professor Haar's analysis of "public interest"
and "market" solutions to the Mount Laurel problem, and I am, it
also bears stating that his is the prevailing wisdom and mine the
dissenting view. I have dwelt on it here at some length in part because Professor Haar's lifelong commitment to sound planning values, which ought to have made him skeptical of the builder's
remedy, apparently was not enough to overcome the siren song of
the quick and tangible results that could be obtained from the
court's potentially Faustian bargain with the developers. This tells
me that revising the conventional wisdom will not be easy. My concerns also relate directly to the "legitimacy" and "public relations"
themes of his book, to which I now turn, because in my view the
popular stereotype of the builder's remedy and, on occasion, the
tangible evidence of its misuse - suburban sprawl development have been a very large factor in the inability of the courts and the
public interest community to sell the Mount Laurel doctrine as a
legitimate exercise of public policy.
AcrIVIST CouRTs: THE MOUNTLAUREL PROCESS

Suburbs Under Siege hits its stride at about the midpoint, where
Professor Haar shifts his focus from narrative to critique; the heart
of his thesis is found in Chapters Ten and Eleven, entitled, respectively, "Leadership in Institutional Reform: Rallying Support for a
Vision," and "The Last Recourse: Why Judges Intervene." The
two chapters should be considered in reverse order, however. The
"Leadership" chapter, which is very brief, criticizes the New Jersey
Supreme Court for not "selling" its Mount Laurel decisions effectively to the public. But selling the decisions assumes that the justices had a legitimate basis for rendering them in the first place, and
so "Why Judges Intervene" is really the first and more important
question.
A Theory of JudicialActivism
Professor Haar's answer is succinct:
The Mount Laurel litigations bring to the fore the residual role of
the courts in the checks-and-balances system of a constitutional democracy. Local governments, ordinarily endowed with total discretion in the exercise of zoning power, are found to be seriously and
chronically in constitutional default. In such a state of affairs,
and engendering the animosity of the township - on whose goodwill the developer inevitably depends for numerous small matters during the course of development - Hovnanian
typically came in after a Mount Laurel suit was finished, acquired the compliance site, and

thereafter built what is generally regarded to be a very acceptable affordable housing product. Achieving Mount Laurel goals, in other words, is not dependent so much on the

builder's remedy as it is on inclusionary zoning, which public-interest plaintiffs are quite capable of negotiating.
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whatever a court's adherence to the separation of powers as usually

enunciated or whatever the loyalty to the conventional division of
powers among the levels of government as typically argued, the strict

rules of judicial insulation become inapposite. [p. 175]
The "usual," "conventional," or "typical" rules of separation of
powers can be set aside, he argues, because it is both "appropriate"
and "necessary" to vest in the courts "a residual role" (pp. 175-82).
It is appropriatefor four reasons: because a constitutional right is
at stake (p. 176); because the courts are institutionally disinterested
other than in the correct application of the rules of law (p. 176);
because courts, unlike legislatures, are capable of acting as trustees
for future generations against the "long-term, potentially irreversible, and frequently incalculable harms" of present-day political
decisionmaking (p. 177); and because it is a peculiar characteristic
of the judicial system that it can stimulate "reasoned discourse"
about "a more generous vision of the social order" than can the
political process (p. 177). It is necessary, in the Mount Laurel cases,
because there is no reason to believe that the political system will
correct the violation of the constitutional order on its own and because the decentralization of political power in state and local governments makes it impossible to bring a regional perspective to
land use issues (p. 181).

Some of this framework is essentially unarguable. The dynamic
of modem-day politics certainly places a premium on short-term
fixes that can pay off before the next election rather than on longterm solutions -

particularly if they carry short term costs

-

and

land-use decisionmaking is extremely fragmented because of the
tradition of deference to local control in this field. Beyond these
basic points, however, agreement fades. Even if we can readily accept that judges are more likely to keep an eye on the interests of
future generations, the future remains essentially unknowable, even
to conscientious judges. Thus, it may not be obvious to the present
generation that a judicial decision is legitimate simply because it is
forward-looking. Nor, in connection with political fragmentation
and the abuses of local control, is it correct to identify the state
courts as the only institution with a sufficiently broad perspective to
correct any perceived abuses. The governor and the state legislature have a statewide perspective, even if imperfect. To many people, these political institutions' acceptance of a decentralized landuse process reflects the legitimate resolution of the pushes and pulls
of a myriad of interest groups. In the abstract, I would agree readily with Professor Haar that the enlightened New Jersey Supreme
Courts of Justice Hall and Chief Justice Wilentz had the capacity to
do a better job than the governors and legislatures of those times at
reforming the abuses of land-use power - witness Governor
Kean's "communistic" crack - but the "best" solution is not neces-
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sarily the only solution that can claim to be a legitimate one in a
complex world. On the factors thus far enumerated, Professor
Haar's claims for the legitimacy of structural reform litigation and
judicial decisionmaking have a slightly conclusory or makeweight
character about them.
Professor Haar's broader claims are also problematic. For example, one has to approach his assertion that courts are "disinterested" with caution. The disinterestedness of judges has been the
classic defense of the legitimacy of judicial review since the time of
John Marshall and Marbury v. Madison.43 But as Professor Haar
himself carefully acknowledges, "pressed by the force of events,
even the court may become an advocate for a particular position or
side" (p. 176). His solution, imposing "curbs" on judges - "both
traditional and adjusted for the new situation" - that will "confine
too extensive an exercise of discretion" (p. 176; emphasis added),
will not do much to persuade the skeptical observer that judges are
truly "disinterested," at least without a much more thorough exploration of what may constitute "too extensive" an exercise of legitimate judicial power.
Finding the ConstitutionalBasis for JudicialActivism
The core of the problem with Professor Haar's justification for
an activist judiciary, at least as revealed through the example of the
Mount Laurel cases, lies in his first premise - namely, that there is
an unredressed constitutional violation that will remain unredressed unless the court intervenes and acts for the benefit of the
victims of such behavior. In principle, he is certainly correct. Our
preference for legislative control in a democratic society notwithstanding, when the legislature disregards the constitution, as New
Jersey's did in the eight years between Mount Laurel I and Mount
Laurel II and even for some years thereafter, Professor Haar is
surely right to say that the legislature has forfeited much of its claim
to primacy. Judicial action becomes necessary - that is, legitimate
- to vindicate the higher mandate of the constitution itself (p.
177). So, too, it is easier to accept a judge's slipping from disinterestedness to advocacy, for present as well as future generations,
when such one-sidedness is on behalf of an accepted constitutional
principle. Holmes and Brandeis were not disinterested when it
came to the First Amendment, but their views are now accepted as
legitimate nonetheless.
But is there an accepted constitutional principle that undergirds
the vigorous and controversial activism of the Mount Laurel cases?
The simple answer, and the one that apparently convinces Professor
43. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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Haar that he need go no farther, is that in Mount Laurel I the New
Jersey Supreme Court held that there was a constitutional principle
that had been violated - the principle of regional "fair share" that
Justice Hall found to be embodied in the constitutional concept of
"general welfare." As a constitutional lawyer, I have no quarrel
with the New Jersey Supreme Court's analytic use of the general
welfare approach, but in accepting it as the basis for explaining the
legitimacy of the court's activist stance in political terms to the lay
public, Professor Haar inevitably commits himself to an argument
that is, again, a bit circular. The New Jersey Constitution does not
contain the phrase "fair share," and the phrase "general welfare" is,
well, general. It can mean many things to many people, and one can
certainly perceive how the average person in the street - particularly if that person is faced with an unpopular order to rezone in his
or her backyard for development that he or she does not welcome
- might think that the court interpreted the constitution the way it
did in order to be able to pursue, as the modem-day conservative
would have it, its liberal agenda.44
This problem of the relationship between judicial legitimacy and
the general welfare theory has dogged the Mount Laurel process
from the outset. I wrote about it in 1976; 45 less friendly critics have
heaped scorn on the theory.46 I regret that Professor Haar did not

turn his formidable experience and analytic skills more fully to the
problem. In saying this, I hope that I am not falling into the customary book-review mode of complaining that the author should
have written the book that I think he should have written. Without
a more probing inquiry into the condition precedent of a popularly
acceptable constitutional theory crying out for enforcement, Professor Haar's very valuable analysis of the conditions subsequent that
justify judicial activism simply does not persuade those who, unlike
me, are not already persuaded.
The uncompleted task of Professor Haar's analysis, therefore, is
to inquire whether a reformulation of the underlying constitutional
obligation that animates the Mount Laurel doctrine might lay a better, stronger foundation for convincing the fair-minded citizen-inthe-street that judicial intervention was both appropriate and neces44. Application of the general welfare concept is, after all, essentially the doctrine of
substantive due process, which has had scant legitimacy even in more sophisticated profes-

sional circles since the demise of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). While substantive
due process is still encountered fairly often in state courts, the lack of clear standards for its
use ought to send state courts the same warning signals about legitimacy as are so clearly sent
and received under federal law.
45. See John M. Payne, Delegation Doctrine in the Reform of Local Government Law:
The Case of Exclusionary Zoning, 29 RUTGERS L. REv. 803, 808-19 (1976).
46. See, e.g., Jerome G. Rose, New Additions to the Lexicon of Exclusionary Zoning Litigation, 14 SEroN HALL L. REv. 851, 865 (1984).
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sary in order to foster a just reordering of society's use of land. 47
Without limiting the possibility that other theories might also meet
the test of legitimacy as I discuss it here, 48 I propose that the theory
that cries out for reincorporation into the Mount Laurel doctrine is
that of race discrimination.
Race and Exclusionary Zoning
A singular aspect of the first Mount Laurel case is that it totally
eschewed race in favor of economic discrimination as the basis for
its holding, although there was not much doubt, then or now, that
racial concerns play a large part in suburban attitudes toward lowincome housing. Hindsight suggests that the court may have made
the wrong choice, at least insofar as protecting its own legitimacy is
concerned. At the time, however, the focus on economic class
rather than race seemed quite inspired. The law of race discrimination was the law of the Federal Equal Protection Clause, and by
1975 law reformers were anxious to keep their cases out of the federal courts to avoid the more restrictive rulings of the post-Warren
Court era. It was also becoming clear that the U.S. Supreme Court
would not prohibit economic discrimination on federal constitutional grounds, 49 and so placing the Mount Laurel doctrine on
income-related state constitutional grounds made it virtually immune to federal court revision. By glossing over race, however, the
New Jersey Supreme Court lost the opportunity to draw the clearest of moral lines, and hence to defend the legitimacy of its intervention on the compelling grounds that Professor Haar urges namely, that the state constitution must be enforced, and the court
must do it if no other institution will.
I do not wish to be naive about this. I am not suggesting that by
1975, the people of New Jersey had achieved such a state of beatific
colorblindness that we would all have thanked the supreme court
for pointing out the racially discriminatory consequences of suburban exclusionary zoning and immediately complied. There would
47. Recall that Professor Haar, too, criticizes the court for failing to explain its constitutional theory adequately. See pp. 48-49.
48. I have suggested elsewhere that the shift from passive remedies in Mount Laurel I to
"affirmative" remedies in Mount LaurelII implies that Mount Laurel II is based on an unarticulated constitutional right to shelter. See John M. Payne, Norman Williams, Exclusionary
Zoning, and the Mount Laurel Doctrine: Making the Theory Fit the Facts,20 VT. L. REv. 665,
683 (1996). Because of its speculative - some might say grandiose - nature, this theory
might not survive my reformulation of Professor Haar's defense of judicial legitimacy,
although I think my idea can be stated with sufficient clarity and moral force to pass the test.
I do not pursue the right to shelter as an alternative theory here, however, because it is not
fairly within the scope of Professor Haar's book. In any event, judicial legitimacy is for
judges, not law professors; it is our professorial duty to concoct the fanciful ideas out of
which legitimate judicial innovation may eventually result, somewhere way down the line,
and that is the only appropriate context within which a right to shelter can be discussed.
49. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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have been a brawl, possibly even a bigger brawl than the one that
ensued over the actual terms of Mount Laurel L But that reaction,
in whatever form, would have put the defenders of suburban exclusionary zoning much more on the defensive than did the actual
Mount Laurel case. By 1975, two decades after Brown v. Board of
Education,50 the legitimacy of judicial enforcement of constitutionally based racial equality was broadly accepted, even if specific judicial decisions remained controversial. Also by 1975, it had become
virtually impossible, except at the extremist fringes, to speak openly
the language of racial discrimination, as had been the case in earlier
decades. "I'm not a racist, but.. ." may still have been a cover for
race-conscious thought, but the norm of legitimate public debate required at least formal adherence to the principle of nondiscrimination that Brown and the civil rights movement had taught us. It
would have been difficult to deny the legitimacy of that principle
when carried over into a race-based theory of the Mount Laurel
doctrine.
From the earliest days of the Mount Laurel doctrine, perceptive
commentators have recognized the perils of a theory that deemphasized race. 51 Simply put, there are so many more poor White
families than there are poor minority ones that, absent a massive
infusion of resources into producing affordable housing that has not
happened and realistically could not have happened, it was foreseeable that the lion's share of the housing that could be produced
would go first, whenever possible, to White households, which, if
suspect because of their poverty, were nonetheless not so frightening to many middle-class suburbanites as poor Black families.
These concerns came to pass. The available data, although far from
perfect, reveal that minorities have not benefitted from the Mount
Laurel process in anywhere near the proportion that they ought to
52
have in a colorblind world.
Race: The Warren Township Opinion
The deemphasis on race also leads Professor Haar into one of
the rare errors of reportage in Suburbs Under Siege. He considers
at some length the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in In re
Township of Warren,53 in which the court held that the Mount Laurel doctrine prohibited municipalities from establishing priorities
50. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
51. See, e.g., Robert C. Holmes, A Black Perspectiveon Mount Laurel II: Toward a Black
"FairShare," 14 SEroN HALL L. REv. 944 (1984).

52. See Lamar et al., supra note 21, at 1256; Naomi Bailin Wish & Stephen Eisdorfer, The
Impact of Mt. Laurel Initiatives: An Analysis of the Characteristicsof Applicants and Occupants, 27 SEToN HALL L. Rav. 1268, 1302-05 (1997).
53. 622 A.2d 1257 (NJ. 1993).
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residents in occupying newly available

Mount Laurel units. Haar applauds the decision as evidence of the
court's continued vigor as an engine for law reform. Insofar as the
specific holding is involved, he is correct, but the full story is more
complex and not so encouraging.
The Warren Township plaintiffs initially challenged two provisions in the Warren Township substantive certification and proposed two separate legal theories to explain how each provision was
invalid. The plaintiffs challenged the residency requirement and, in
addition, a provision in the township's certified plan permitting it to
transfer fifty percent of its Mount Laurel obligation - 166 units of
housing - to New Brunswick through an RCA.54 They alleged
that both provisions violated both the Mount Laurel doctrine and
the race discrimination provisions of the Federal Fair Housing
Act.55 The challengers lost on both issues and on both theories in
the appellate division of superior court, where the case was first
heard, and they appealed to the supreme court. Under New Jersey
practice, there is an appeal as of right only when there is a dissent in
the appellate division, and the dissenting judge in the Warren Township case dissented only on the residency issue. The petitioners
therefore had to seek leave to appeal as to the RCA provision,
which presented the racial issue in its starkest form, as the lowerincome housing was being transferred from a virtually all-White
suburb to an urban municipality with a significant minority population. Because the court had to hear the other branch of the case as
of right, and the petitioners had raised the race issue there as well,
the petitioners were confident that the justices would hear the en56
tire case. Not so. The court refused to touch the RCA issue.
While the court included an extensive -

and quite helpful -

dic-

tum about the applicability of Title VIII to Mount Laurel issues in
the residency preferences opinion, it expressly declined to hold that
the residency preferences violated Title VIII, instead explicitly rest57
ing the decision only on the Mount Laurel ground.
The court, in other words, appears to remain deeply ambivalent
about the relationship between race, exclusionary zoning, and affordable housing. The longer I stay in this business, the more convinced I become that this is a mistake. Housing mobility is one of
the keys to reducing race consciousness in our society, because mobility offers members of minority groups access to the good schools
and good jobs that have built the American middle class and be54. See Warren Township, 622 A.2d at 1258-61, 1278.
55. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1994). The Fair Housing Act is also known as Title VIII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

56. See 606 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1992) (denying certiorari).
57. See Warren Township, 622 A.2d at 1276, 1277.
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cause racially integrated neighborhoods force all of us to deal with
the race issue as people rather than as stereotypes. Professor
Haar's careful analysis of the legitimacy of judicial activism reinforces these convictions of mine, because it convinces me that the
morality of a constitutional rule requiring municipalities to exercise
their land-use power in a racially fair way would command broad, if
sometimes grudging, respect as a legitimate exercise of judicial
power. Such a rule therefore would achieve greater and better results than has the complex, hard-to-explain Mount Laurel doctrine.
Alas, however, Professor Haar misses the opportunity to make this
point to the wide audience his book will command, instead giving
the constitutional theory of the Mount Laurel doctrine a more respectful obedience than it in fact deserves.
I suggest, in other words, that the legitimacy of judicial activism
in the Mount Laurel cases rests on a slender reed, if that reed is
merely the court's interpretation of the general welfare clause of
the New Jersey Constitution. Make no mistake about it, it is the
popular view of legitimacy that counts for these purposes, not the
exquisitely spun theories of scholars and judges, no matter how
convincing those theories may be to other scholars, judges, and professionals, myself included. So I would add a major qualification to
Professor Haar's exploration of when it is appropriate and necessary for courts to intervene in matters of social policy. The legitimacy of doing so, I would argue, is related directly to the clarity and
precision with which the court can articulate an underlying constitutional principle that a fairminded person would find obvious. This
is not to say that soft constitutional principles, such as the general
welfare clause, cannot be enforced or can only be enforced in unaggressive ways. But a court, mindful of its own finite stock of legitimacy, should interfere with political choices only in proportion to
its confidence that the constitutional mandate is clear and unambiguous. The general welfare approach of the Mount Laurel cases has
failed this test. In practice, the fair-share rules are too complicated
to be readily understood, too arbitrary and counterintuitive on occasion to be perceived as fair -

the sprawl problem -

and, despite

their superficial objectivity, too subjective to be anchored unambiguously in the vague language of the constitution.
Representation and Exclusionary Zoning
There is a way to reformulate the general welfare approach,
however, and most of its elements are suggested by Professor
Haar's legitimacy analysis. He argues, for example, that one reason
why judicial activism is appropriate is that it can stimulate a broad
public debate on matters of social policy that might otherwise be
ignored if the status quo of entrenched interest groups is allowed to
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govern (p. 177). He is certainly right about this as a matter of practical politics. One of the great achievements of the Mount Laurel
cases was that they forced the legislature to consider the consequences of exclusionary zoning, even though the interest group that
benefited - poor people - was relatively powerless and the interest group that was burdened - suburbanites - was the dominant

political voice in statewide politics. As a matter of law, however,
and particularly in providing an argument that judicial intervention
is appropriate and legitimate, Professor Haar proves too much. If
the source of legitimacy in judicial activism is that the court is enforcing a constitutional norm, then it would seem to follow that the
constitutional norm provides the answer, not the starting point, for
a new dialogue. If the court is disinterestedly doing what Marbury
courts do

-

resolving disputes in accordance with law -

how much

leeway is there for the legislature, or various pressure groups, to
decide after suitable dialogue not to follow the court's pronouncement? Not all that much, if judging in constitutional cases is to remain judging and not become the work of a council of revision.
Professor Haar also argues for the necessity of judicial intervention when political power is territorially dispersed and "[n]o one
agency in front of the court, acting alone, has the governmental authority or ability to clear up the situation created by the multitude
of local authorities responsible only to local constituencies" (p.
181). As I noted above, however, it simply is not correct to identify
the judiciary as the only statewide institution capable of bringing a
regional perspective to bear.5 8 But if we take these two points and
combine them with Professor Haar's further observation that, both
before Mount Laurel I and between Mount Laurels I and HI, the
statewide political system was manifestly disinterested in the problem of exclusionary zoning (pp. 177-81), we may then have a way of
defending the legitimacy of the court's general welfare approach.
Approached with a view toward making the application of the
general welfare concept obvious, as I proposed above, the constitutional violation that is the essential precondition to Professor
Haar's theory of judicial legitimacy is not the failure to provide
poor people with a "regional fair share" of housing opportunities,
but rather the failure to provide them with a political forum in
which they can fairly compete with other interest groups for their
"fair share" of society's beneficence. Rather than a "dialogue" between the court and the people, as Professor Haar envisions, I suggest that the court can and should mandate a fairer dialogue among
the people themselves, all of them, by mandating a reconsideration
of the forum in which the debate takes place. So long as land use
power, and hence the power to control the creation of housing af58. See supra Section: A Theory of Judicial Activism.
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fordable to lower-income groups, is delegated to municipalities unconditionally, those municipalities will have not only the power to

exclude but the ability to ignore the voices of those now excluded.
The constitutional right that is implicated in this approach to the

problem of exclusionary zoning is the right to have fair participation in the political process -

the right, as the late Richard

Babcock described it, to play "the zoning game"5 9 on the same
playing field as everyone else. The remedy for such a reformulated

right is much more straightforward than the substantive implementation of "fair share" rules that has preoccupied the Mount Laurel
process for the last twenty years. All that is required is that the
court order the state to reclaim the delegated zoning power from
the gaggle of fragmented, parochial municipalities and either exer-

cise the power itself, redelegate it to new state or regional planning
agencies, or redelegate it to municipalities subject to tighter standards that protect the interests of prospective as well as present res-

idents of the decisionmaking community.60 This is, undoubtedly, a

softer remedy than the Mount Laurel fair-share rules, if those rules
were fully implemented, but that of course is the point. By building
a very aggressive judicial remedy on a hard-to-explain constitutional base, the supreme court virtually guaranteed that controversy

would be maximized and that much of the focus of the controversy
would be shifted to the supposed illegitimacy of judicial activism,

rather than remaining where it belongs, on the callousness of ignoring the needs of poor people. The representation theory, by contrast, would justify judicial activism on a ground that fair-minded
people could understand and accept - namely, that in a democracy
the willingness to lose a political fight depends on having the
chance to win the battle on some other occasion. Under the regime

of exclusionary zoning, that could not happen. 61
59. See RicHARD F. BABcocK, THE ZONING GA~m (1966).

60. I made this argument to no avail more than twenty years ago. See Payne, supra note
45. The majority opinion in Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 371 A.2d
1192, 1219 n.41 (N.J. 1977), characterized that argument as "a highly novel idea" but did not
suggest following it. The supreme court also took note of the approach during the briefing
that led up to Mount Laurel II, see John M. Payne, HousingRights and Remedies: A "Legislative" History of Mount Laurel II, 14 SEToN HALL L. Ruv. 889, 899-900, 931 (1984), but
none of the parties was willing to embrace it and the court made no mention of it in the
subsequent opinion.
61. I am grateful to my colleague, Professor Eric Neisser, for pointing out an interesting
parallel to this argument. The recent controversy involving the President's "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell" policy on gays in the military and the passage through Congress at lightning
speed of the so-called Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (West 1994 & Supp.
1997), indicate that Americans remain deeply troubled about departures from traditional
norms of sexuality. Yet the U.S. Supreme Court's decision two years ago in Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620 (1996), striking down a Colorado initiative that effectively denied proponents of
gay rights access to conventional political processes, caused barely a ripple of protest. Fair
process, it would seem, has independent value in the American system.

1712

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 96:1685

Arguably, the representation approach that I am suggesting can
be teased out of the history of the Mount Laurel doctrine. As Professor Haar's narrative describes quite accurately, the 'New Jersey
Supreme Court and its three designated trial judges, after the requisite period of Sturm und Drang, convinced the politicians of New
Jersey that the Mount Laurel decision would be enforced vigorously. In the face of judicial orders rezoning specific towns, the legislature put aside traditional home rule concerns and created a
state-level decisionmaking institution, the Council on Affordable
Housing, which brings together -

imperfectly -

municipal and

housing advocates to hash out ground rules within which municipalities must then act in the exercise of their delegated zoning powers,
though compliance with the Act is voluntary. As a housing advocate, I now have a political forum within which to lobby, scheme,
and intrigue, just as any other interest group does, with recourse to
the cabinet officer who oversees COAH and, on those occasions
when the stakes are high enough - usually just before an election
to the office of the governor herself.
But at what cost was this access purchased? Instead of the decade of heated debate about the legitimacy of the court's acting at all
a debate the continuing legacy of which is evident in that the
phrase "Mount Laurel" still arouses knee-jerk opposition - might
it not have been preferable to have attended more carefully to the
legitimacy problems up front, fashioning the doctrine to maximize
both its legitimacy and its effectiveness? Of course, this is hindsight. Given the choice of repeating the Mount Laurel process as it
was or doing nothing at all, I unhesitatingly would cast my vote with
Justice Hall and Chief Justice Wilentz and Professor Haar. But we
do have the benefit of hindsight, and I would caution the reader
understandably swept up in the enthusiasm of Professor Haar's
commitment to judicial activism to take his defense of judicial legitimacy as a starting point rather than a roadmap, at least insofar as
Mount Laurel is Exhibit A. 62
Selling JudicialActivism
Finally, let me comment briefly on Professor Haar's third overarching theme, the failure of the New Jersey judiciary to explain
adequately its Mount Laurel doctrine to the public, to convince
them of its legitimacy and, correlatively, of the legitimacy of the
court itself. While I certainly share Haar's view that the Mount
62. The argument for the legitimacy of judicial enforcement of race-based equality is in-

dependent of the representation argument made here. The mandate for racial equality has a
strong, explicit foundation in the federal and state constitutions and is not subject to a popular override to the extent that less explicitly protected interests may be. See, e.g., Hunter v.

Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (holding unconstitutional a referendum on open housing law).
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Laurel doctrine was a public relations disaster,63 1 disagree with his
argument that the court should have waded more vigorously into
the world of talk shows and op-ed columns. To be fair to Professor
Haar, I do not think that that degree of engagement is what he has
in mind. But that in turn is my underlying point, for selling a controversial issue is an all-or-nothing process. Politics is a tough business, as I learned when I strayed from the classroom and the
courtroom to lobby on behalf of affordable housing issues - and
specifically in opposition to a constitutional amendment that would
have reversed Mount Laurel. A state senator once reprimanded me
at a public hearing for having the temerity to oppose his anti-Mount
Laurel bill, on the grounds that as a teacher at the state university, I
worked for the legislature and should therefore obey the boss's that is, his - lead. Imagine how judges would fare in even the
outer orbits of this world - keeping in mind, as Professor Haar
points out, that Chief Justice Wilentz and Justice Pollock both ran
into reconfirmation troubles as a result of their participation in the
Mount Laurel case.
The problem, ultimately, is the same problem of judicial legitimacy. In order for judges to act boldly, as both Professor Haar and
I believe they should, they must convince the public at large that
they are acting within the special competence of judges, rather than
as unelected - and therefore illegitimate - politicians. Selling
their product ultimately connects judges to the political, rather than
to the judicial, side of our system of governance and thus undercuts
their legitimacy. Hence my preceding argument: reformist, activist
judges must place their decisions on clearly understandable and
easilyacceptable bases, such as fair representation or racial equity,
so that the decisions sell themselves.
CONCLUSION

To sum up, then, I disagree with Professor Haar's celebration of
the role that private litigants can play in structural reform litigation,
and I have reservations about the extent to which the Mount Laurel
doctrine, as actually formulated and defended, can sustain all of his
claims for the legitimacy of judicial activism. The two criticisms,
moreover, are related: the perceived self-interest of private
builder-litigants undercuts the perceived legitimacy of the entire
process, particularly when the absence of public-interest litigants
requires the judges to rely extensively on planning masters to gain a
balanced picture. 64 When the process no longer looks very much
like litigation, doubters are more likely to ask why the decision be63. This is my phrase, not Haar's. See John M. Payne, Rethinking FairShare: The Judicial Enforcement of Affordable Housing Policies, 16 REAL EsTATE L.J. 20, 27 (1987).
64. See supra text accompanying note 16.
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longs to an - unelected - judge at all. Law reform is still law,
even if the law in question is heavily infused with policy and planning expertise.
But it is also important to emphasize our broad areas of agreement. I fully agree that there is a legitimate role for the courts to
play in stimulating social reform - I do not subscribe, in other
words, to the "hollow hope" thesis, 65 because I have seen the results in New Jersey - and I also agree that there is a great deal of
room for creative thinking about the role of private actors in the
process. Inclusionary zoning is a marvelous addition to the armament of a housing advocate, so long as it is the public interest that
controls and not the private developer. Professor Haar's detailed
and thoughtful exploration of the Mount Laurel story helped me to
focus on how much has been achieved and how much remains to be
done. His work offers the start of a dialogue that can result in a
further refinement of the Mount Laurel doctrine, that can suggest
new and better ways to defend it, and that ultimately can take the
cause of fair housing to heights yet unimagined.

65. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HoPE: CAN COURTS BuNG AnouT So.
CIAL CHANGE? (1991).

PUBLIC CHOICE REVISITED
Daniel A. Farber*
and
Philip P. Frickey**
PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW: READINGS AND COMMENTARY.

By Maxwell L. Steams. Cincinnati: Anderson Publishing Co. 1997.

Pp. xxxvii, 1035. $54.95.
Although not the first book on public choice for a legal audience,1 Max Stearns's Public Choice and Public Law2 is the first fullscale textbook for law school use.3 An ambitious undertaking by a
rising young scholar, the book provides law students with a comprehensive introduction to public choice.
Public choice - essentially, the application of economic reasoning to political institutions - has become a significant aspect of
public law scholarship. Indeed, in his Foreword, Saul Levmore
hails public choice as "[t]he most exciting intellectual development
in law schools in the last decade" (p. xi). Be that as it may, the
publication of the first textbook surely marks an important stage in
the development of a subject. It is an apt occasion to evaluate the
ways in which public choice can best contribute to legal education
and scholarship.
Our goal in this review, consequently, is not merely to assess the
Stearns book, but to see what light it sheds on this broader question. In Part I of the review, we accompany Steams on a tour of
public choice and public law. The book provides a good cross section of the major writings of legal scholars interested in public
choice. For readers familiar with the field, Part I provides an op* Henry 1. Fletcher Professor of Law and Associate Dean, University of Minnesota.
B.A. 1971, M.A. 1972, J.D. 1975, Illinois. - Ed. We received useful comments from participants at the Harvard Law and Economics Workshop.
** Faegre & Benson Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. B.A. 1975, Kansas; J.D.
1978, University of Michigan. - Ed.
1. See, e.g., JERRY L. MAsaAw, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERANC: USING PUBLIC
CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW (1997); DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FuccY, LAW
AM PunLc CHOICE: A CRMCAL INMODUcrION (1991).
2. Maxwell Steams is an Associate Professor at the George Mason University School of
Law.
3. A briefer treatment of public choice, suitable for use as a supplement but not for a
complete course, is DAVID W. BARNES & LYN' A. STOUT, THE ECONOMICS OF CONSTrruTIONAL

LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE (1992). Besides its brevity, this work differs from the

Steams book in that it takes the form of a traditional casebook, with its discussion of public
choice mostly added in the form of textual notes.
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portunity to examine Stearns's organization and choice of readings.
For others, it provides a primer on the topic. Building on Stearns's
materials in Part II, we offer some thoughts about how public
choice can best inform legal scholarship. A similar debate about
the utility of public choice has been raging in political science, 4 and
we believe that this debate has generated some useful insights
about the possible contributions of public choice to understanding
legal issues. Indeed, some of the leading public choice scholars in
political science have now revamped their claims for the theory as a
result of this debate.5 Legal academics such as Stearns have not yet
had time to absorb these developments and thus may be asking
more from public choice theory than its best practitioners believe it
can realistically offer. Finally, in Part III, we consider how public
choice can contribute to the education of law students. One of the
questions raised in Levmore's Foreword is the extent to which public choice should be integrated into existing courses, as opposed to
receiving a separate place in the curriculum (pp. xiv-xv). Our own
view, unlike Levmore's, is that public choice is likely to be most
useful when integrated into existing courses, but that materials like
Stearns's can serve a beneficial function for more advanced
students.
I.

PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW:

A

GUIDED TOUR

Instead of using a casebook format, Public Choice and Public
Law offers a series of lengthy excerpts from scholarly articles, almost all from law reviews, followed by extensive notes and explanatory text by the author. Unlike the snippets of articles that most
law-school casebooks offer, the substantial portions of original
works provided by Stearns give authors a fair chance to elaborate
their views in their own words. Stearns's notes explore the readings
in detail, with citations to a broad segment of the scholarly literature.6 By following Steams through his tour of public choice, we
can get a good sense of the current state of legal scholarship in the
field.
4. See THE RATIONAL CHOICE CONTROVERSY: ECONOMIC MODELS OF POLITICS RECONSIDERED (Jeffrey Friedman ed., 1996) [hereinafter THE RATIONAL CHOICE CONTROVERSY];
DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: A CRI.
TIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE (1994). "Rational choice" is a somewhat
more comprehensive term that includes both public choice and game theory.
5. See text accompanying notes 55-67 infra.
6. Not the least of the book's virtues is the 25-page bibliography, which should be invalu-

able to students and scholars who want to explore the literature more deeply. Pp. 977-1002.
The bibliography cites approximately 600 works, though some concern jurisprudence or con-

stitutional theory rather than public choice. Another very useful source for legal scholars is
PERSPECrIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE: A HANDBOOK (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997) [hereinafter
PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE].
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The book is divided into three segments: Chapter One introduces the use of rational choice models of political institutions;
Chapter Two covers social choice theory deriving from Arrow's
Theorem; and Chapter Three surveys selected applications to public
law. We follow that organization in this section.
A. Rational Choice Models .
As Stearns points out in his Preface, public choice is not a monolithic field (pp. xvii-xviii). It derives from three different academic
movements, each with a separate home base: the Chicago School,
which emphasized the tendency for the regulatory process to be coopted by special interests; the Rochester school, which stressed "the
arbitrariness and unpredictability of governmental outcomes, at
least if the preferences of the legislators or their constituents are
employed as a baseline"; and the Virginia School, which studied
how constitutional frameworks could shape the future development
of public policy (pp. xviii-xix). Further, some public choice models
are based on standard microeconomics, while others are based on
game theory or on the work of Kenneth Arrow and his followers
(pp. xix-xx). Not surprisingly given the field's complex origins,
even its name is unsettled: public choice, social choice, rational
choice, and positive political theory 7have each been favored at one
time or another by various authors.
What holds this diverse movement together is a common methodology based on the concept of rational decisionmaking: simply
put, political actors, like economic ones, make rational decisions
designed to maximize the achievement of their preferences. This
maximization assumption makes it possible to use mathematical
techniques of various kinds, many of them borrowed from economics, to model political behavior. Less formally, it allows the application of economic insights to political behavior. These economic
insights can result in powerful conclusions about the political
system.
One such economic insight concerns the possibility of free riding. A rational person would avoid investing in the production of a
benefit if virtually the same benefit could be enjoyed without the
investment. This simple point has manifold implications in economics, ranging from the instability of cartels - because individual
members of the cartel have an incentive to cheat - to the inadequate market supply for public goods such as clean air - because
individuals prefer to enjoy the clean air without having to pay for
the pollution control equipment. It also has a powerful analogy in
7. Cf Daniel Farber & Philip Frickey, Foreword. Positive PoliticalTheory in the Nineties,
80 GEO. LJ. 457, 458-60 (1992). Often, an author using a particular term would attribute
slightly different connotations to the other terms on the list.
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politics, first pointed out by Mancur Olson.8 A legislative enactment may benefit everyone in a group, perhaps everyone in the
country, but each can enjoy a statute's benefits without having contributed to the lobbying effort. Hence, there is a temptation to free
ride and let other people pay the price to pass the new legislation.
As it turns out, the free-riding problem is inversely related to the
size of the group - for example, when the issue is air pollution, it is
much easier to mobilize a handful of car companies than the urban
population. (Group size is crucial for two reasons: (1) given the
same total benefit to the group, size is inversely related to the magnitude of any individual's stake; and (2) size increases transaction
costs.) The result is a skew in politics giving greater influence to
special interests - relatively concentrated groups with high individual stakes - than to the diffuse interests of taxpayers, consumers,
and citizens generally. Given two groups with roughly equal but
opposing interests, the smaller group has an innate advantage.
The key to this argument is that political actors behave rationally in the sense that they maximize their expected personal welfare, taking into account both the costs and benefits of political
activities. Clearly, there are possible alternatives to this view: people may attempt to optimize outcomes but suffer from systematic
cognitive defects; their conflicting, incoherent, or unstable goals
may make optimizing impossible; strong emotional currents may
render them incapable of thinking rationally about consequences;
or they may behave rationally in some noninstrumentalist sense for example, by following a Kantian ethical edict. Notwithstanding
these potential alternatives, public choice theory rests on the premise that instrumental rationality is an effective basis for predicting
political behavior, if not an entirely realistic psychological model.
Given its centrality to public choice, the rationality assumption
clearly warrants careful examination, and Stearns begins Chapter
One with a group of articles debating its validity. At one extreme,
Judge Abner Mikva rejects the premise of self-interested welfare
maximization in politics, remarking that even in the notoriously venal Illinois legislature he had found examples of public-regarding
conduct. 9 At the other extreme, Michael DeBow and Dwight Lee
provide a thoughtful defense of the assumption that "people will
allocate their limited means.., to maximize their personal satisfaction."' 10 In the middle, the book includes excerpts from our own
8. P. 16 (discussing MANCUR OLSON, Tim
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965)).

Loric OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC

9. See p. 38 (excerpting Abner Mikva, Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice: Foreword, 74 VA. L. Rnv. 167 (1988)).
10. P. 45 (excerpting Michael E. DeBow & Dwight R. Lee, The Jurisprudenceof Public

Choice: A Response to Farberand Frickey, 66 TEXAS L. REv. 993 (1988)).

May 1998]

Public Choice

1719

work, arguing that both ideology and self-interest play a role in the
political system. 1
Voting provides one of the greatest challenges to the rationality
assumption. It is not clear that voting can be usefully, explained as
an effort to maximize the achievement of some goal. Recall that
the temptation to free ride increases with the size of the group, and
here the group consists of the entire electorate. An individual vote
has almost no chance of influencing a national election. Indeed, it
would hardly be worth the trouble of standing in a voting line on
the minuscule chance of casting the single decisive vote in a Presidential election! Of course, it is possible that people simply like to
vote, that voting is a form of personal consumption, with pulling the
lever in the voting booth playing much the same role as jiggling the
joystick in a video game. But this explanation seems distinctly unhelpful: it does little more than pronounce that people vote because it is something they want to do.
Steams discusses several possible methods of saving the "consumption" explanation from tautology. One possibility is that people vote on the gamble that other people will choose to stay home,
thereby increasing the likelihood that they will cast the decisive
vote. On the other hand, individuals may vote as a signal to others
that there is no point in playing this cat-anrd-mouse game, thus encouraging people with contrary political views to stay home. Or,
perhaps people pursue extremely risk-averse strategies or are misled into thinking that their votes count (pp. 67-69). In any event,
Steams himself questions whether the "voting paradox" is really
important:
We might all agree that from the perspective of instrumental rationality, voting lies at the outer edge of human conduct. But so what?
Whatever the reasons for popular voting, the fact is that many people
vote. More importantly, most activities in which people engage, including those that are the subject of public choice, can be explained
with models that are premised upon more intuitive understandings and manifestations - of rationality. [p. 69]
In particular, Steams argues, even if we cannot model voters, we
can model the behavior of elected officials on the assumption that
their sole goal is reelection. His rationale is that politicians who fail
to follow the model "quickly move off the radar of political analysts, and of public choice scholars, if their principles prevent an
electoral victory" '(pp. 71-72). Hence, "[i]f those candidates who
are elected behave as if they are primarily motivated by the desire
to be re-elected (regardless of their actual and initial motivations),
11. Pp. 5-35 (excerpting Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudenceof Public Choice, 65 TExAs L. Rav. 873 (1987)); pp. 58-62 (excerpting Daniel A. Farber & Philip P.
Frickey, IntegratingPublic Choice and PublicLaw: A Reply to DeBow and Lee, 66 TEXAS L.

REv. 1013 (1988)).
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public choice modeling built
upon the electoral goal postulate is
12
likely to remain robust.'
The voter's paradox is not necessarily a fatal flaw in public
choice theory, but as we see in Part III of this review, it has received
considerable attention from political scientists, and for good reason.
Voter behavior is only a subset of public political conduct, which
includes making campaign contributions, joining interest groups,
and monitoring political affairs. If we cannot predict voting, it is
not clear that we can expect to do much better in predicting these
other forms of behavior, and thus we leave many of the inputs into
the political process as unexplained "black boxes." Moreover, if we
cannot explain why people vote at all, we have no reason to think
we can account for how they vote. At best, we are left with a partial explanation of the overall political process. Furthermore, we
may not be able to rely entirely on natural selection among politicians to ensure that only the most reelection-oriented survive. Depending on people's motivations for entering politics, at any given
time the political process might contain a large number of short13
term players who nevertheless hold considerable political power.
More fundamentally, if we have no workable model of political inputs, the assumption that politicians try to maximize their chances
of reelection has limited predictive value.
As Stearns observes at the end of his discussion of the voting
paradox, the voting-paradox debate raises a more general issue
about empirical validation: "[I]t may well be harder than it first
appears to test public choice modeling empirically" (p. 72). If the
assumptions of public choice theory are not completely realistic,
and if it does not generate testable empirical predictions, just what
claim does it have to validity? This partial disconnect between
modeling and empirical data raises important methodological issues, to which we will return in Part II. In any event, whether this
disconnect is a serious flaw depends in large part on what we expect
public choice theory to accomplish.
For the moment, however, we can put aside the voter's paradox
and indulge the assumption that politicians, at least, are instrumentally rational. Let us also put aside the question of empirical validation and simply ask whether public choice theory has anything
12. P. 72. On the same theory, presumably, one might counsel hospital administrators to
act on the assumption that all patients are long-term residents of the hospital, because short-

timers will "quickly move off the radar."
13. Indeed, the current move toward term limits markedly increases the likelihood of this
outcome. See Elizabeth Garrett, Term Limitationsand the Myth of the Citizen-Legislator,81
CORNELL L. REv. 623, 647-48 (1996). One can even imagine a process of reverse selection, in

which voters favor politicians whose past records suggest that they are willing to take principled but seemingly inexpedient stands, so that politicians might take risky, unpopular stands,
gambling on achieving a higher office but increasing the risk of losing their current positions.
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interesting to say about issues of public law. The book's next batch
of material will reassure the student who has such concerns.
Steams closes the first chapter with three case studies that help illustrate the theory's utility: the line-item veto, the nondelegation
doctrine, and the scope of judicial review. The discussion of the
line-item veto is illustrative and confirms that public choice can provide intriguing insights.
Glen Robinson's article about the line-item veto 14 makes an effective analogy to economic bargaining models. Robinson points
out that the President and Congress are in a position of bilateral
monopoly. The President cannot obtain legislation without Congress, but given the difficulty of overriding vetoes, as a practical
matter Congress needs the President's consent to obtain what it
wants (p. 103). As Robinson observes, economists have studied bilateral monopolies extensively, but their predictions are cloudy (p.
105). After considering some of the strategic possibilities open to
both players, Robinson argues that "the effects of an item veto authority are more complex than they have been made out to be" (p.
107). He concludes that "[t]he complexities confound any simple
predictions about effects; probably the most reliable prediction
would be that the item veto would be only marginally useful in curtailing private goods legislation" (p. 107).
The other excerpt about the line-item veto, written by Steams
himself,15 takes the strategic analysis a step further. Robinson's
model implicitly assumes that only a single piece of public-interest
legislation is on the table at any given time. Legislators must either
attach their riders to this one bill or present them as separate enactments. But, as Steams points out, multiple public-interest proposals actually are pending simultaneously, so legislators have a choice
about which proposal to use as a vehicle (p. 97). By threatening to
use the line-item veto if legislators attach riders to anything but his
favored bill, the President can extract support for his bill as the
price of obtaining passage of the rider. The end result is the passage of the same amount of special-interest legislation despite the
line-item veto, but the President has much greater leverage over
general legislation vis-A-vis Congress (p. 98). The strategic process
could be more complicated still: for example, if the President regards the riders as too costly, he might tend to favor bills that require little leverage of this kind, leading him back in the direction
of the general legislation favored by Congress.
14. Pp. 101-09 (excerpting Glen 0. Robinson, Public Choice Speculations on the Item

Veto, 74 VA. L. Rnv. 403 (1988)).
15. Pp. 77-100 (excerpting Maxwell L. Steams, The Public Choice Case Against the Item

Veto, 49 WASH. & LEE L. Rnv. 385 (1992)).
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The reader may or may not have confidence in the ability of
public choice theory to predict the effects of the line item veto. But
public choice does illuminate the complexity of predicting the effects of even the simplest procedural or institutional changes. 16 If
nothing else, public choice reveals the assumption that the line item
veto will reduce pork-barrel legislation as highly simplistic.
B. Arrow's Theorem

Chapter TWo is devoted to Arrovm's Theorem and its possible
implications for political institutions. Some background on Arrow's
Theorem may be useful before turning to Stearns's treatment of the
subject. Arrow was interested in the measurement of social welfare. Essentially, he asked whether, given only individual rankings
of outcomes, it is possible to derive a ranking of those outcomes for
society as a whole. Arrow placed very modest restrictions on the
ranking technique. Beyond some technical requirements necessary
to set up the problem, he added only two requirements for a technique to qualify as a social welfare measure. First, the technique
had to be nondictatorial. Obviously, it would be easy to construct a
ranking of societal preferences by simply picking a dictator and
adopting that person's ranking. Whatever one might think of this
as a form of government, it clearly does not qualify as a measure of
social welfare. Hence, Arrow required that no one person's preferences be decisive. This minimal form of egalitarianism, however, is
not enough to connect the resulting social-preference ranking with
social welfare. To provide such a link, Arrow also required that the
technique: satisfy the Pareto standard. That is, if at least one person
in society prefers outcome 1 over outcome 2, and no one else has
the opposite preference, then society as a whole prefers outcome 1.
Again, this is a very weak requirement - it says nothing about
what happens when 240 million people prefer outcome 1 and only
one person prefers outcome 2.
Arrow's specifications thus amount to the barest possible qualifications for a social welfare function. Quite remarkably, however,
he proved that no method of combining individual preferences can
satisfy these two qualifications along with the technical requirements.17 The technical requirements themselves are seemingly
modest. Arrow's technical requirements are as follows:
16. As actually implemented, the "line item veto" turns out to be anything but simple
(and in fact is far from being a true line item veto). For a discussion of the complexities of
the current statutory scheme, see Elizabeth Garrett, Accountability and Restraint: The Fed-

eral Budget Process and the Line Item Veto (applying public choice to project some possible
consequences) (forthcoming).

17. For a fuller discussion of Arrow's theorem, see DEaNis C. MUELLER, PunLc CHOICE

II 384-99 (1989).
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Minimum Rationality. If society prefers outcome A to outcome B,

and outcome B to outcome C, then society prefers A over C.

Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. If C is not on the agenda,

whether A is preferred to B should not depend on how either one
compares with C. This is really a disguised guarantee that outcomes
are based solely on how alternatives are ranked, rather than on how
intensely they are desired.

UniversalApplicability. The method has to work - that is, produce a

definite outcome - for any possible combination of preferences, not
just particular distributions of preferefices among the group.
Arrow was also interested in voting, and his theorem has important implications regarding voting mechanisms. Voting, like social
welfare measurements, may be considered a way of determining the
"public interest," and at the very least, it ranks alternatives based
on how they fare in an election. The immediate consequence of
Arrow's Theorem is that voting mechanisms must fail at least one
of Arrow's criteria. In most voting situations, the sticking point is
minimum rationality. It turns out that even in very simple situations it is possible for the electorate to choose outcome A over outcome B, and outcome B over C -

but for outcome C to beat

outcome A (p. xii).
This cycling of outcomes raises some obvious questions about
democratic institutions. For example, is majority rule too capricious to deserve the central role it has sometimes played in political
theory? Putting aside this normative question, we also find puzzles
about the actual behavior of legislatures. Specifically, because legislatures rarely exhibit cycling, we may wonder how-legislatures are
able to produce stable outcomes. This18inquiry tends to lead toward
the sophisticated use of game theory.
For political scientists, Arrow's Theorem is only the starting
point in an attempt to model legislatures. Presumably, well-tested
models of the legislature would be useful in considering public law
issues, but Stearns does not explore the efforts of political scientists
to provide such models. Indeed, at one point he goes so far as to
warn the reader to "[b]eware the 'sophisticated' model" (p. 718).
Rather than exploring these more sophisticated models by political
scientists, Stearns excerpts two law review articles on social choice
models of legislative voting. The first, by Saul Levmore, explores
the question of why legislatures generally follow certain decisionmaking procedures, such as a sequence of motions and amendments. 19 Levmore proposes that, where cycling does not exist,
legislative rules are designed to identify the "true" winner - called
18. For a survey of some later efforts, see FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 1, at 47-51.
19. Pp. 258-94 (excerpting Saul Levmore, ParliamentaryLaw, Majority Decisionmaking,

and the Voting Paradox, 75 VA. L. Rav. 971 (1989)).
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the Condorcet winner for historical reasons. Other times, legislative rules are designed largely to paper over the possibility of cycling. Specifically, Levmore suggests that legislative procedures
may have evolved through applying the following guidelines:
(1) employ the motion-and-amendment process when there are few
alternatives because it promises to find any Condorcet choice without
encouraging unavoidable dissatisfaction; (2) when there are numerous
alternatives likely to be proposed, facilitate a switch to succession voting because a Condorcet winner is quite unlikely and the switch will
make it difficult for the chair to manipulate the order of recognition
to unfairly influence the outcome; and (3) when succession voting exposes unavoidable dissatisfaction, tinker with the order in which proposals are considered 2 0
Levmore concludes that he has "produced... a strong positive theory which explains a remarkable number of decisionmaking rules.
"Moreover," he adds, the theory is "accompanied by an evolutionary theory, built around the idea of dissatisfied majority coalitions,
which explains how things came to be as they are" (p. 294).
Although intriguing, Levmore's speculations have the disadvantage of being unprovable, as we know nothing about the history of
core parliamentary rules (pp. 259-62). Although, as Levmore says,
"it is easy to imagine" (p. 270) that something like his evolutionary
mechanism operated, we really have no way of knowing, particularly since Levmore does not give much thought to alternative explanations. But more important, in terms of its usefulness for
teaching purposes, Levmore's hypothesis is disassociated from any
larger research agenda about legislative structure or procedure of
the kind developed by political scientists. In particular, most political scientists consider Condorcet winners quite rare; indeed, one
theorem shows under plausible assumptions that no Condorcet winner exists if the issue space is multidimensional. 2 1 Nor is it easy to
see why the rules should be designed primarily to produce Condorcet winners if one by chance exists, because almost any set of rules
will do so if legislators are sophisticated and vote strategically (p.
282 n.136).

20. P. 285. Succession voting, mentioned in guideline 2, is a fill-in-the-blank process in

which proposals are considered in a preset order - for example, dates from earlier to later.
Pp. 272-76. The Condorcet winner beats every other alternative in pair-wise voting. It is thus
the "top" choice.

21. This result is known as the chaos theorem, because it seems to imply that all outcomes
cycle, leaving the legislature with no stability. See PETER C. ORDESHOOK, GAME THEORY
AND POLITICAL THEORY: AN INTRODUCrMON 76-82 (1986). Much effort has been devoted to
explaining why this instability does not obtain in reality. See FARBER & FRmicY, supra note
1, at 48-57; Peter Ordeshook, The Spatial Analysis of Elections and Committees: Four Decades of Research, in PERsPECrrvEs ON PUBLIC CHOICE, supra note 6, at 250-56.
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Building on Levmore's theory, Stearns moves on to an excerpt
from one of his own articles.22 Steams undertakes to compare the
voting procedures used in legislatures and courts with respect to
Arrow's criteria, with the aim of clarifying the relative strengths
and weaknesses of these institutions (p. 305). The hypothesis is that
courts use different voting rules than legislatures because courts are
sacrificing different items out of Arrow's list of criteria.23 The legislature is designed - 6 la Levmore (p. 323) - to seek a Condorcet
winner when one exists, but legislatures give up on the decisiveness
criteria, which means that often the legislature will produce no action whatsoever. Steams asserts that because courts must always
decide cases (p. 329), they sacrifice the possibility of finding the

Condorcet winner (pp. 329-38). More generally, the Arrovian "requirement of rationality in Supreme Court decisionmaking is
subordinated to the requirement that the Court decide all cases
before it" (p. 348).
This theory may somewhat outstrip the evidence. The notion
that the mandate to decide every case can explain basic features of
the judicial system seems a bit like the tail wagging the dog. It has
the additional disadvantage that the tail is flawed, inasmuch as the
Supreme Court is not in fact subject to any formal requirement to
make an affirmative decision in every case.24 On the contrary, the
decision rule is the same as that of the legislature: the status quo in the form of the lower court judgment - stands unless a majority
of Justices votes to change the result; thus the occasional notation
of cases "affirmed by an equally divided Court." Alternatively,
when, for whatever reason, no majority exists to decide a case, it
can be reset for argument the following Term, in theory a process
that could continue indefinitely. (The Court also has the option of
remanding for consideration in light of a completely inscrutable
opinion, which has the same practical effect as making no decision
at all.) Of course, if the Court frequently failed to issue any decision at all, it would be subject to grave criticism. But this is not
necessarily different from Congress, whose failure to pass an appropriations bill can shut down the government and cause considerable
consternation. So, the distinction between courts and legislatures
regarding the decisiveness criteria is less stark than Steams
suggests.
Our point is not that the Levmore and Steams arguments have
possible flaws, but rather that their speculations about institutional
22. Pp. 295-354 (excerpting Maxwell L. Steams, The Misguided Renaissance of Social

Choice, 103 YALE LJ.1219 (1994)).
23. See supra text accompanying notes 17-18.
24. Like Steams, we are putting aside the cases where the Court simply fails to grant

certiorari. P. 329 n.156.
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processes, while intriguing, may be too idiosyncratic to introduce
students effectively to the subject. The book provides a somewhat
broader look, however, as it moves on to consider some institutional implications of public choice. Here, the selections include:
an effort by Levmore to explain bicameralism, also based on the
pivotal importance of Condorcet winners;2 a well-known essay by
political scientist Ken Shepsle describing "legislative intent as an
oxymoron" on the ground that Arrow's Theorem eliminates the
concept of a coherent set of legislative preferences; 26 and two papers about the possibility of cycling in Supreme Court decisions
presenting multiple issues.27 These papers do provide students a
somewhat broader exposure to social choice theory. 28
C. Applications to Law
The final section of the book, Chapter Three, considers applications of public choice to a broad range of issues, ranging from the
doctrine of stare decisis to antidiscrimination law. Most of the selections cover one of three general areas: the functioning of the
judiciary, the concept of legislative intent, and constitutional issues.
The first two areas are not our focus in this review. Research on
the judiciary is somewhat peripheral to the main body of public
choice scholarship

-

though by no means unimportant -

and.the

two of us have already written more than enough about the subject
of legislative intent, some of it reprinted in the book (pp. 641-70).
Consequently, we will concentrate here on the constitutional area,
which probably holds the greatest interest for most readers. Because the book includes excerpts on such a broad range of constitutional topics, it would be difficult to provide a comprehensive yet
coherent description. Instead, we will focus on two areas of particular interest relating to the structure of government: federalism
and term limits.
25. P. 386 (excerpting Saul Levmore, Bicameralism: When Are Two DecisionsBetter than
One?, 12 IN. Rv. L. & ECON. 145 (1992)).
26. Pp. 393-408 (excerpting Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congressis a "They," Not an "It": Legislative Intent as an Oxymoron, 12 INm. REv. L. & ECON. 239 (1992)).
27. Pp. 418-64 (excerpting Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizingthe Court,95 HARV.
L. REv. 802 (1982) and Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96
YALE L.. 82 (1986)).
28. Although each of these papers is individually interesting, it would probably be more
useful to give students a coherent picture of the current state of thought among public choice
theorists about institutional structures and procedures, rather than a handful of papers deal-

ing with isolated problems. The extensive attention given to the procedures used by courts,
here and elsewhere in the book (pp. 477-551, 724-876), is probably a tribute to the continued
fascination that we in the legal academy have with the judiciary, while the public choice
literature as a whole pays more attention to legislatures-and, secondarily, to popular
elections.
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The topic of federalism is represented by an article by Jon

Macey about federal deference to local regulators. 29 For example,

Congress allows Delaware law to govern the internal affairs of most
major corporations (p. 878 n.11). Macey asks why federal legislators would ever allow states to regulate, rather than exercising their
power to preempt. After all, preemption would allow federal legislators to capture all of the political gains to be obtained from legislating on a topic (p. 878). In short, it would appear, "deference to
state regulators simply allows local lawmakers to capture for themselves the political support available for supplying regulation to
rent-seeking constituents" (p. 880). Macey's theory is that "Congress will delegate to local regulators only when the political support it obtains from deferring to the states is greater than the
political support it obtains from regulating itself" (p. 878). Like a
business franchiser, Congress sometimes finds it more profitable to
subcontract rather than vertically integrating and taking over the
field. Macey suggests that this will be true when: (1) a particular
state like Delaware "has developed a body of regulation that comprises a valuable capital asset"; (2) the most politically appealing
alternative varies sharply on a geographic basis; or (3) "Congress
can avoid potentially damaging political opposition from specialinterest groups by putting the responsibility for a particularly controversial issue on state and local governments" (p. 879). Under all

other circumstances, however, "obtaining a federal law will be the
strategy of choice for most interest groups seeking to obtain wealth
transfers" (p. 880). In particular, "interest groups will favor federal
law over state law because states face stiffer competition from one
another than the federal government faces from other sovereign nations" (p. 882).
In sum, Macey maintains:
From a public-choice perspective, the federalist system can only
be viewed as a mechanism that provides a complement rather than a
substitute for federal law as a mechanism by which interest groups
can exchange political support for wealth transfers. Deferring regula-

tory matters to the state legislatures must take its place alongside the
other strategies by which federal politicians can offer wealth transfers
to interest groups in exchange for political support. [p. 894]
Or, as Steams puts it, "[iln Macey's analysis, federalism is not a
doctrine with independent political content, but is instead a handy
label politicians attach to outcomes that they have reached for quite
independent reasons" (p. 895).

29. Pp. 877-94 (excerpting Jonathan R. Macey, FederalDeference to Local Regulators and
the Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76

VA. L. REv. 265 (1990)).
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Federalism is an increasingly important area, both in constitutional law3o and public choice scholarship, 31 and Stearns is to be
commended for including it in his coverage. The Macey article,
however, gives only a partial view of this developing body of literature. While Macey's Chicago School perspective gives little weight
to institutional factors, much current research is dedicated to exploring the institutional supports for federalism, including the structure of American political parties, competition between states to
offer the optimal package of regulations, taxes, and services, the
influence of state governments as federal lobbyists, and the role of
the judiciary as enforcers of the federalist bargain. 32 Perhaps a
fuller coverage of these institutional issues will be warranted in
later editions.
Steams does address one question of institutional design - the
issue of term limits. Will term limits affect the behavior of legislators, and if so, will it make them more or less inclined to follow the
lead of special interests? Linda Cohen and Matt Spitzer address
this topic through game theory.3 3 Unlike many selections in the
book, their paper offers a classic example of public choice research;
although lacking in mathematics, it gives students the genuine feel
of typical work by public choice theorists. Cohen and Spitzer carefully specify their models, explicitly discuss each significant assumption, and then trace the logical implications of each model.
Although they provide variants, there are essentially two basic
models.
The first model explores the tendency of politicians to favor
projects with short-term benefits over long-term projects with
greater public benefits (pp. 930-39). The key assumption, which
Cohen and Spitzer support with some empirical evidence, is that
politicians primarily seek reelection and that voters primarily assess
candidates based on a candidate's past performance rather than
predictions about the future. In other words, voters engage in retrospective voting. Given these assumptions, politicians devalue
long-term projects for two reasons. Most obviously, benefits that
accrue after the politician leaves office provide him with no payoff.
Less obviously, the payoff from winning any one election is partly
the chance to run as an incumbent in later elections. The value of
this payoff, of course, depends on the number of potential future
elections a politician has left to win at any given time. For example,
30. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549 (1995).
31. See, e.g., Symposium, The Law and Economics of Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REv. 249

(1997).
32. These issues are discussed in the contributions to the Minnesota symposium, id.
33. Pp. 925-60 (excerpting Linda Cohen & Matthew Spitzer, Term Limits, 80 GEo. L.J.

1992)).
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a project whose benefit accrues in a politician's last term before
retiring provides no reelection payoff at all and is therefore politically worthless to him. The upshot is that politicians discount future benefits too heavily. Cohen and Spitzer go on to show that
term limits accentuate this effect - more benefits take place after
the politician has left office or when there are relatively few future
elections left to be won (pp. 936-39).
The second Cohen and Spitzer model illustrates an important
game theory concept known as unraveling (pp. 937-38). In its
baldest form, the problem is this. Suppose a legislator can only
serve for three terms. After his second reelection, the legislator no
longer faces the possibility of losing an election and therefore has
no reason to care about the opinion of the electorate. Instead, she
will cater to special interests who can provide her with benefits after she leaves office. The electorate will respond by refusing to reelect her a second time. The politician thus knows that her first
reelection campaign will be her last, so her second term will be free
from any electoral discipline. The electorate will respond by refusing to reelect even once, so we are left with a one-term legislature,
during which every legislator is a lame duck who is free from any
responsibility to the electorate and devotes himself to serving special interests.
Of course, this model is greatly oversimplified, and Cohen and
Spitzer relax their assumptions to consider more realistic scenarios.
Nevertheless, they find, the general conclusion remains intact:
"Other things being equal, term limits should induce legislators to
spend more time servicing special interests and personal interests
than they do at present" (p. 951).
Unlike some public choice scholars, Cohen and Spitzer are cautious in drawing normative conclusions. As they point out, they define a special interest as "any minority of the constituency that
would not be served in a world of full information" (p. 958). Thus,
serving a special interest could include both "taking money for terminating fraud investigation" and "standing up for what is 'right"'
(p. 958). Cohen and Spitzer predict "more looting and graft, mixed
with an increased number of principled stands against the electorate" (p. 959). Their concerns under the first model are less ambiguous, because they feel strongly that legislators are already too
present-minded (p. 959).
The Cohen and Spitzer models are hardly bulletproof. Their assumptions have some empirical support but are subject to dispute.
Moreover, it is possible that term limits would change the rules of
the political game enough to undermine their assumptions even if
they are now valid - for example, voters might switch away from
the retrospective voting that Cohen and Spitzer's first model as-
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sumes. Or, as Cohen and Spitzer admit, other structural changes
such as strengthening of legislative ethics rules might counter some
of their projections (pp. 944-45). As Stearns points out, responsiveness to district electorates may also lend itself to pork barrel legislation, which term limits might usefully diminish (pp. 963-64). But
despite these and other possible replies to their argument, 34 the
Cohen and Spitzer paper is an excellent example of how public
choice theory can help us think through the complex consequences
of institutional changes.
II.

PUBLIC CHOICE IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP

Under any but the most formalist view of legal analysis, an improved understanding of how government works can aid public law
scholarship. The question is whether - and how - public choice
can contribute to that understanding. In addressing this question,
we begin by examining a recent heated controversy about the explanatory power of public choice among political scientists. Unlike
many such debates, this one generated as much light as heat. Based
on some of the insights generated by this debate, we then use some
recent important work by legal scholars to illustrate how, in our
opinion, public choice can best be integrated into legal scholarship.
A.

The "Pathologies"Debate and the Limits of Theory

The debate opened in 1994 with the publication of Donald
Green and Ian Shapiro's book, Pathologiesof Rational Choice Theory.35 Setting out to examine the public choice literature on its own
terms, Green and Shapiro ask what that literature has revealed
about politics, and conclude "that exceedingly little has been
learned. ' 36 Although admitting that intellectually elegant models
had been created, they find little in the way of empirical payoff: a
"large proportion of the theoretical conjectures of rational choice
theorists have not been tested empirically," and "[t]hose tests that
have been undertaken have either failed on their own terms or garnered theoretical support for propositions that, on reflection, can
only be characterized as banal. ' 37 In short, they vigorously disagree
with Stearns's assessment that public choice offers "rich and falsifiable theses about collective decisionmaking" (p. xxii).
34. For the contrary view about the desirability of term limits, see Einer Elhauge, Are
Tenn Limits Undemocratic?,64 U. Cmi. L. REv. 83 (1997). See also Garrett, supra note 13, at
639 (critiquing the Cohen and Spitzer model but concluding for other reasons that term limits
will not decrease the power of special interests).
35. GREEN & SHAPrNo, supra note 4.
36. Id. at x.

37. Id. at 6.
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In their survey of the empirical evidence, Green and Shapiro
cover a broad range of topics: the voter's paradox, prisoner's dilemmas and free-riding, legislative behavior, and spatial theories of
electoral competition. They accuse public choice researchers of a
number of methodological pathologies, including (1) developing
models to fit the data, rather than testing models by making predictions, (2) failing t6 test competing explanations, (3) making vague
or ambiguous predictions that cannot readily be38falsified, and (4)
mining the historical record for confirming data.
Green and Shapiro's analysis of the voter's paradox is illustrative. As we saw in Part I, one possible explanation for voting is that
the act itself is gratifying - that is, has consumption value. Green
and Shapiro point out, however, that no one has offered independent evidence of this consumption value apart from voter turnout
itself - the fact to be explained. They also observe that it seems
peculiar that people do not obtain equal consumption value from
other actions such as jury service or writing letters to legislators.
An equally unproven explanation is that political leaders are aware
of who votes and offer selective incentives to individual voters. Or,
perhaps voters have inflated estimates of the likelihood of casting
the tie-breaking vote, though no evidence of such a cognitive error
has been produced.3 9 More recent efforts to resolve the voter's paradox involve game theory. In some game theory models, "voters
simultaneously decide whether to vote based on their strategic anticipation of others' actions [producing] an equilibrium result in
which many people turn[ ] out."' 40 The problem is that the results
depend entirely on the assumption that voters are perfectly informed about the voting costs of other citizens and about the exact
level of support of the candidates. 41 Turnout disappears with more
realistic assumptions about voters. Nor are Green and Shapiro impressed by the argument that voting is a uniquely low-cost activity
that consequently offers an unusual chance to express ideological
preferences: "Can it be said of Latin American elections, in which
voters spend hours in polling lines, sometimes amid threats of violence, that turnout is a low-cost activity? What of the more than
100,000 African-Americans who persevered through the intimidation and poll taxes of the Jim Crow South and voted in the national
elections of the 1950s?"42 Finally, they consider the fall-back assumption that, while public choice cannot explain the existence of
high turnout, it can explain marginal variations in turnout relating
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

See ii. at 33-46.
See iULat 51-56.
Id. at 57.
See id. at 57-58.
Ia&at 58-59.
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to the closeness of the election or the costs of voting - for example, bad weather. They find the theory's empirical predictions
about these marginal effects to be either banal or unconfirmed. 43
In sum, Green and Shapiro conclude, "[r]eaders interested in
the determinants of voter turnout... will derive little insight from
the empirical work in the rational choice tradition." 44 It is difficult,
they contend, to see how rational choice theory could be disconfirmed given the range of maneuvers open to account for the data,
including "post hoc insertion of idiosyncratic tastes, beliefs, and
probability assessments as explanatory devices. '45 Nor do they find
the voter's paradox to be an isolated failure of public choice theory.
They find similar failings in the literature on the related problem of
free riding and collective action, a problem that is basic to the Chicago School's prediction of undue influence by concentrated special
46
interests.
Given Stearns's stress on problems of cycling, it is also worth
considering Green and Shapiro's empirical evidence on the subject.
They begin by deconstructing purported historical examples of cycling offered by William Riker and others. 47 Green and Shapiro
find little empirical evidence on the question of whether institutional arrangements affect instability,48 nor even testable predictions on this question. 49 Perhaps most tellingly, they find that the
experimental evidence fails to confirm clearly a central prediction
of voting theory: that outcomes should be found in the "core"
when one exists.50 Moreover, seemingly extraneous factors, like
perceptions of fairness, differences in the gaming talents of the participants, and cognitive difficulties, seem to affect outcomes heavily. 51 Indeed, the dispersion of outcomes seems to be only a little
larger in games without a core, where cycling should be rampant.5 2
None of these findings, of course, disprove Arrow's Theorem; by
definition, mathematical theorems cannot be falsified empirically.
What is unclear is whether Arrow's Theorem and its successors lead
to useful falsifiable predictions about how actual legislatures behave under varying conditions.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

See id. at 59-68.
Id. at 68.
Id. at 69.
See id. at 72-97.
See id. at 109-11.
See id. at 113.
See id. at 117-19.
See id. at 127-28.
See id. at 129-31.
See id. at 135.
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Green and Shapiro's conclusion, in a nutshell, is that public
choice has failed to produce usable empirical knowledge. They find
little payoff in terms of understanding actual political behavior.
They call upon public choice theorists "to get closer to the data so
as to theorize in empirically pertinent ways," and to open their eyes
to competing hypotheses about human behavior stemming from so53
cial sciences other than economics.
Although Steams does not cite Pathologies of Rational Choice
Theory, leading researchers in the field have taken the book seriously. Public choice theorists were quick to respond to the accusation that they had failed to live up to their own methodological
standards that required scientific theories to deduce falsifiable predictions subject to rigorous statistical testing. Perhaps the most interesting feature of the responses is the extent to which leading
public choice scholars themselves rejected these "scientific" aspirations in favor of a more humanistic approach. 54 Consider the views
of three leading public choice scholars: John Ferejohn, Morris
Fiorina, and Ken Shepsle.
Ferejohn, in an essay coauthored with Debra Satz,55 argues that
Green and Shapiro's "conception of what constitutes a contribution
to knowledge is too narrow; it excludes much good social science."' 56 Specifically, the essay argues, social science theories serve
other important purposes besides producing valid empirical predictions. First, a good theory may make problematic previously unexamined phenomena - like voter turnout - creating a new
research agenda. Second, a theory may unify apparently unrelated
phenomena or shed light on deep structural similarities that might
otherwise escape understanding. 57 For example, pointing to studies
of the reelection motive of legislators, the essay applauds the research for demonstrating the existence of an underlying causal
mechanism for seemingly unrelated phenomena: "Even if none of
these studies had provided an improved statistical account of any
specific behavioral phenomenon, they would remain outstanding
additions to our understanding of congressional behavior and
58
organization."
Fiorina takes a similar position. He argues that the "notion of
empirical research that 'contributes to our understanding of poli53. See id. at 203.
54. For an overview, see Jeffrey Friedman, Introduction: Economic Approaches to Politics, in THE RATIONAL CHoicE CowrcIovmEsy, supra note 4, at 1-24.
55. John Ferejohn & Debra Satz, Unification, Universalism, and Rational Choice Theory,
in THE RA-IONAL CHoICE CorCImovERsy, supra note 4, at 71.

56. IL at 72.
57. See id. at 72-76.
58. Id. at 76.
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tics' is far more general than the idea of testing a specific theoretical
proposition." 59 For example, he says, "it boggles the mind that anyone would deny the empirical contributions that resulted from the
work of Mancur Olson, ' ' 6° Olson's theory provided an explanation
of a familiar phenomenon - the unequal representation of different interest groups in the political process. In doing so, he sparked
a new research agenda about why people join groups, and he provided the basis for imaginative accounts of larger-scale events like
the periodic surges in congressional power. Thus, Fiorina says, we
need a broader conception of what constitutes an empirical
contribution:
Every empirically based modification, generalization, or even rejection of Olson is an empirical contribution stimulated by his work.
Every extension of his ideas to new areas is an empirical contribution.
Every incorporation of his ideas in larger explanatory accounts is an
empirical contribution. Even seeming counter-examples that lead
people to see matters in a new light are empirical contributions. 61
Besides their overly demanding concept of empiricism, Fiorina
says, Green and Shapiro also overlook several important aspects of
public choice itself. First, public choice is a general perspective, not
a unified theory, so there is a large diversity of scholarship embodying many different models: "every manner of disagreement - theoretical, substantive, methodological - can be found" in public
choice. 62 Second, public choice is not intended as a monocausal explanation. Instead, it is offered with an implicit "all other things
being equal" clause. For example, Olson's work does not predict
the absence of collective organizations, but merely that, all things
being equal, larger, diffuse groups are more difficult to organize
than small concentrated ones. 63 Finally, no public choice model is
intended as a comprehensive explanation of an institution. Instead,
each offers a partial view focusing on significant features of the institution. As a result, "there will never be a single ... model of a
real presidential campaign, of the U.S. Congress, or of the federal
regulatory process. What we are engaged in is the construction of
scores of models that focus on different aspects of political institutions and processes."' 64
Like Fiorina and Ferejohn, Shepsle faults Green and Shapiro for
having too narrow a view of public choice and too restricted a concept of valid research. Given the undeveloped nature of political
59. Morris P. Fiorina, Rational Choice, Empirical Contributions,and the Scientific Enterprise, in THE RATIONAL CHOICE CoirIovERsy, supra note 4, at 90.

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

111
Id. at 91.
Id. at 87.
See id. at 88-89.
Id at 89.
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science, he says, "a theory may remain a live prospect, even though
it is not a very good theory, because it trumps alternatives" which, he adds, should be a source of modesty for public choice
theorists. 65 Moreover, one should be "charitable toward relatively
soft assessments" of theories given the great difficulty of rigorous
statistical testing.66 Finally, Shepsle says, Green and Shapiro underestimate the extent to which public choice scholars have responded
constructively to criticism by incorporating cultural explanations
into their models and generalizing their models to include human
67
cognitive limitations.
The upshot of these responses is a significant modesty about the
aspirations of public choice theory. A public choice model may
give us insights into commonalities between different phenomena; it
may suggest new avenues for empirical research; and it may provide
insights into how particular aspects of institutions function. Public
choice theory will not, however, give us a unified model of even a
single major political institution that accounts for all aspects of its
behavior, let alone a model of the political system as a whole. Nor
will public choice allow us to evade a realistic appreciation of the
complexities of human behavior, whether those complexities become complications of the model itself, as Shepsle suggests, or serve
instead as implicit, "all things being equal" conditions, as Fiorina
suggests. In short, we can hope for insights from public choice theory, but we are not going to get The Truth About Politics anytime
soon.
From the point of view of legal scholars, the ideal interdiscipli-

nary theory would have several characteristics. It would be simple
- so that even law professors could use it. It would be unequivocal
in its predictions - so we could easily use the predictions to evaluate the consequences of legal rules. It would explain all or most
human behavior within some clearly specified field of activity - so
we would know when to apply it. Finally, it would produce verified
but counterintuitive predictions - so that it would reveal something startling about legal rules. As is evident from the debate over
Green and Shapiro's book, public.choice is not this dream theory.
But that does not mean that it is useless from the point of view of
legal scholars. Instead, it means that we must be more realistic in
our expectations for interdisciplinary scholarship. As we will see,
despite its shortcomings, public choice has been used to good effect
to illuminate legal issues.
65. See Kenneth A. Shepsle, StatisticalPoliticalPhilosophy and Positive PoliticalTheory,
in TH-E RATIONAL CHoicE CoNTRovERsY, supra note 4, at 217.

66. See id. at 219.
67. See id. at 220-21.
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Fruitful Encounters Between Law and Public Choice

Steams lauds public choice for providing "a powerful set of analytic tools with which to evaluate the most pressing problems that
face public policy makers, lawyers, bureaucrats, and judges" (p. xxiii). In light of the Pathologies debate, however, the reader may
wonder whether public choice really does have anything useful to
contribute to public law. We believe the answer is yes. In this subsection, we discuss three recent, and in our opinion, successful uses
of public choice insights in public law scholarship. Our purpose is
not merely to pass out plaudits, but to use these examples to explore the conditions under which public choice is likely to prove
most useful in legal scholarship.
Our first example is Jerry Mashaw's recent work on preenforcement review of administrative regulations. 68 In the past few
decades, rulemaking has played an increasingly central role in administrative regulation, and courts have responded by allowing immediate judicial review of regulations - without waiting for
application of the regulation to specific situations. Today, there is
considerable dissatisfaction about the "ossification" of the rulemaking process, a problem that may be partly due at least to overzealous judicial review. As a result, agencies increasingly abandon
rulemaking for other - often less desirable - regulatory techniques. 69 Mashaw suggests that we might usefully restructure judicial review to decrease the incentive for private interests to exploit
judicial review as a form of obstruction.
Specifically, Mashaw argues that limiting pre-enforcement judicial review would dramatically improve the incentives of private
parties. To explore this possibility, he uses simple game theory
models, working through two pre-enforcement review games and
one who-will-sue game.70 These models demonstrate that a firm
will almost always bring pre-enforcement suit if there is no penalty
for noncompliance with the regulation during the litigation. If
there is a penalty for noncompliance, the game becomes more complicated, because it becomes likely that some firms will comply
rather than sue. This successful compliance may increase the likelihood that a court will uphold the regulation - and hence the likelihood of a penalty against noncompliers. Challenges to regulations
do not disappear, but the likelihood of challenges becomes sensitive
to parameters such as the probability of success.
At least in some settings, Mashaw suggests, shifting the timing
of review would have valuable consequences. It would push regu68. MAsHAw, supra note 1, at 158-80.
69. See id. at 158-66.
70. See id. at 167-74.
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lated parties toward devoting their energies to a good-faith effort to
comply rather than toward elaborating arguments about the impossibility of compliance. It would make judicial review more realistic,
because review could be based not only on the record before the
agency but on evidence about the real-world implementation of the
regulation. It would eliminate unnecessary judicial review where
compliance costs turn out to be lower than expected by industry.
But Mashaw does not offer pre-enforcement review as a panacea.
He concedes that pre-enforcement review may be suitable where
the need for legal certainty is especially high - for example, when
environmental regulations require
complex interactions between
71
different levels of government.
Our purpose here is not to endorse Mashaw's proposal, 72 but
rather to highlight his fruitful use of game theory. The decision of
one firm to sue depends on the strategic decisions of other firms,
and game theory is designed to clarify just such complex interactions. But Mashaw wisely does not place sole reliance on his models. Instead he draws on his own learning as an expert on
administrative law to assess the significance of the conclusions.
Thus, he melds his legal expertise with public choice techniques.
Our second example also deals with interactions between courts
and agencies. In a substantial body of work culminating in a recent
book,7 3 Bill Eskridge argues that statutory interpretation by courts
inevitably involves value judgments that evolve over time. For this
reason, he conceptualizes courts as participants in a dynamic interaction with agencies and Congress, rather than being aloof from the
rest of the governance system. Eskridge makes apt use of public
choice models to assess the way in which the Chevron doctrine 74
affects interactions between the branches of government. He models statutory interpretation as a sequential game involving median
legislators in both houses, the President, agencies, and the courts.
His analysis suggests two conclusions. One conclusion is rather banal: the Chevron doctrine increases presidential power to shift policy over time (pp. 190-93). The other conclusion, however, is more
intriguing. The models suggest that "even if judicial preferences
about statutory policy were completely unrelated to legislative pref71. See id. at 174-80.
72. For criticisms, see Mark Seidenfeld, Playing Games with the Timing of Judicial Review: An Evaluation of Proposalsto Restrict Pre-Enforcement Review of Agency Rules, 58

Omo ST. L.J. 85 (1997); Jim Rossi, Public Choice Theory and the Fragmented Web of the
ContemporaryAdministrative State, 96 MICH. L. Rnv. 1746 (1998) (reviewing MASHAW, supra

note 1).
73. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIc STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994).

74. The Chevron doctrine, named after Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), requires courts to defer to reasonable agency interpretations of statutes. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 73, at 161-64.
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erences . . . aggressive judicial review would not necessarily be

countermajoritarian because it would create a new default position
relatively less influenced by presidential preferences." 75 It is this
capacity to produce novel insights that make public choice a potentially useful tool.
Our final example is drawn from the work of an economist,
rather than a law professor. Interestingly enough, it is less oriented
toward formal modeling and more toward empirical evidence than
the last two examples. William Fischel provides an in-depth analysis of takings law in his recent book, Regulatory Takings.76 One of
his intriguing suggestions is that the application of takings law
should be more stringent for local governments than for higher
levels of government. His argument, which he only sketches, rests
on the propensity of local governments to break their commitments, because the long-term effects of such betrayals will fall upon
future residents of the community, who often come from elsewhere,
rather than the community's current residents and their descendants.77 Competition between localities for residents and businesses mitigates this effect, but the restraining effect of competition
fails to operate in some settings, particularly those involving the
regulation of immobile capital. In contrast, higher levels of government are more inclusive and less able to externalize costs on outsiders. Although Fischel's argument is rooted in public choice theory,
what makes it plausible is the body of empirical evidence, ranging
from the anecdotal to the econometric, that Fischel presents about
the tendency of local
government to impose costs on outside own78
ers of fixed assets.
We consider each of these examples to be a successful use of
public choice theory in legal scholarship. Though one may well
quarrel with each author's ultimate conclusions, each effectively
uses public choice to expose a previously neglected dimension of a
legal issue, whether it be the effect of timing rules on litigation
against agencies, the relationship between judicial review and subsequent legislative action, or the relevance of a jurisdiction's size to
the propensity toward overregulation of land use. By highlighting
some neglected structural aspect of a situation, each author pro75. ESKRIDGE, supra note 73, at 167. By countermajoritarian, Eskridge means that the
outcome is farther away from the ideal points of the legislature, which means that the outcome would be less likely to receive the sanction of the Article I lawmaking process.

76. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS
(1995).
77. See id at 131-35.
78. See id. at 289-324. One particularly striking example involves studies of rent control
regulations for mobile homes in some California communities that prevent owners of mobile
home parks from utilizing any "exit" options while leaving them at the prey of localities with
high concentrations of tenants. Id. at 309-24.
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vides a basis for an innovative modification of existing legal rules.
Each author also shows a sensitivity to cross-cutting normative issues - for example, the tension between our commitment to the
democratic process and our desire to block special-interest legislation. None of the authors attempt to give the public choice findings
more weight than they can reasonably carry.
Notably, we think, each work is by an author with a deep, longstanding immersion in both the field of law and the relevant public
choice literature, not someone who has merely read a few Supreme
Court cases and knows the term "rent-seeking." At least in the
right hands, then, the tools of public choice theory can make a genuine contribution to public law scholarship.
These uses of public choice may be less ambitious than the
fondest hopes of some of its early advocates in legal scholarship.
But these applications of public choice are consistent with the more
modest aspirations expressed in responses to Green and Shapiro.
As we saw, Ferejohn, Fiorina, and Shepsle praised public choice
more for its ability to offer illuminating explanations of particular
phenomena than as a source of certainty about governmental functioning, while admitting that - at least as yet - its predictive powers are limited. The legal scholarship discussed in this subsection
harmonizes with the views expressed by Peter Ordeshook, another
prominent public choice scholar, in the Pathologies debate:
Thus, rather than approach the construction and assessment of
models as though we were scientists discovering basic laws of the universe, we should try to solve specific problems in specific contexts
with an understanding that different models may be best suited for
different situations. Every bridge is a special problem in engineering.
We also need to appreciate that certain aspects of reality cannot yet
be subjected to abstract theoretical analysis, or even to fully coherent
empirical analysis. Crude rules of thumb, intuition based on experience, simple insight, and "mindless
statistical analysis" will be an es79
sential part of our enterprise.
We leave it to political scientists to decide whether Ordeshook's
advice is suitable for their discipline, but we have little doubt that
his views about the uses of public choice are entirely on target with
respect to legal scholars.
III:

PUBLIC CHOICE IN THE CLASSROOM

One implication of our discussion is that public choice has influenced legal scholarship in some important ways and, if applied with
appropriate modesty, may have even more significant influence in
the future. As in at least the early days of law and economics, how79. Peter Ordeshook, Engineeringor Science: What is the Study of Politics?, in THE RATIONAL CHOICE CoNTRovERsy, supra note 4, at 187.
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ever, it is much more daunting to analyze how public choice can be
domesticated for the law school classroom. It may be a hit in the
glitzy Broadway of the faculty lounge, but how will it play in the
Peoria heartland of the classroom?
Few law professors have developed sophistication with public
choice. Those who have may find Stearns's book an excellent vehicle for teaching a seminar or course devoted to the subject.
Levmore, for example, reports that he used portions of the book in
manuscript form and found much student enthusiasm for the materials (p. xiii). Even sophisticates, however, may face some structural
difficulties. Unlike Richard Posner's Economic Analysis of Law80
and, to a lesser extent, Mitchell Polinsky's An Introduction to Law
and Economics,81 Stearns's book is constituted largely of lengthy
excerpts of law review articles, with numerous questions and comments interspersed. Both the Posner and Polinsky books are in
monograph form, eschewing reprinting the work of others. Accordingly, as the products of one mind and organizational structure,
they provide a more integrated and overarching look at their subject. In our experience pondering the presentation of law-andmaterials to students, books of the Posner-Polinsky format tend to
lend themselves more easily to classroom use. We have not taught
out of Stearns's book, however, and in any event have no desire to
belabor this matter of pedagogical taste.
We doubt that we have much useful pedagogical advice to offer
to sophisticates who have dedicated at least some of their scholarly
agenda to the relationship of public law and public choice. Obviously, these professors are well equipped to take on Stearns's book
as teachers and follow Levmore's advice that public law and public
choice should be offered as a methodological course, much like law
and economics, feminist legal theory, and so on (pp. xiv-xv). Will
such methodological courses supplant traditional substantive
courses? For the moment, we doubt that a revolution in the law
school curriculum along these lines is about to happen. Frankly, we
also doubt that, as yet, many law professors have come to share
Levmore's judgment that "[t]he most exciting intellectual development in law schools in the last decade is surely the arrival and
growth of public choice theory" (p. xi).
The much more daunting question is what the professor who
finds public choice analysis helpful in analyzing public law should
do in the classroom, if she is unable or unwilling to offer a course or
seminar dedicated solely to the relationship of public law and public
choice. The obvious alternative to the focused, methodological approach is what Levmore himself calls the "trans-substantive" ap80. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (4th ed. 1992).
81. A. MrrCHELL POLINSKY, AN NTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS (2d ed. 1989).
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proach, in which an area of law is enriched by interdisciplinary
analysis (p. xv). Our preference for this undertaking is exemplified
by the two casebooks we have edited, which both attempt to weave
public choice analysis into various topics of public law that are at
the core of the fields the books cover.82 But even in situations in
which a teacher of public law is using a casebook that provides no
linkage to public choice, she has a rich array of articles - many of
them excerpted by Steams - from which to pick and choose
illustrations in which public choice provides useful analysis. 83
For example, when one of us taught a basic course in statutory
civil rights a few years ago, using a casebook that did not mention
public choice analysis, he found it helpful to illuminate the Supreme
Court's shifting approaches to the interpretation of these statutes
through public choice analysis. That was not a difficult task: Bill
Eskridge had published an article that provided a roadmap for analyzing these jurisprudential meanderings through straightforward,
easily understood public choice analysis - the sort of thing that
lends itself to intuitive diagrams on the blackboard. 84 The teacher
never assigned the article to the students, but instead did a bit of
the rabbit-out-of-the-hat act the first time the topic seemed logically to present itself in class. The students were fascinated by it
and themselves returned to that analysis at later points, often without the need for any suggestive questions from the podium. This
approach worked well because the insights were intuitive, required
no sophisticated mathematics or modeling, and were of general interest to students because they provided a sharper window on basic
lawyerly questions, such as the extent to which the Supreme Court
has demonstrated the apparent capacity to engage in strategic statutory interpretation and the factors that would seemingly influence
the exercise of strategic discretion.
Similarly, in teaching environmental law, one of us has found it
useful to introduce the Chicago School model of interest group influence. Environmental law seemingly serves the diffuse social interest in environmental quality at the expense of concentrated
industry interests. It thus presents something of a puzzle for the
Chicago School. Bringing in the Chicago School model serves two
purposes. First, it invites students to consider the ways in which
82. See DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THms

FOR THE CONSTTU-

TION'S THIRD CENTURY (2d ed. 1998); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUrEs AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY

(2d ed. 1995). We organized and presented the materials in a way that, we hope, allows the
professor who does not desire to present public choice analysis simply to skip over it.
83. Ironically, the success of Steams's book in the economic marketplace is endangered
by this "free riding," in which his book serves as a sort of teacher's manual for those teaching

public law.
84. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Congress/Presi-

dent Civil Rights Game, 79 CA.L. L. Rnv. 613 (1991).
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special interests may have succeeded in reshaping environmental
legislation to serve better their own interests.8 5 Second, it raises the
question of how our society has managed to overcome the transaction costs and free-rider barriers to environmental legislation. Part
of the answer may be the role played by environmental groups in
the process of creating and implementing environmental law.8 6 An
appreciation of the role of these groups can improve students' understanding of the dynamics of environmental law.
Our guess is that this episodic approach is the most frequent
scenario by which public choice is making its way into the classroom. To be sure, it is a somewhat intellectually impoverished
pedagogy when compared to a class dedicated to public choice. But
if done carefully, it broadens the intellectual content of the law
school classroom in a way that demonstrates to students a meaningful linkage between the practice of law and interdisciplinary insights. Unfortunately, the messages law students receive about lawand- analysis are often not the ones professors are attempting to
send. A class dedicated to law-and- analysis threatens to suggest to
law students that the professor is grudgingly employed in a professional school while attempting to replicate graduate-school curricular offerings that have no obvious utility to the practicing bar.
Much the same problem arises from poorly integrated law-and- insertions into traditional courses: the message is something like, "we
will now spend ten minutes on something intellectually interesting,
unlike our basic casebook material, and unlike what lawyers really
do for a living."
The trans-substantive approach provides a number of ways to
combat this problem. For example, one of us introduces many of
the topics in the Legislation course through the use of a case study
of the adoption of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,87 followed by an
examination of United Steelworkers v. Weber,88 a well-known case
addressing whether Title VII of the Act forbids voluntary affirmative action in private employment.8 9 One lesson extracted from
Weber is that there are at least three potential perspectives to give
meaning to a statute - the textual perspective, focusing on statutory language; the institutional perspective, focusing on the legislature in general and the legislative history of the statute in particular;
and the contextual perspective, focusing on the factual and legal
85. The classic discussion of this phenomenon is BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T.
HASSLER, CLEAN CoALJDIRTY AIR (1981).

86. For further exploration of these issues, see Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure
in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 59, 59-61, 65-72 (1992).

87. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241.
88. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
89. See ESERuDGE & FRcKEY, supra note 82, at 1-34, 71-87.
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situation in which the parties find themselves years after the statute
was drafted and enacted. The instructor then has the class examine
materials presenting three models of the legislative process - one
focusing on problems of rational choice, such as Arrow problems;
another examining interest group formation and activity, including
free-rider problems; and a third assessing the deliberative capacities
of the legislative process. 90 The first two models seemingly undercut the attractiveness of focusing on the institutional perspective in
interpreting statutes. The legislature ends up looking like an institution capable of reaching majoritarian decisions that are arbitrary
for Arrovian reasons and lack any coherent underlying purpose. To
the extent that any organizing intent lies behind a statute, moreover, the interest group transactional model posits that it merely
reflects a systematic skewing of political power in favor of small,
well-organized interests. The third -

deliberative -

model is

more normatively attractive, but strikes many students as descriptively implausible.
This conversation is designed to debunk the institutional perspective on giving meaning to statutes. At that point, the instructor
then briefly has the class debunk the other two perspectives as well.
Students are usually able to bring something from their undergraduate liberal-arts education of assistance here. For example, the notion of plain textual meaning is subject to a variety of objections,
such as deconstruction theory, the theory that textual autonomy
cannot be divorced from authorial intent, and the notion that textual meaning requires an understanding of the interpretive community engaged in assessing it. Similarly, the notion that judges can
achieve pragmatic contextual outcomes is challenged -by studies
measuring the impact of judicial decisions and by basic law-andeconomics analysis of the inefficiency of some areas of the law.
One major goal of the exercise is to demonstrate that learning from
allied fields is, indeed, relevant to the practice of law, when legal
practice is understood as including an important component of formulating arguments in an ongoing dialogue within a professional
community where interpretive theory remains essentially contested.
In a Legislation course that focused not only on statutory interpretation but on structural issues such as term limits and on process
issues such as campaign finance reforms, an even stronger case can
be made for introducing public choice theory at the beginning of
the course. Once the theory has been explored in some depth, the
teacher can return to the public choice models throughout the
course when confronting, for example, regulation of lobbying,
single-subject rules, the appropriations process, and so on. Similarly, a constitutional law course that focused on the structural is90. See id at 44-61.
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sues of federalism and separation of powers might benefit from the
conceptual framework provided by public choice theory.
There are surely a variety of ways in which teaching materials
might attempt to overcome the difficulties of presenting law-andmaterials so that students appreciate their relevance. Stearns has
made a noble effort to overcome these difficulties. His book focuses on a number of topics of obvious significance even to lawyers
who narrowly conceive their professional purview - the legislative
veto, the nondelegation doctrine, statutory interpretation, stare decisis, constitutional structure, and so on. Furthermore, his questions often attempt to push students toward the integration of
insights gleaned from public choice into legal doctrine. Only time
will tell whether his methodological structure, or our transsubstantive and sometimes episodic preferences, will prevail in the
curricular marketplace. Similarly, it remains to be seen whether
public choice scholarship will take the pragmatic route we
recommend.
We believe that public choice does have something to contribute
to law schools. Both in terms of teaching and scholarship, public
choice may turn out to function in several different ways. It may
penetrate legal analysis only superficially, by contributing a few basic concepts about interest group influence or vote cycling, which
legal academics can then invoke in their scholarship and pass on to
their students, probably using the episodic approach. But this approach misses the opportunity to take advantage of the rich and
sophisticated work now being done by political scientists in the public choice mode. 91 Another possibility is that legal scholars will
merely translate the findings of political scientists into recommendations for legal reform, using methodological courses to teach students how to "apply" public choice results to legal issues. Though
better than the first approach, we believe that this approach to
teaching and scholarship suffers from the opposite weakness, because it limits the opportunities for legal academics to bring their
own expertise to bear on problems. In our opinion, the best,
although most difficult approach, is to try to integrate a fairly sophisticated understanding of public choice with a nuanced appreciation of the dynamics of the legal process. In the classroom, this
approach lends itself to trans-substantive use of public choice
materials; in scholarship, to a fruitful pragmatic melding of public
choice and legal analysis. 92 But regardless of whether the reader
shares our view about the best approach to this kind of interdiscipli91. We highly recommend PERsPECTrvEs ON PuBLIc CHoICE, supra note 6, as an accessible but sophisticated survey of this body of learning.
92. The kind of work we have in mind is exemplified by the scholarship discussed suprain

section II.B.
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nary venture, the Steams book will provide a valuable introduction
to efforts to apply public choice to public law.

PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY AND THE
FRAGMENTED WEB OF THE
CONTEMPORARY ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
Jim Rossi*
GREED, CHAOS,
IMPROVE PUBLIC

& GOVERNANCE:

USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO

LAW. By Jerry L. Mashaw. New Haven, Con-

necticut: Yale University Press. 1997. Pp. 209. $28.
Since World War II, public choice theory - defined broadly as
the application of the assumptions and methodology of
microeconomics to describe or predict the way public officials exercise power - has grown from a fledgling movement, gaining mainstream acceptance and respect for its insights into voting behavior,
judicial decisionmaking, and other public actions.' Although a theory first explored by economists and political scientists, public
choice's normative insights have earned credibility in recent years
in academic legal literature. 2 Public choice's acceptance in the law
school curriculum is demonstrated by the recent publication of
* Assistant Professor and Patricia A. Dore Professor of State Administrative Law, Florida State University College of Law. B.S. 1988, Arizona State University; J.D. 1991, University of Iowa College of Law; LL.M. 1994, Yale Law School - Ed. E-mail:
jrossi@law.fsu.edu.
1. Public choice insights have also contributed to the understanding of private decisionmaking in areas such as bankruptcy and corporate law. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Public
Choice and the Future of Public-Choice-InfluencedLegal Scholarship,50 VAND. L. Rav. 647,
672-73 (1997) (reviewing MAXWELL L. STEARNS, PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW: READINGS AND CoMMEaNTARY (1997)).

2. See, e.g., WiLLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIc STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994);
DANmL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCINON (1991); NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS
IN LAW, ECONOMIcS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994); Symposium on the Theory of Public

Choice,74 VA. L. REv. 167 (1988). Law review articles discussing or deploying public choice
ideas are far too numerous to catalogue here, but some representative examples not otherwise discussed in this review include Linda Cohen & Matthew Spitzer, Term Limits, 80 GEo.

LJ.477 (1992); Richard L. Hasen, "High Court Wrongly Elected": A PublicChoice Model of
Judging and Its Implications for the Voting Rights Act, 75 N.C. L. Rnv. 1305 (1997); Saul
Levmore, Bicameralism: When Are Two Decisions Better Than One?, 12 INTL. REv. L. &
ECON. 145 (1992); Erin O'Hara, Social Constraintor Implicit Collusion? Toward A Game
Theoretic Analysis of Stare Decisis, 24 SETON HALL L. REv. 736 (1993); Pablo T. Spiller &
Emerson H. Tiller, Decision Costs and the Strategic Design of Administrative Process and
JudicialReview, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 347 (1997); Maxwell L. Steams, Standing Back from the
Forest Justiciabilityand Social Choice, 83 CAL. L. Rav. 1309 (1995); Lynn A. Stout, Strict
Scrutiny and Social Choice: An Economic Inquiry into FundamentalRights and Suspect Classifications, 80 GEo. LJ. 1787 (1992).
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course material on the topic. 3 However, despite public choice's
self-proclaimed positive nature - as a descriptive and predictive
tool - it continues to have its share of vigorous opponents, who
"angrily reject its pessimistic model of human behavior, and suspect
its analysis of being4 driven by an underlying dislike of regulation
and redistribution."
Theories of administrative law have also been the subject of
much discussion in the legal literature over the past half-century.
Many contemporary scholars have attempted to weave administrative law statutes and cases into overarching theories of bureaucracy.
At the same time both bureaucracy and administrative law have
had a fair number of vigorous critics, some rejecting delegation as
inherently antidemocratic, 5 others condemning the actions of bureaucrats as without common sense, 6 still others decrying theories
of bureaucracy as incoherent and illegitimate 7 or the administrative
8
state as unconstitutional.
It thus seems that public choice and administrative law share a
common subject matter and vigorous opposition. Jerry Mashaw
seeks to address both in Greed, Chaos, & Governance: Using Public Choice to Improve Public Law. Mashaw, a Sterling Professor of
Law at Yale Law School, has had a major influence on federal administrative law for nearly three decades. His first two books, on
the social security disability claims process 9 and the 1970s due process revolution,' 0 are cited regularly in the administrative law and
public administration literature. A later book on the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA's) failed auto
safety program, coauthored with David Harfst, led the charge
against judicial ossification of the administrative rulemaking process and secured Mashaw's reputation for using case-study analysis
3. See MAXWELL L. STEARNS, PuBLIc CHoIcE AND PUBLIC LAW: READINGS AND COMMENrARY

(1997).

4. Edward L. Rubin, Public Choice and Legal Scholarship, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 490, 490
(1996). One administrative law scholar ascribes to public choice theory "general skepticism
about activist government in all its forms." Thomas W. Merill, Capture Theory and the
Courts: 1967-1983, 72 C -.. KENrT L. REv. 1039, 1053 (1997).
5. See DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHoUT RESPONSIBILITY: How CONGRESS
ABUSEs THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993) (criticizing Congress's tendency to dele-

gate lawmaking authority to bureaucrats).
6. See PmuiP K. HOWARD, TbR DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: How LAW Is SUFFocATING
AMERICA (1994) (providing anecdotal accounts of how bureaucrats lack common sense).
7. See Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REv.
1276, 1377-80 (1984) (decrying as "self-contradictory" models of bureaucratic legitimation).
8. See Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REv.
1231 (1994) (arguing the post-New Deal administrative state is unconstitutional).
9. See JERRY L. MAsHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILrrY CLAIMS (1983).
10. See JERRY L. MAsHAw, DuE PROCESS IN THE ADMNIsTRATIvE STATE (1985).
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of bureaucracy to shed light on administrative law.1 ' Greed, Chaos
and Governance,more than any of Mashaw's other works, attempts
to explore systematically the normative issue of bureaucracy and its
12
role in a tripartite system of governance.
In Part I, I introduce public choice theory and its now-common
association with a pessimistic view of public law, Mashaw's bate
noire. In Part II, I summarize Mashaw's applications of public
choice theory to the modem administrative state, placing his contribution in the contexts of his previous work and the current genre of
administrative law scholarship. As I will suggest, although his policy recommendations are tentative, they are related by the use of
public choice tools as a mirror for evaluating myths associated with
one of the most cherished institutions in our democracy - the
legislature.
Mashaw's applications of public choice theory are lucid, reasonable, and often convincing; his is an important contribution toward
recognizing defects in the legislative process and giving both public
choice and administrative law broader legitimacy. Like Daniel
Farber and Philip Frickey, authors of one of the first legal books
with a public choice theme,13 Mashaw is not sanguine about the
coherence of using public choice to build grand theories of government or administrative law and searches instead for a middle
ground approach.
For Mashaw, public choice is most insightful for public law when
it yields usable knowledge, a realism that requires us to listen to
"whatever truths modem public choice theory is telling us without
succumbing to the excessively negative vision it so often supports"
(p. 31). Farber and Frickey, who adopt the neorepublican framework 14 as a unifying perspective in their practical reason approach
to integrating public choice and public law, see public choice theory
as consistent with pursuit of the public interest.' 5 For Mashaw, who
distances himself from neorepublicanism and other unifying intellectual perspectives of administrative governance, public choice's
self-proclaimed positivism also does not imply normative skepticism about pursuit of the public interest. As I suggest in Part III,
11. See JERRY L. MAsHAw & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR Auro SAFETY

(1990).
12. The book elaborates and extends themes Mashaw developed more than a decade ago

in the Rosenthal Lectures at Northwestern University Law School, delivered in February
1986.
13. See FARBER & FRiCKY, supra note 2, at 116-18 (distancing their examination of public choice from grand theory and espousing a practical reason stance).
14. By "neorepublican" I mean the view, associated with modern civic republican or de-

liberative democratic theories of governance, that self-interest is not the sole motivating factor for individuals and that at least sometimes individuals will avail themselves of a publicregarding deliberative process.
15. See FARBER & FRicKEY, supra note 2, at 9-11.
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Mashaw's realism is truer to the positivism and method of public
choice theory, understood on its own terms, than the efforts of
those, such as Farber and Frickey, who utilize public choice tools

from a unifying practical reason perspective. Mashaw's fidelity to
realism, however, may come at some cost; absent a unifying perspective of administrative governance outside of public choice theory, we can expect little more than rampant pessimism or
fragmented lessons from public choice.
I.

PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY AND THE RISE OF PESsIMIsM

ABour PuBLIc LAW

Greed, Chaos and Governance, in large part a synthesis of several previously published journal articles, 16 addresses several applications of public choice theory and also distances public choice
from both its most ardent critics and its most ideological proponents. At the outset, it should be made clear that Mashaw does not
set out to glorify public choice theory. Instead, Mashaw attacks
head-on many well-accepted public choice analyses, including justifications for textualist judicial interpretation of statutes - advocated by Judge Frank Easterbrook 17 - and arguments against
delegation to administrative agencies - advocated by Peter
Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn, and Glen Robinson 8 and, more recently, David Schoenbrod.19 Yet, at the same time, Mashaw uses
public choice to make several tentative policy recommendations.
Mashaw's starting point is the dismal antiregulation, antidelegation stance often ascribed to public choice theorists. This reputation, in part earned by public choice's association with one of its
16. See Jerry L. Mashaw, ConstitutionalDeregulation: Notes Toward a Public, Public
Law, 54 TUL. L. REv. 849 (1980); Jerry L. Mashaw, The Economics of Politicsand the Understanding of Public Law, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 123 (1989); Jerry L. Mashaw, Improving the
Environment of Agency Rulemaking: An Essay on Management, Games, and Accountability,
LAW & CoNTEmp. PROBS., Spring 1994, at 185; Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation:Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81 (1985) [hereinafter
Mashaw, Prodelegation];Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism,and the Interpretation of FederalStatutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. Rnv. 827 (1991). Related works by Mashaw that
surface from time to time in the book include Jerry Mashaw, As If Republican Interpretation,
97 YALE LJ. 1685 (1988) [hereinafter Mashaw, As If Republican];Jerry L. Mashaw, Explaining Administrative Process: Normative, Positive, and CriticalStories of Legal Development, 6
J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 267 (1990) [hereinafter Mashaw, Explaining Administrative Process];
Jerry Mashaw, Imagining the Past; Remembering the Future, 1991 DuKE L.J. 711.
17. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term - Foreword: The Court
and the Economic System, 98 HARv. L. REv. 4 (1984) [hereinafter Easterbrook, 1983 Forward]; Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Cm. L. Rlv. 533 (1983) [hereinafter
Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains].
18. See Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. Rnv.

1 (1982).
19. See SCHOENBROD, supra note 5.

1750

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 96:1746

first cousins, the Chicago School of economics, 20 is reinforced by
two primary research agendas: the economist George Stigler's
"greed" research agenda, which describes regulation as driven primarily by private rent-seeking behavior;21 and the "chaos" research
agenda, associated primarily with Kenneth Arrow, an economist
who early in his career22 offered a modem proof of the instability of
democratic processes.
According to Mashaw, "the way we, as citizens, articulate and
understand our most cherished political ideal, democratic governance, has been a product largely of our changing understandings
of how human beings do behave within particular institutional settings, not changing ideas of the moral underpinnings of democracy
itself" (p. 3). To illustrate this thesis, Mashaw turns to the political
science of the founding of the Republic and the progressive New
Deal era, and then to the modern political science from which public choice theory has sprung. After looking at history, Mashaw
characterizes today's "political life .

.

. as a world of greed and

chaos, of private self-interest and public incoherence" (pp. 3-4).
This vision provides a challenge for designers of public institutions
by making all public action "deeply suspect" (p. 4). Moreover,
Mashaw suggests, this negative vision already has shaped our understanding of public life.
The insights of modem public choice theory can be traced to
James Madison, who was influenced by David Hume and (probably) the French mathematician the Marquis de Condorcet.23 In
20. There is an apparent tension here, for the Chicago School would suggest that transaction costs may inhibit private economic markets from moving resources to their most highly
valued use. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). Yet
political markets have sufficiently low transaction costs so as to render political structures
indeterminate in predicting the outcome of capture. See GEORGE J. STIOLER, THE CIrzeN
AND THE STATE:

ESSAYS

ON REGULATION

(1975) [hereinafter

STIGLER, CITIZEN AND

STATE]; George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MoMT.

Sci. 3 (1971) [hereinafter Stigler, Economic Regulation]. Other first cousins include the
Rochester School, which builds on William Riker's early work to emphasize how governmental outcomes are arbitrary and unpredictable, and the Virginia School, which builds on the
early work of James Buchanan and Gordon Tbllock to emphasize the distinction between
constitutional rules and positive law. See STEARNS, supra note 3, at xviii-xix.
21. See STIGLER, CITIZEN AND STATE, supra note 20; Stigler, Economic Regulation, supra

note 20. Stigler was awarded a Nobel Prize for his work on interest group theory in 1982,
22. See KErETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963).

Arrow was awarded the Nobel Prize jointly with John Hicks in 1972, although for work on
general equilibrium theory, not Arrow's collective choice research. James Buchanan received the award in 1986, for his pioneering work - with Gordon Tuilock - on political
economy, which is perhaps most consistently identified as the magnum opus of the early
public choice movement. See JAMEs M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS
OF CONSENT- LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTrrutONAL DEMOCRACY (1962).
23. See EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: Tm RISE OF POPULAR SOVER-

EIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 268-69 (1988) (discussing the influence of Hume's Idea
of a Perfect Commonwealth on Madison). Thomas Jefferson and Madison were familiar with

Condorcet. See Maxwell L. Steams, The Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, 103 YALE
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Federalist No. 10, "popular democracy's tendencies to instability,
oppression, and ineffectualness are set forth as the major problems
to be solved when constructing a government that can and will protect individual rights" (p. 4). Madison intended to "eschew what
many thought democracy to be about - local autonomy, direct citizen participation, and the sovereignty of popular majorities" (pp. 45). Thus, the triumph of the Federalist-era political science is often
seen as the triumph of representative over direct democracy in our
constitutional structure. 24
In the New Deal era, the dominant view of human nature (the
"is") also influenced normative theories of democratic governance
(the "oughts"). By this time, both courts (slow to adapt the Constitution to new societal needs and demands) and representative legislative bodies (perceived as corrupt and incompetent since the turn
of the century) had fallen into disrepute. Initially, progressive political scientists returned to the anti-Federalist idea of the referendum, primarily to bypass the inertia of conservative legislatures, but
this did not continue for long. Soon, social psychologists' dire visions of irrational drives, passions, and prejudices seemed borne out
by historical events, such as the democratic rise of fascism in Italy
and Germany.
The New Deal response was an emerging field of positive theory: management science. The industrial revolution had heralded
organized intelligence in the corporatibn as a cure for social ills.
According to Mashaw, "[w]hile representative assemblies had failed
to further Madison's 'permanent interests of the community,' those
interests might yet be furthered by rational planning. Public administration thus was the key to meeting public demands while avoiding the dysfunctions of either popular or representative democracy"25
(p. 7). Led by the vision of reformers such as Felix Frankfurter,
Louis Brandeis, 26 and James Landis, 27 apolitical administrative
agencies were a New Deal solution to the perceived failures of markets and, perhaps more important, the perceived ills of democracy.
As Mashaw observes, the Federalist and New Deal political sciences converged. Both were suspicious of popular democracy for
the same reason - the perceived tendency of citizen passions or
interests to produce majoritarian tyranny. But, unlike the FederalL.J. 1219, 1221 (1994); see also lain McLean & Arnold B. Urken, Did Jefferson or Madison
Understand Condorcet's Theory of Social Choice?, 73 PUB. CHOICE 445 (1992).
24.
human
25.
26.

Contrast the view of the anti-Federalists, based on a fundamentally different view of
nature. For them, direct participation was seen as enhancing civic virtue. P. 5.
See FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS GovERNMENT 145 (1930).
See Louis D. BRANrDEIS, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS (Osmond K. Fraenkel ed., 1934);
BRANDEIS ON DEMOCRACY (Philippa Strum ed., 1995).
27. See JAMEs M. LANDIS, THE ADm STRAETrvm PROCESS (1938); DONALD A. RrrCHIE,
JAMEs M. LANDIS: DEAN OF THE REGULATORS (1980).
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ist era, political science in the 1950s and 1960s gave rise to a new
positive theory: the theory of public choice. Public choice theory,
according to Mashaw, "seeks to explain, or at least to 'model,' 'rational public choice' within the typical institutional environment of
the modem welfare state" (p. 10). The unifying thread of modern
public choice theory is that "[w]e must always seek to understand
political outcomes as a function of self-interested individual behaviors" (p. 11). In other words, the political sphere is a market in
which voters and representatives, like consumers and firms, act as if
they are rational, maximizing individuals pursuing their selfinterests. 28 There is a market for collective social action. Like private economic markets, the collective social action market is also
subject to market failure, particularly when chaos results or there is
widespread abuse for private gain. Public choice theorists gear
much of their institutional design work toward correcting these
failures.
Today's public choice theorists regard many majoritarian
processes as chaotic. Kenneth Arrow's Impossibility Theorem which asserts that it is impossible to structure a voting scheme without making a choice which is imposed or dictatorial 2 9 - illustrates
how normal majoritarian voting processes may fail to translate individual preferences into a collective preference. Most voting systems have developed ways to constrain choice to avoid the pitfalls
identified by Arrow, but these institutional solutions admittedly entail a choice between incoherence, known formally as cycling, 30 or
some form of unfairness. Of particular interest to modern studies
of bureaucracy, Arrow's theorem illustrates the awesome power associated with agenda setting.
28. Mashaw flatly rejects the arguments of those who disavow public choice theory because of its assumption that citizens are self-interested. P. 27. Recent research in psychology
suggests that the problem of self-interest may be more difficult than either Mashaw or critics
of the self-interest assumption recognize. Jonathan Baron, for example, has found that citizens, believing that they are acting in their self-interest, in fact regularly commit cognitive
errors by acting altruistically or cooperatively. See Jonathan Baron, The Illusion of Morality
as Self-Interest. A Reason to Cooperate in Social Dilemmas, 8 PSYCHOL. Sci. 330 (1997).
29. Arrow's theorem basically illustrates that no scheme of voting on individual ordinal
ranking of pairs can simultaneously meet the requirements of minimum rationality, the
Pareto standard, nondictatorship, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and universal applicability. See FARBER & Fmcicy, supra note 2, at 38-39. There is no need to reproduce
the Impossibility Theorem, a generalization of the eighteenth-century proof known as Condorcet's Voting Paradox, here. In his book, Mashaw nicely illustrates Condorcet's Voting
Paradox and the contribution of Arrow's proof. Pp. 12-13; see also Herbert Hovenkamp,
Arrow's Theorem: Ordinalism and Republican Government, 75 IowA L. Rnv. 949 (1990).
30. Arrow's theorem implies cycling only where certain conditions are present. For example, cycling does not occur if members of the decisionmaking group have unipeaked preferences, which may occur when legislators implicitly or explicitly agree in advance to rank
their choice on similar liberal-to-conservative ideological scales. See FARBER & FRICKEY,
supra note 2, at 48-49; DENNis C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHoIcE II 67-73, 94 (1989).
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In addition, according to modem public choice theorists, the
political process is driven by private greed. As Mashaw notes, public choice has grown up to tell a "downright depressing" story about
legislatures and bureaucracy (p. 15). George Stigler applied interest group theory to the study of bureaucracy and brought "greed"
to the forefront of the modern political science research agenda,
helping to secure public choice's reputation as the modem dismal
science.3 1 According to the rent-seeking research agenda, private
interest groups seek to use the political process to shift resources
from the general public to their members. For example, logrolling
allows trading across issues in the political process. As described by
public choice theorists, logrolling can help' to solve some of the cycling problems Arrow identified.3 2 Logrolling, however, raises its
own set of problems. By trading across a variety of issues, a bare
majority can enact policies that benefit it, but whose net costs to the
minority create a loss for society as a whole (pp. 16-18).
Mashaw observes that the intellectual history of public choice
theory is long and thoroughly interdisciplinary. 33 But contemporary public choice theory sounds a much more dismal theme than
its intellectual predecessors:
Whereas Federalist and New Deal political science feared only those
expressions of popular will unmediated by the rationalizing influence
of either a representative assembly or an expert bureau, contemporary theorists despair of expressing the will or preferences of the people through any device whatever. For them, our public laws capture
instead only a particular concatenation of private preferences made
politically relevant by the dynamics of self-interested behavior on the
part of voters and officials alike. The 'public' in 'public law' identifies
only the nature of the power that is put in the service of private ends.
Legislation elaborates norms without normativity; it expresses neither
the passionate commitments nor the reasoned judgments of a political
community. [p. 21]
While some of the insights of public choice theory were implemented by optimistic activists in the 1960s and 1970s - making
agency statutory mandates more specific, circumscribing enforce-

31. See STIGLER, CIZEN AND STATE, supra note 20; Stigler, Economic Regulation,supra

note 20.
32. Logrolling, for example, might allow the voters considering three distinct funding issues to vote on all three issues in the covert of a single funding bill, thus trading their votes

across the different budget items. By avoiding comparison of each item, logrolling avoids
cycling.
33. For example, Arrow's twentieth-century contribution owes much to Condorcet, one
of Madison's contemporaries. Likewise, Stigler's contribution was shared by Madison in
FEDERALisT No. 10 and has a rich parallel in liberal and Marxist political science, as well as

in the work of David Hume and Condorcet. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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ment discretion, and enhancing participation in rulemaking 34 public choice theory has been invoked from the Carter administration forward to justify pessimism about government and public law.
The last twenty years have seen movement, supported by arguments from public choice, toward parliamentary-style government,
balanced budget amendments, term limits, public finance of elections, sunset laws, Office of Management and Budget rule review,
and deregulation. Mashaw writes:
The striking thing about the public choice literature.., is the degree
of 'government failure' it finds. Indeed, the message is generally not
about the ameliorative steps needed to improve the political marketplace. It is instead a message about why political markets cannot
work to satisfy the democratic wish, that is,to provide the people with
the government that they want. Modem positive political theory provides a much bleaker picture of political life than virtually any of its
influential predecessors. [p. 12]
The overriding message of conventional public choice theory,
Mashaw suggests, is to return to the principles of the Federalists or,
better yet, the anti-Federalists: constrain government radically and
place trust in the market, voluntary associations, and community35
based government.
Together, the orthodox greed and chaos research agendas provide a coherent thematic vision for applying public choice ideas to
public law, but the vision is pessimistic about government generally
and bureaucracy in particular. Public choice theory, understood exclusively through the greed and chaos lenses, provides strong reinforcement to the market and consensus-based reforms so popular in
recent years at the federal and state levels.3 6 Apart from such reforms, which focus primarily on dismantling the mechanisms of bureaucratic governance, the future for administrative law on this
understanding of public choice is dismal.3 7
34. For a critique of some of the institutional aspects of the participatory revolution in
administrative law, see Jim Rossi, ParticipationRun Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation
for Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 173 (1997).

35. One recent administrative law scholar, agreeing with Mashaw's assessment, finds support in post-1980 judicial doctrine. See Merill, supra note 4.
36. See Timothy A. Wilkins & Terrell E. Hunt, Agency Discretion andAdvances in Regulatory Theory: Flexible Agency Approaches Toward the Regulated Community as a Model for

the Congress-Agency Relationship, 63 GEo. WAsH. L. Rav. 479 (1995); see also HOWARD,
supra note 6.

37. Bruce Benson, succumbing to a similar reading of the public choice literature, writes,
"the real problem of bureaucracy is unquestioned acceptance of the belief that government
can solve most perceived problems, which allows bureaus to be established and expanded,"
Bruce L. Benson, UnderstandingBureaucraticBehavior: Implicationsfrom tie Public Choice
Literature,2-3 EcoNoNA DELLE ScELa' PUBBLICE 89, 114 (1995). This dismal view nicely
dovetails with Niskanen's classic hypothesis that bureaucracies will attempt primarily to maximize their budgets and sizes. See WILLIAM A. NiSKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GovEruNmEra
(1971).
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MASHAW'S APPLICATION OF PUBLIC CHOICE TOOLS TO THE
MODERN ADMINISTRATIVE STATE

Mashaw's book does not endorse the bleak view of democratic
governance portrayed by many modem public choice theorists. Instead, the book attempts to extract usable knowledge from public
choice tools by putting them to constructive use as a basis for institutional reform. Three applications form the core of Mashaw's project: (a) use of public choice tools to defend rationality review of
legislation by courts and to critique the dominant public choice argument in favor of textualist statutory interpretation; (b) use of
public choice tools to build a positive theory of delegation of political decisionmaking authority to agencies; and (c) application of
game theory to suggest abolition of preenforcement review of
agency rulemaking.
Public Choice and the Nature of JudicialReview
of Legislation
Mashaw begins with the institution his earlier works addressed
with cynicism: the courts. BureaucraticJustice criticized judicial review of social security disability cases as largely ineffectual.3 8 Due
Process in the Administrative State scolded courts for constitutionalizing participation in the administrative state through due process
doctrine. 39 In The Struggle for Auto Safety, Mashaw and Harfst arfor NHTSA's failure
gued that the judiciary was largely responsible
40
to adopt rules regarding automobile safety.
One would not, based on his earlier books, think Mashaw a fan
of the courts. Yet, as he argues in this book, judicial review of legislative action is not necessarily incongruous with public choice.
Mashaw deploys public choice arguments both to justify rigorous
rationality review of statutes and to debunk those who invoke public choice theory to demand textualist interpretation of statutes by
judges. In both instances, Mashaw attempts to ground normative
arguments about the institutional role of judicial review of legislation in public choice terms; his arguments are related by his implicit
recommendation that legislation be subjected to judicial constraints
similar to those applicable to actions by contemporary administrative agencies.
A.

1. The Case for Rationality Review
Courts in the twentieth century have struggled endlessly with
the issue of when a court may strike down a statute simply because
38. See MAsHAW, supra note 9, at 185-90.
39. See MAsHvW, supra note 10, at 254-71.
40. See MAsHAv & HAR=S, supra note 11.
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it is arbitrary - that is, irrational or unreasonable. In the post-New
Deal era, courts have displayed almost universal deference to legislation. Courts almost always accept a statute if its ends are legitimate - if it can be said to have any rational basis. Against the
grain of most public choice commentators - as well as courts and
administrative law scholars - Mashaw, in public choice terms,
staunchly defends reinvigorating a more substantive rationality review of legislative decisionmaking. 41
It is not surprising that public choice theory might justify
activist judicial review of legislation. The contributions of Arrow
and Stigler have led to widespread perceptions that legislation is
either completely arbitrary or the product of special interest deals.
For example, those who view statutes through Arrovian or interest
group lenses - particularly William Riker 42 and Frank
Easterbrook 43 - regard rigorous judicial review of legislation as
necessary to preserve individual liberty.
Mashaw's defense of rationality review of legislation contrasts
with the strong public choice argument for rationality review.
Mashaw maintains that judicial failure to entertain rationality analysis suffers the same fault that Holmes recognized with Lochner: it
privileges one view of legislation - the view that it reflects the general will - criticized widely by public choice theorists writing after
Arrow. Yet in defending rationality review of statutes, Mashaw
does not suggest a return to Lochner. Rather, Mashaw suggests
that courts review statutes for "public regardingness" (p. 67). This
approach would suggest
judicial review of the adequacy of a statute's beneficial purposes when
judged in the light of its harmful effects, Any citizen should be entitled to an explanation of why her private harm is at least arguably
outweighed by some coherent and plausible explanation of the public
good. [p. 68]

Courts should uphold a statute as long as a "coherent and plausible" public purpose can be identified (p. 75). In Mashaw's view,
rationality review of legislation is inevitable and should be pursued
regardless of the extant doctrinal subterfuges applied by courts and
41. Mashaw can only defend rationality review to the extent public choice allows him to
do so. Public choice theory supplies a relatively weak sense of rationality. For the public

choice theorist, rationality is taken to mean "transitivity" or lack of cycling, as Arrow's theorem predicts. In other words, collective actions are irrational if they fail to yield consistent
results from the aggregation of individual preferences. Mashaw, however, has in mind a

more robust sense of rationality review.
42. See WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALIsM

AGAINST POPULIsM: A CONFRONTATION BE.
TWEEN THE THEORY OF DEMOcRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE (1982); William

H. Riker & Barry R. Weingast, ConstitutionalRegulation of Legislative Choice: The Political
Consequences of JudicialDeference to Legislators,74 VA. L. REv. 373 (1988).
43. In this book, Mashaw responds to Easterbrook's writings from the years before he
became a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. See Easterbrook, 1983
Foreword,supra note 17; Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, supra note 17.
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litigants. 44 Moreover, Mashaw argues, public choice theory, particularly interest group theory, can provide a pro-democratic argument for rationality review in contexts in which the legislative
process has failed to produce public-regarding democratic results.
However, as Einer Elhauge has argued, interest group theory,
applied on its own terms, fails to provide a meaningful baseline for
evaluating "what level of petitioning effort is normatively proportional to each group's interest." 45 In other words, public choice theory itself cannot provide a measure of "public regardingness,"
independent of some set of criteria for evaluating the success or
failure of the political process. Mashaw's public choice argument in
favor of substantive rationality review seems logical and plausible,
and is nicely complemented by recent attempts to justify rigorous
46
judicial review of legislation following United States v. Lopez.
Public choice theory, however, does not make explicit an adequate
set of normative criteria for evaluating the political process, and
thus fails to provide a meaningful measure of public regardingness.
2. Public Choice Against Textualism
Mashaw also attacks a widely endorsed public choice argument
in favor of textualist statutory interpretation. Reacting to a view
associated most closely with Frank Easterbrook, public choice arguments allow Mashaw to explore the risks and costs of textualist interpretation of statutes.
New Deal public interest legislation invited courts to discern the
general reform purpose that motivated the statute and to promote
that purpose in individualized cases (p. 83). Initially, in the 1950s,
New Dealers found the legal process approach of Hart and Sacks
particularly attractive, a way of rationalizing designers of statutes as
"reasonable people pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably" (p.
84). Sometime in the 1960s, however, this optimistic vision began
to unravel and eventually was replaced by a cynicism that continues
through the present:
In the 1990s governmental efforts tend to be viewed as inevitably
flawed. Public policy reform is directed almost exclusively at limiting
direct government expenditure and preventing the implementation of

44. On the pervasive application of subterfuges in due process and equal protection contexts, see Gumo CALABREsI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
45. Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Re-

view?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 49 (1991).
46. See Philip P. Frickey, The Fool on the Hilk CongressionalFindings, Constitutional
Adjudication and United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 695 (1996) (observing

that judicial requirement of legislative findings can work to promote congressional deliberation); Harold J. Krent, Turning Congress into an Agency: The Proprietyof RequiringLegislative Findings,46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 731 (1996) (endorsing limited judicial requirement of
legislative findings as an intermediate level of process review).
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costly regulatory policies. Institutional reform consists largely of
privatization, desolution, and downsizing - and of creating roadblocks to regulatory initiative. [p. 84]
The 1990s pessimists' views of statutory interpretation contrast with
those of New Dealers. Instead of consulting a statute's purposes,
1990s courts might doubt that a statute, little more than the "vector
sum of organized political forces" (p. 84), even has public purposes.
On this modem view,
[a] court, or any interpreter, confronting such a statute will surely be
puzzled about how to proceed. At best it may be engaged in the enforcement of compromise among contending special interests. At
worst it may be implementing legal rules whose only coherent explanation is the political advantage provided to legislators. [p. 85]

As Mashaw observes, this approach is certain to create a crisis for
purposive statutory interpretation. At the very least, it is absurd for
the interpreter of such statutes to fill in gaps. Instead, such an interpreter might be led to focus more on the plain meaning of the
statute, as some suggest the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have
done.
A predominant approach in the political science literature often associated with Easterbrook - is to understand legislation as
a contract or deal. Easterbrook contends that statutory interpretation is nothing more than the enforcement of an arms-length bargain. Statutes therefore should be construed to cover only those
domains of human conduct explicitly anticipated in the statutory
language. By applying doctrines of strict constructionism to statutory language, courts ensure that interested parties get precisely
what they bargained for in the political process. 47
One problem with Easterbrook's approach, Mashaw notes, is
that it is based on Gary Becker's view of legislation, which predicts
that such deals will enhance - not reduce - general welfare. 48 "If
one believes that private contracting among individuals and firms is
socially beneficial (the invisible hand), to put those contracts in legislative rather than contractual language is a mere formal change
that should not alter the aggregate welfare effects" (p. 89).
Easterbrook, however, does not have an explanation for why legislative deals are inherently evil. And, while Easterbrook does say
that contracts should be strictly construed, even this overstates contract doctrine. So, Mashaw suggests, understanding legislation as a
47. See Easterbrook, 1983 Foreword,supra note 17, at 15-18; Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains,supra note 17, at 544-51. The position attributed to Easterbrook precedes his appointment to the bench. He since has softened his position by acknowledging some use of

legislative history to explain ambiguous language or to show "that a text 'plain' at first reading has a strikingly different meaning." See In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1344 (7th Cir. 1989).
48. See Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groupsfor Political
Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371 (1983).
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deal can just as easily lead us back to purposivism as strict constructionism. For Easterbrook's application to succeed, at a minimum
public choice needs a normative theory for explaining why interestgroup-generated legislation is bad. Easterbrook himself harbors
much skepticism about public interest goals, but this skepticism is
not a necessary condition to the application of public choice tools.
Mashaw has raised a plausible criticism of Easterbrook's position, but his own argument in favor of substantive rationality review
suffers a similar defect in its failure to make explicit a normative set
of criteria for public .regardingness. While Mashaw does not, like
Easterbrook, claim that all interest group legislation is inherently
suspect, he does believe that such legislation will require reversal if
a coherent and plausible explanation of its public regardingness
cannot be given. Public choice theory cannot, on its own terms,
provide an adequate set of criteria for making this determination.
This normative limitation with public choice analysis aside,
Mashaw addresses another problem with Easterbrook's approach.
Much of the current attention to statutory interpretation has been
generated by Justice Scalia's attacks on the use of legislative history,49 attacks that can be rationalized in public choice terms. Plain

meaning, according to Scalia, reinforces the legislative process as it
was envisioned in the Constitution and thus enhances the democratic process as a whole. Voting theory, particularly the work of
Kenneth Shepsle suggesting the impossibility of mapping collective
decisions onto individual preferences,5 0 provides some support for
Scalia's views.
However, the authors who write collectively under the pseudonym McNollgast, in contrast to Shepsle, argue that nothing in voting theory undermines the usefulness of legislative intent to aid
judicial interpretation of statutes. 5 ' In practice, contra Arrow, legislative decisions do not cycle endlessly until they are cut off by
some arbitrary feature in the legislative process; instead, congressional organization excludes certain preference orderings from the
agenda and gives certain people veto or dictatorial powers with respect to the progress of a bill. Focusing on the agency side of public
choice analysis thus aids the search for legislative intent. Public
choice tools would suggest focusing on the enacting coalition while
discounting cheap talk and statements by the minority. For exam49. Scalia's first published attack on the use of legislative history is Hirschey v. Federal
Energy Regulatory Commn., 777 F.2d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, I., concurring).
50. See Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress is a 'They,' Not an 'It': Legislative Intent as an

Oxymoron, 12 INTL. REv. L. & ECON. 239 (1992).
51. See McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory
Interpretation,LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter & Spring 1994, at 3. The professors who
comprise McNollgast are Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast.
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ple, statements by the President early in the legislative process
should be given weight, but later statements should be discounted.
Using game theory and inspired by McNollgast, Mashaw goes
on to argue that the legislature rarely is able to correct interpretive
mistakes in laws. First, he suggests, procedural hurdles and limited
time and resources may make correction improbable. Second, and
more insightful, even if the legislature can act to correct a mistake
with which it disagrees, "it will almost never end up with its original
policy reinstated, even if not a single
member of the legislature has
'52
altered his or her preferences.
Therefore, Mashaw concludes, public choice theory has failed to
provide a decisive methodology for interpreting statutes. Indeed,
many of its ideas - such as Easterbrook's notion of legislation as a
deal and voting theory's chaotic characterization of legislation have proven "seriously unhelpful" (p. 104). Nevertheless, Mashaw
acknowledges some lessons from public choice, particularly a focus
on the speaker, notions of dynamic evolution, and the application
of game theoretic tools. His most notable lesson is that judicial interpretation can make it impossible in many cases for the legislature
to overturn the policy imposed by the judiciary; in most cases, it will
preclude the legislature from reenacting the original policy.
The use of public choice to attack textualist approaches to statutory interpretation is related to Mashaw's public choice argument in
favor of rationality review. The conventional view is that
[r]ationality review is strongly antimajoritarian because it forecloses
the implementation of the will of the majority. It is thus a danger to
democracy and requires extremely strong justifications, none of which
have ever been wholly successful. Judicial interpretation of statutes
by contrast is not only inevitable, it can be structured to be
prodemocratic, that is, to enforce the true will of the majority. Moreover, should the judiciary err, the injury to majoritarian governance is
remediable by the legislature itself. [pp. 104-05]
Against this conventional approach, Mashaw suggests another alternative: courts should use rationality review to strike down statutes rather than to interpret them. According to Mashaw,
52. P. 102 (emphasis omitted). William Eskridge and John Ferejohn model the Article I,
Section 7 Game, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game,
80 GEo. L.J. 523 (1992), which Mashaw utilizes to suggest that "interpretation of the law
establishes a status quo point that will have the stability that our form of government gives to
any existing state of affairs." P. 103. The game goes something like this: Assume the House,
Senate, and President are each involved in new legislation. Each has slightly different preferences, but they can compromise and adopt a policy. Basically, if the interpretation leaves at
least one of the House, Senate, or President better off, any one of these can take action to
block its revision. Thus, tripartite division and the presentment clause favor the status quo,
Judicial interpretation of statutes, Mashaw recognizes, has agenda-setting effects in the legislature: "[E]ven when the legislative process can overturn an interpretation, it literally cannot
escape the force of the interpreter. Interpretation has rearranged the status quo and thus
reconfigured the structure of subsequent legislative bargaining." P. 103.
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a court overturning a statute on irrationality grounds may invade legislative prerogatives for public choice hardly at all. By contrast, a
court misconstruing the legislature's statutes may often disempower it

from implementing anything very close to the legislators' most preferred policy. [p. 105]

Maxims such as "construe statutes to avoid serious questions of
constitutionality" are often, Mashaw suggests, more strongly
countermajoritarian than substantive judicial review. Courts will,
under Mashaw's normative application of public choice theory,
have an active role in reviewing legislation53for rationality, but they
must construe legislative intent cautiously.
The approach Mashaw proposes for judicial review of legislation
is remarkably similar to the process by which modern courts generally review policymaking by administrative agencies: courts reluctantly interpret statutes, instead deferring to agency interpretations
of law, but exercise rigorous rationality review with the possibility
of reversal. Mashaw seems to suggest that modern democracies can
learn from the growth of the administrative state by reflecting on
how the traditional lawmaking body - the legislature - might react when subjected to judicial oversight similar to agencies. He uses
public choice ideas as a mirror, forcing us to reflect alternative institutional restraints upon our traditional image of the legislature.
Mashaw's applications of public choice tools as a way of critiquing legislatures move the debate forward considerably. His critique
depends upon a set of analytical tools outside of conventional public choice theory. Specifically, some of the insights of what has
come to be known as "positive political theory" 54 - rational choice
and game theoretic analysis of political institutions - allow him to
transcend the dismal lessons of the orthodox greed and chaos research agendas. For example, McNollgast's research, which posits
assumptions about the behavior of institutions rather than individuals, assists Mashaw in debunking conventional public choice arguments. Although well-accepted in the political science of
institutions, there is little agreement as to whether contemporary
public choice theory is sufficiently capacious -to accommodate positive political theory as an analytical approach alongside the greed
and chaos research agendas.55 Public choice and positive political
theory share a common subject matter, but public choice theory
53. In this sense, Mashaw's proposal to reinvigorate substantive rationality review of leg-

islation for public regardingness differs from Jonathon Macey's argument that courts interpret statutes in a public-regarding way. See Jonathan R. Macey, PromotingPublic-Regarding
Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 CoLuM. L. REv.

223 (1986).
54. See Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Positive PoliticalDimensionsof Regulatory Reform, 72
WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (1994).
55. See Daniel A. Farber & Phillip P. Frickey, Forward Positive Political Theory in the
Nineties, 80 GEo. L.J. 457, 458-63 (1992).
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provides no methodological account of how assumptions about individual behaviors are linked to institutional behaviors; on the
other hand, positive political theory often posits assumptions about
institutions, such as the legislature, without necessarily reconciling
these with findings about how individual behavior, such as that of
the legislator,is aggregated into institutional phenomena. Nevertheless, Mashaw sees enough similarities between positive political
theory and public choice that he is comfortable applying these tools
56
side by side.
B.

Public Choice and Legislative Incentives for Delegation

Mashaw's deployment of public choice tools to evaluate myths
associated with legislatures also allows him to provide a rationale
for delegation to administrative agencies. His view contrasts remarkably the bleak visions of bureaucracy espoused by many other
public choice theorists. According to the "greed" research agenda,
at the core of the orthodox public choice explanation of legislative
incentives for delegation
[B]ureaus are conceptualized as being as susceptible to private interest influence as legislatures, and may assist the latter in obscuring the
true nature of legislative action from the general public. By passing
vague statutes that seem to be in the public interest, but then pressuring agencies to favor their supporters, legislators can have it both
ways. They can take credit for good government while pandering to
the special interests. Moreover, administrative institutions generate
their own bureaucratic aims. They may function much like interest
groups themselves by trading favors to powerful legislators (projects
in the home district, help for a valued constituent) for aggrandizement of bureaucratic budgets or prerogatives. [p. 21]
Louis Jaffe and Theodore Lowi, writing in the 1960s, were early
critics of delegation to agencies under broad legislative grants of
power.5 7 In the early 1980s, Peter Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn, and
Glen Robinson gave these arguments grounding in the public
choice literature.5 8 And, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, this approach to criticizing delegation to administrative agencies was revived in the writings of David Schoenbrod.5 9
56. See Mashaw, Explaining Administrative Process,supranote 16, at 280 (noting distinctive methods but concluding that public choice and positive political theory share "a core
general presumption that political behavior is to be explained as the outcome of rational (and
often strategic) action by relevantly situated individuals within some set of defined institutional boundaries").
57. See Louis L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMNisriTnvnE ACTIoN (1965);
THEODORE J. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED

(1969).
58. See Aranson et al., supra note 18.
59. See SCHOENBROD, supra note 5.
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These critics of delegation, who borrow heavily from public
choice ideas, have inspired a significant defense of delegation, pri'60
marily among those Mashaw tends to view as "idealists.
Mashaw, no idealist, has also been an active voice in defending delegation, relying heavily on public choice tools. Public choice theory
envisions the use of principal-agent models for examining the role
of agencies. The "McNoligast hypothesis" asserts the following:
electorally accountable officials must place the implementation of
public policies in the hands of administrators who have their own
designs, but they can still continue to control bureaucrats through
legislatively imposed administrative process requirements. 61 Yet
McNolgast argues that Congress faces two major obstacles in controlling agencies: (1) information asymmetry, and.(2) the erosion of
an original legislative coalition over time.6 2
Mashaw suggests that the McNollgast hypothesis should not undermine public choice arguments in favor of delegation. If it is assumed that legislators have some independent preferences, the
McNolgast hypothesis can be decoupled from the notion that legislator preferences are a function of constituent or interest group
preferences. This move, made possible by the technique of positive
political theory, may be inconsistent with other public choice ideas,
but it does allow the use of agency theory to survive by assuming
that "[t]he legislators (principals) who vote for programs.., prefer
that administrators (agents) carry out their instructions as specified
63
in the statute."
Using this principal-agent approach, Mashaw presents an argument for broad delegation of political decisionmaking authority to
administrative agencies. Critics of delegation have provided two
main lines of argument: Lowi argued against delegation on authoritativeness grounds, asserting that statutes are the only legitimate

60. The "idealist" delegation vision, which Mashaw most closely associates with modem
deliberative democrats, holds that administrative procedure "contributes ...to the construction of an operationally effective and symbolically appropriate normative regime." P. 108.

Mashaw - always searching for empirical grounding - does not have faith, however, in such
idealist solutions. Instead, he suggests, the time is ripe for a realist revolution in administrative law.
61. See Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Proceduresas Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987); Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and
Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the PoliticalControl of Agencies, 75 VA. L. Rav. 431 (1989) [hereinafter McCubbins et al., Structure and Process].

62. See McCubbins et al., Structureand Process, supra note 61, at 435-40.
63. Pp. 121-22. Thus, Mashaw concludes, in salvaging the principal-agent model, that

"major insights into the structure and processes of federal administrative agencies as they
actually operate are unlikely to flow from viewing agency structure and process primarily in

terms of the monitoring and sanctioning problems that legislative controllers have with federal bureaucracies." P. 129.
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vehicle for making law;64 John Hart Ely65 and Justice Rehnquist, 66
by contrast, argued against delegation on accountability grounds,
positing that legislatures are institutionally more likely than bureaucrats to engage in accountable decisionmaking. The public choice
argument against delegation articulated by Aranson, Gellhorn, and
Robinson lends support to the latter view. In their view, public
choice theory predicts that there are two circumstances in which
legislators should be willing to confer broad authority on agencies:
(1) if a policy stands to benefit one group while imposing substantial costs on another, in which case delegation to an agency allows
legislators to claim credit and pass blame; or (2) if opposing groups
are unable to agree, in which case delegation allows legislators to
punt responsibility for the decision altogether. They conclude,
however, that such delegation will not likely enhance welfare, but
instead will produce "private benefits ... at collective cost."'67
Mashaw maintains that the prodelegation position looks at least
as good on welfare and accountability grounds as do calls for reforms to statutory drafting made by critics of delegation. He argues
that three problems plague Aranson, Gelihorn, and Robinson's
claim that delegation to administrators systematically reduces welfare: (1) they equate democracy with legislative majoritarianism;
(2) they treat the agency costs of delegation without considering the
information and decision costs, which may be higher for a legislature than an administrative agency; and (3) they analyze logrolling
without considering how agency changes the logrolling game (pp.
142-45).
Mashaw then attempts to present an affirmative case for delegation.68 First, challenging the welfare reduction argument, Mashaw
observes that delegation can help reduce the sum of decision,
agency, and error costs (pp. 148-52). Second, against the political
accountability argument, Mashaw contends that delegation can enhance the responsiveness of political decisions to the desires of the
general electorate through accountability to the President, who is
more responsive than the legislature to diversity in voter preferences and better able to avoid voting cycles. 69 Implicit in Mashaw's
64. See Lowi, supra note 57.
65. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY Am DIsRUsr. A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

(1980).
66. See American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607,
671 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
67. Aranson et al., supra note 18, at 63.
68. Mashaw first articulated the argument in public choice terms in a 1985 article. See
Mashaw, Prodelegation,supra note 16.
69. See Pp. 152-56. Even if Congress were to adopt specific legislation, Mashaw observes,
discretion by agencies would still be necessary. Mashaw creatively posits a "Law of Conservation of Administrative Discretion": because the amount of discretion in a system is always
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prodelegation argument is the assumption that the Constitution
does not require the legislature to enact all laws, but instead requires only that lawmaking be done 70by a representative institution,
such as the legislature or President.
Mashaw's prodelegation arguments - as well as his discussion
of judicial review of legislation - should suggest that public choice
ideas provide powerful ways of critiquing legislatures as well as administrative agencies. Although predominantly used to critique the
institution of bureaucracy, public choice theory harbors no necessary alliance with antibureaucratic sentiments. As Mashaw illustrates, public choice ideas also provide some compelling arguments
in favor of delegation of political decisionmaking authority to administrators, although this conclusion is qualified; Mashaw is careful to suggest that public choice does not provide any compelling
answer to the question
of whether delegation is welfare-enhancing
71
or welfare-reducing.
Yet, although public choice modeling may not provide a compelling formal answer to this question, public choice does provide
some powerful tools for argument. Mashaw's criticisms of
Aranson, Gellhom, and Robinson are convincing, but his reluctance to engage the argument that delegation to administrative
agencies can, in certain circumstances, enhance welfare proves disappointing. Mashaw argued in a previous article that "it makes
sense to have the delegation device available for use when and if it
would reduce the sum of decision, error, and agency costs." 72 In
addition to the literature addressing the costs of congressional decisionmaking, which Mashaw discusses, there is a rich literature criticizing Congress's perceived legitimacy in the eyes of the public. 73
Moreover, as some civic republican scholars have suggested, deleconstant, squeezing discretion out of the system in one place merely causes it to migrate
elsewhere. P. 154.
70. See MARm H. REDISH, THm CONSTITuTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE 145-46
(1995). Redish attacks Mashaw's argument, suggesting that it is problematic as a matter of
both constitutional law and political theory. See id. at 143-49. Of course, Redish's response,
reinvigorating the nondelegation doctrine, has its own problems. One flaw with the nondelegation doctrine is that the judiciary is "institutionally incapable of creating and applying a
delegation doctrine." Richard T. Pierce, Jr., PoliticalAccountabilityand DelegatedPower: A
Response to Professor Low4 36 Am.U. L. REv. 391, 393 (1987).
71. For example, Mashaw writes:
Public choice can help us to better understand how certain choice procedures structure
or allocate decisional powers. It can help us to see possibilities for strategic behavior
and strategic equilibria that yield likely outcomes in particular decision processes having
particular structures and stakes. But it cannot itself tell us anything about whether those
outcomes will be welfare-enhancing or welfare-reducing.
P. 157.
72. Mashaw, Prodelegation,supra note 16, at 92.
73. See, e.g., JoHN R. HmBING & ELIZABETH THIss-MosE, CONGRESS AS PUBLIC ENEMY: PUBLIC ATrrruDs TOWARD AMmRcAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

(1995).
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gation to administrative agencies may enhance welfare. 74 Although
public choice theory, on its own terms, may not suggest that delegation to bureaucrats is always welfare-enhancing, sophisticated application of public choice tools might allow development of theories
explaining in which contexts delegation is most likely to enhance
social welfare. As with his earlier discussions of rationality review
and statutory interpretation, in discussing delegation to administrative agencies Mashaw has adopted a critical stance towards public
choice theory, albeit one that draws on public choice tools, rather
than an approach that uses public choice to construct a theory that
explains, in more than a very sketchy sense, under what conditions
delegation to administrative agencies is normatively desirable.
C. Public Choice, the Timing of JudicialReview, and Separation
of Powers
Insights from public choice theory can also help evaluate the
role of courts in reviewing agency action. Since the 1960s, the
American administrative state has undergone a paradigm shift away
from adjudication and toward rulemaking as the principal mechanism for agency action. A major difference between judicial review
of policies made through case-by-case adjudicative proceedings and
judicial review of rulemaking is the ability of parties to challenge
rules prior to their enforcement in individualized cases. Beginning
with the Supreme Court's 1967 decision in Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner,75 which articulated the standards for preenforcement judicial review of administrative rules, courts have liberally permitted
preenforcement review of final rules that mandate a substantive
standard of conduct.
Over twenty years ago, Paul Verkuil predicted problems with
this approach:
In the past, when a rule was reviewable only after enforcement, considerable time could elapse before the rulemaking procedures and the
factual basis for the rule were tested. As a result, review of the circumstances surrounding the rule's enactment was secondary and
somewhat obscured by time; the main issue was the rule's application
to the particular respondent before the court. But with a final order
requirement tied more closely to notions of finality and ripeness,
rulemaking review can take place almost instantly and the focus on
the rulemaking process may be much sharper. In this sense, earlier
review means closer review, which76itself leads to a vigorous judicial
scrutiny of the rulemaking model.
74. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justificationfor the BureaucraticState, 105

HARv. L. Rnv. 1511, 1543-54 (1992).
75. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
76. Paul R. Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking, 60 VA. L. REv. 185, 205
(1974).
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In 1990, Mashaw and Harfst chronicled some of the adverse effects

of judicial review on rulemaking at the NHTSA, 77 adding to the

growing literature that laid the blame for ossification of agency
rulemaking at the feet of the judiciary. Unlike others, who advocate easing the standard of review, Mashaw and Harfst suggest that
courts refrain from reviewing a rule until
after the agency has ap78
plied the rule against a private entity.
Today's reformers, Mashaw observes, view rulemaking more as
part of the problem than the solution. Those who criticize courts
for ossifying agency rulemaking chronicle how judicial review has
adversely affected agency rulemaking as an external constraint on
agency decisions. 79 For Mashaw, "[g]ame theory dramatizes the
power of external legal and political controls on the administrative
process. More important, the standard understandings of 'the problem' besetting agency rulemaking look very different when approached from the strategic perspective game theory provides" (p.
160). Game theory places focus on when judicial review should be
pursued, not, as others have suggested, on the standard or scope of
review.80
Most writing in the ossification literature agrees that "the real
impediment caused by judicial review is uncertainty" (p. 165). As
Mashaw observes:
Because the courts are relatively uninformed about what is important
among the many issues thrown up by parties seeking review of a rule,
and because they are technically and scientifically unsophisticated in
analyzing the issues that they perceive to be critical to a rule's 'reasonableness,' the perception in the agencies is that anything can happen. This produces defensive rulemaking, if not abandonment of the
rulemaking process. [p. 165]
The results may have been motivated by private interests pursuing
various stratagems, such as delay. Focus on incentives for such behavior - incentives that might be built into the institutions of administrative governance - could prove insightful.
To illustrate how these incentives affect the behavior of litigants
and courts, Mashaw develops a rulemaking review game. This
game assumes that "to the extent that an opponent of rulemaking
(regulatory or deregulatory) perceives the use of an external obsta77. See MAsHAw & HARFsT, supra note 11.
78. See id. at 245-47.
79. See, e.g., Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on 'Deossifying' the Rulemaking Process, 41 DuKE W. 1385 (1992); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Unintended Effects of Judicial
Review of Agency Rules: How FederalCourtsHave Contributedto the Electricity Crisisof the
1990s, 43 ArDmn. L. Rnv. 7 (1991). For a slightly different story, see Jim Rossi, Redeeming
JudicialReview: The Hard Look Doctrine and FederalRegulatory Efforts to Restructure the
Electric Utility Industry, 1994 Wis. L. RPv. 763.
80. See McGarity, supra note 79, at 1453-54 (recommending replacement of "hard look"
with a more deferential metaphor).
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cle to rulemaking to have a higher expected value than failing to
use it, that external constraint will be activated. ' 81 Under current
law, rules by agencies like NHTSA or the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission are immediately appealable to a court of appeals.
At the same time, there is typically a lead time, sometimes significant, before the rule becomes effective. Thus, following adoption of
a rule, a firm faces a decision whether to begin immediately to work
toward securing compliance or to appeal.
To simplify this game, Mashaw presents the choice faced by a
private firm or interest group as compliance or noncompliance with
the new rule. Initially, he assumes no penalties for noncompliance
because the rule is not effective or an appeal stays enforcement.
Given this assumption, firms do not view themselves as in a game
with the agency; rather, they view their position vis-A-vis other competitors. Here the dominant strategy for all parties, Mashaw illustrates, is not to comply with the rule but to seek judicial review: "It
would appear that with preenforcement review no manufacturer
would ever comply prior to the deadline. Presumably they would
always seek judicial review because suit at least delays, and may
eliminate, the need to comply" (p. 168).
Mashaw then takes the analysis to the next level. The judicial
review game presents a free-rider problem; it is in the interest of
someone to sue, but each manufacturer will want to avoid bearing
these costs itself. This can be solved in a variety of ways. In practice, it most commonly is solved by the formation of an industry
association or some other interest group. Without such a solution, a
new game may be played regarding who will sue. This game,
Mashaw observes, does not produce a dominant strategy, but produces a classic "chicken" problem. Each player, while not itself suing, would like to bluff the other into suing. But, given that each is
better off if it sues than it would be if no 8one
sues, it might be
2
rational for a player to chicken out and sue.
The game changes again, Mashaw illustrates, if there is a penalty
for noncompliance pending the determination of the validity of a
rule. Here Mashaw maintains that his analysis teaches three lessons. First, "without a penalty for noncompliance the balance of
the benefits or costs from litigating or complying will strongly favor
litigation" (pp. 173-74). Second, the presence or absence of a penalty will not be a determinative predictor of challenges. Mashaw
observes that,
81. P. 166. Mashaw speaks in terms of straightforward costs and benefits; he does not
attempt to model exceptional preferences, such as the firm opposed to all government regulation or the good citizen. P. 167.
82. Of course, to maintain credibility for future bluffs, it may be possible that neither
would sue. Nevertheless, as Mashaw illustrates, the probability of at least one suit is 0.91. P.
170. The same type of analysis applies to beneficiaries.
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even with a penalty that is greater than the sum of compliance costs
and market share losses, an actor whose disbenefits from compliance
were only slightly greater than [those faced by another actor] would
still find it rational to bring suit or, what is the same thing, to fail to
comply and resist enforcement by raising the potential validity of the
rule as a defense. [p. 174]
Third, it suggests that a focus on the stringency or scope or standard
of review as a source of the problem of ossification may be misguided. "Judicial stringency is but one factor bearing on the likelihood of success in appealing a rule and on the payoffs to appeal
versus compliance. The timing of review and the conditions on its
availability also shape that calculation, as does the level of compliance costs" (p. 174).
Thus, Mashaw's analysis leads him to recommend efforts to ease
compliance burdens, as John Mendeloff has recommended in the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) context. 83
Mashaw does not believe, however, that easing compliance burdens
alone will solve the problem of too little rulemaking; it will also be
necessary to eliminate preenforcement review. To begin, the
lengthening of time periods and reduction of a penalty can help to
reduce compliance costs. Further, echoing his previous observations with David Harfst, Mashaw writes:
Tune and again, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration regulations foundered on the shoals of practicability or reasonableness.
Yet over time it became clear that many of the technological
problems that convinced courts to remand rules to the agency could
be solved. Moreover, they might have been solved much8 4earlier had
attempts at compliance preceded resort to the judiciary.
Mashaw's argument in favor of eliminating preenforcement review is insightful and original. Nevertheless, there are some
problems with the argument. Specifically, Mashaw may have underestimated some of the benefits associated with preenforcement
review of rules by courts. As Mark Seidenfeld has argued:
From the standpoint of social welfare, Mashaw's game theoretic analysis is incomplete. It fails to, address when compliance with a rule
might be detrimental rather than beneficial. It also fails to incorporate other indirect effects that delaying judicial review might have on
the overall rulemaking process. If an agency adopts a rule that it cannot justify both legally and as a matter of policy, the regulatory system
should avoid forcing compliance. To the extent that judicial review
83. See JomN M. MENDELOFF, Tj-m DILEMMA OF Toxic SUBSTANCE REGULArION: How
OVERREGULATION CAUSES UNDERREGULATION AT OSHA 115-16 (1988).
84. P. 178. Mashaw does temper his recommendation: "While preenforcement review
may have been particularly dysfunctional in the context of standard setting at the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, it may be extremely important to permit preenforcement review elsewhere, for example, of EPA air quality standards." P. 180.
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filters out such bad rules from good ones, pre-enforcement review
benefits society. 85
While Seidenfeld does not reject the abolition of preenforcement
review in all circumstances, he concludes that "the factors that go
into the balance of whether pre-enforcement review of a rulemaking is warranted are too diverse to permit a simple answer that
either pre-enforcement or post-enforcement review is always
best. '8 6 Mashaw's confidence that public choice theory can compel
reform here seems mysterious, as he believes it does not allow us to
draw general welfare conclusions in the delegation context.
Finally, without any specific reforms in mind, Mashaw builds a
political oversight game as a means of relating his various applications of public choice theory and addressing legislative veto of
agency rulemaking. He observes that "[u]ncertainty results not
from vague legal standards applied by relatively uninformed generalist judges, but from the risks inherent in interbranch competition
for control over policy" (p. 181). Both executive and legislative
oversight are subject to failures in controlling agency decisionmaking. Executive oversight, such as the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) technocratic cost-benefit analysis requirements, has been described as overtly political. Congressional
action has been more successful in forcing regulation than in reacting to agency policymaking. Mashaw paints a bleak picture:
Political life resembles a theater of the absurd where general public
demand is satisfied by programs designed to fail and thus to protect
the "special interests" who trade politicians money for votes. Access,
participation, fair procedures and rational analytic routines are all
smoke and mirrors disguising the sordid business of politics as usual.
What's more, the public often seems to believe the "blame the bureaucrats, not us" version of legislative responsibility that sound-bite
journalism promotes. Nimbleness at credit claiming and blame avoidance, not the construction of sound policy processes, becomes the skill
that ensures incumbency. [p. 185]
Mashaw's oversight game assumes that political institutions, like
courts, are passive until called on to respond to some other person,
firm, or interest group. So, as with courts, Mashaw's game considers the benefits, costs, and probability of success to institutions engaging in political oversight.87
85. Mark Seidenfeld, Playing Games with the Timing of JudicialReview: An Evaluation
of Proposalsto Restrict Pre-enforcementReview of Agency Rules, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 85, 97-98
(1997) (citations omitted).
86. Id. at 121. Thus, selective abolition of preenforcement review, according to
Seidenfeld, should be made by Congress. See id. at 124.
87. Mashaw urges that calls for transparency should be considered carefully:
"[t]ransparency lowers the 'agency costs' to organized interests," p. 191, i.e., those who already have access to the political process. Yet Mashaw is not, like McNollgast, embracing
procedural reform as "another way of 'stacking the deck' for favored interests." P. 191. Instead, "[e]ncouraging procedural transparency may be the best we can do to limit political
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Mashaw proceeds to model a separation of powers game in
three dimensions, representing the President, Senate, and House of
Representatives. From a normative perspective, Mashaw argues,
the external environment of agency rulemaking should be structured to encourage agency policy choices that are welfareenhancing for the institutions in the legislative-executive separation
of power game (p. 193). But if an agency should choose a policy
that lies closer to the President's preferences than to the House's or
the Senate's, Congress could quash this choice if it had the authority to veto administrative rules. Without the legislative veto, Congress is forced to resort to other mechanisms or to rely on the
judiciary to enforce the original bargain.
Of course, in the absence of effective judicial review or some
other mechanism to deter agencies from choosing a policy that lies
closer to the President's preference, the House and Senate can legislate to revoke the agency's policy choice. The agency's assertion
of a choice closer to the President's preferences, however, redefines
the status quo and the bargaining space. 88 As a result, "[t]he stakes
involved in the constitutionality of the legislative veto may thus
have been somewhat higher than they appeared at first blush" (p.
193). Mashaw concludes:
Because policy choice in a bargaining situation is a function of both
the preferences of the actors and the status quo point, in the face of
presidential opposition Congress literally cannot get back to the policy space that it thought it and the president had defined in the preexisting statute. [p. 194]
Coming full circle, Mashaw posits that the legislative-executive
separation of powers game may have given rise to the judicial review game and, ultimately, ossification of rulemaking. According
to Mashaw, "[llegal control is being employed to leverage politicalinstitutional warfare about administrative policy in ways that dis89
empower the policy process.1

importuning and shore up administrative legitimacy, if not efficacy." P. 191. Transparency is
at best a strategic design tool, p. 191, but one that can have unintended perverse consequences, see Rossi, supra note 34.
88. The Environmental Protection Agency's 1997 clean air rules, establishing stringent
new standards for ozone and fine particulates, are a good illustration. See John H. Cushman,
Jr., Clinton Sharply Tightens Air Pollution Regulations Despite Concern over Costs, N.Y.
TMsES, June 26, 1997, at Al. Although the EPA and the Clinton administration adopted
fairly stringent standards, critics set their sights on the Republican Congress. See Andrea
Marks, Losers in Smog Battle Try End-Run Attack, CnmsTMN ScI. MONrrOR, Aug. 14, 1997,
at 3. Yet despite public opposition, the introduction of bills, and the potential existence of a
majority against the new rules in Congress, Congress has not garnered the support to reverse
the EPA and the administration to date.
89. P. 196. By contrast, parliamentary systems "tie the fate of elected politicians to the
efficacy of administrations," p. 198, effectively redefining the game.
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USABLE KNOWLEDGE AND THE VALUE OF A UNIFYING

THEORY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE

Although Greed, Chaos & Governance spends a significant

amount of time exploring how public choice tools might provide
insights to specific public law reforms, the book is as much an illustration of the power and limits of public choice ideas as it is a series
of arguments for particular reforms.
Mashaw intends his applications of public choice to yield usable
knowledge for institutional reformers, in contrast to both the idealism of those who embrace the elusive public interest and the pessimistic, potentially destructive recommendations often associated
with public choice ideas. In this sense, Mashaw has much in common with Farber and Frickey, who eschew grand theory and stake
out a middle ground in practical reason as a way of integrating public choice and public law. Yet, unlike Farber and Frickey, who provisionally adopt a neorepublican perspective, Mashaw is reluctant
to embrace any single unifying perspective of governance outside of
the public choice framework. Mashaw's cynicism about neorepublican ideas may be truer to public choice theory, but his realism evidenced by a reluctance to adopt a unifying perspective outside of
public choice - may come at a cost, albeit a cost that public choice
method may require on its own terms.
For Mashaw, usable knowledge is a middle ground. The orthodox greed and chaos research agendas have successfully presented a
unifying theme, but it is a dismal theme suggesting destruction or
dismantling of the administrative state. By contrast, usable knowledge recognizes that public choice ideas can provide some assistance to institutional designers without supplying a grand vision of
jaundiced optimism or rampant pessimism. Although public choice
theory cannot provide truths, it can provide arguments and advice,
so long as we do not demand unrealistically that it provide definite
answers and are not misled naively by those who claim stubbornly
that it does (p. 38). Public choice is a Comptean positive theory,
specializing in description and prediction, much like physics. The
fact that there is no unified public choice theory of phenomena such
as voting and institutional behavior, much like there is no unifying
theory in physics of how matter and energy behave, should not
stand as an impediment to learning from public choice's insights (p.
44).
Mashaw's notion of usable knowledge serves a function similar
to practical reason in Farber and Frickey's discussion of public
choice. Farber and Frickey believe that grand theory is of limited
value to law, a discipline that seeks primarily to resolve practical
disputes or to make practical recommendations about institutions.
Legal decisionmakers thus rely on practical reasoning, which "in-
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volves an analogical and inductive method, resolving new problems
by reasoning from well-established paradigmatic cases." 90
Although deductive reasoning, the primary method of public choice
theory, will often yield plausible answers, "[m]ore often such...

answer[s] will ascend from a combination of arguments, none of
which standing alone would constitute a sufficient justification.

Such 'supporting arguments' are 'rather like the legs of a chair and
unlike the links of a chain."' 9'

Farber and Frickey believe that

practical reason will permit the integration of public choice and
92
public law, allowing constructive use of public choice insights.
Their approach, however, is not without its methodological
problems. As Ed Rubin has suggested, the practical reasoning approach may be flawed when applied to foundational methods such
as public choice, as it seemingly prejudges its subject matter by "rejecting its methodology as a premise of the analysis before that re-

jection is advanced or justified." 93

In advancing their practical reason approach, Farber and

Frickey adopt as a provisional unifying perspective the neoMadisonian view of the political system often associated with mod-

em intellectual republicanism. 94 According to Farber and Frickey,

"[1]ike Madison, we believe that no theory of government can ignore the powerful forces of individual self-interest and the critical
role of institutional design. It is equally one-sided, however, to lose
sight of the role of civic virtue."9 5 Farber and Frickey present several illustrations of how neorepublican theories of democratic governance can accommodate public choice arguments. 96
90. FARBER & FRicKEY,supra note 2, at 116.
91. Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, PracticalReason and the FirstAmendment, 34
UCLA L. REV. 1615, 1645 (1987) (quoting ROBERT SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND
AMERcAN LEGAL THEORY 156 (1982)); see also Vrlliam N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip N.
Frickey, Statutory Interpretationas PracticalReasoning,42 STAN. L. REv. 321 (1990); Daniel
A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REv. 1331 (1988).
92. For a defense of practical reason as a way of learning from the insights of law and
economics generally, see Thomas F. Cotter, Legal Pragmatism and the Law and Economics
Movement, 84 GEO. LJ.2071 (1996).
93. Edward L. Rubin, Public Choice in Practiceand Theory, 81 CAL. L. REv. 1657, 1665
(1993) (reviewing FARBER & FRIcKEY, supra note 2); see also Rubin, supra note 4, at 501
("[U]nless public choice analysis is allowed to proceed from its basic premise - what a literary critic would call its donnd - the strength of that analysis cannot be adequately

assessed.").
94. See Seidenfeld, supra note 74; Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public
Law, 38 STAN. L. REv 29 (1985).
95. FARBER & FcricY, supra note 2, at 11.
96. Although Farber and Frickey see neorepublicanism as accommodating and organizing
some public choice ideas, they reject the strong version of republicanism that would suggest
that voters and legislators are always motivated by public spirit rather than self-interest. See
id. at 45-46. Their vantage point, neorepublicanism, probably entails practical reasoning to
the extent that modem republicanism requires consideration of various incommensurable
concepts such as the individual and the collective selves. See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond The
Republican Revival, 97 YALE LJ.1539, 1564-65 (1988).
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Mashaw also seeks to domesticate public choice theory, but
rather than look outside public choice, as do Farber and Frickey, he
urges public choice "lite." Despite any surface similarity between
usable knowledge and practical reason, the methods are distinct.
Mashaw does not reject the compatibility of neorepublican political
theory and some public choice ideas. He sees no necessary connection, however, between neorepublicanism and public choice. In his
applications, he distances himself from those who would embrace
neorepublicanism as the vantage point for evaluating public choice
ideas. 97 Apart from the deductive method of public choice theory,
defined broadly to include positive political theory, Mashaw does
not explicitly embrace any singular intellectual perspective of administrative governance as a vantage point for evaluation, whether
republicanism, pluralism, or any other theory. Thus, although
Mashaw's previous case studies of the Social Security Administration and NHTSA are beautiful illustrations of a practical reasoning
approach, Greed, Chaos and Governance deploys a method distinct
from that of Farber and Frickey. Mashaw, wishing to give public
choice arguments the most sympathetic assessment possible, embraces public choice tools as a common language and eschews any
extra-public choice unifying perspective, carefully and realistically
describing the different stories public choice has to tell about administrative governance. In this sense, Mashaw attempts to use
public choice theory on its own terms, albeit with a healthy degree
of academic cynicism or realism.
Nevertheless, Mashaw acknowledges that most public choice
methodology, including his own realism, has normative consequences. As Mashaw suggests, writers such as Steven Kehnan, 98 a
neorepublican critic of public choice, and Geoffrey Brennan and
James Buchanan, 99 venerable public choice advocates, have acknowledged that positive models can (and do) have normative implications. Although Buchanan and Brennan may disagree on
substance with Kelman, all three agree that preferences are not
wholly exogenous to politics; rather, they are in part a function of
how people go about governing themselves. Public choice theory
and its application to institutional design can and do influence the
preferences of actors. 100
97. For Mashaw, neorepublicanism is too idealistic to reconcile with most public choice
arguments. Pp. 108, 111-18; see also Mashaw, As If Republican, supra note 16 (presenting a
stronger case against republicanism).
98. See Steven Kelman, "PublicChoice" and PublicSpirit, Pun. INTEREsT, Spring 1987, at
80, 93-94.
99. See Geoffrey Brennan & James M. Buchanan, Is Public Choice Immoral? The Case
for the "Nobel" Lie, 74 VA. L. REv. 179, 187 (1988).
100. "[A]t the birth of political societies, it is the leaders of the republic who shape the
institutions but... afterwards it is the institutions which shape the leaders of the republic."
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Indeed, this is where public choice theory, as a method, raises
the most serious difficulties for legal scholarship generally and public law in particular. Mashaw argues that Kelman's neorepublican
critique of public choice theory - which alleges that public choice's
"[c]ynical descriptive conclusions about behavior in government
threaten to undermine the norm prescribing public spirit"' 01 - is
inadequate. Kelman suggests that if we design public institutions as
if people were public-spirited rather than self-interested, then those
citizens would emerge (p. 27). Yet Mashaw believes that the endogeneity of preferences adopted by neorepublicans, such as
Kelman, simply substitutes one implausible and idealistic view of
human nature with another (p. 27). Instead of adopting this outright rejection of public choice's first-order assumption, Mashaw
borrows from Buchanan and Brennan's response, urging that "we
design institutions to protect us from self-interested political action,
while recognizing that such activity may shape our attitudes towards governance" (p. 26).
By eschewing any extra-public-choice-unifying perspective,
Mashaw may be truer to public choice methodology than Farber
and Frickey. His reluctance to embrace a unifying intellectual perspective of governance, however, broadens the range of knowledge
that public choice will yield, while also limiting the ability to deem
the knowledge usable. This, for example, probably precludes
Mashaw from developing a more complete explanation for when
delegation to administrative agencies is desirable. It also potentially weakens Mashaw's ability to further his main thesis - that
public choice ideas can be salvaged from those who wish to dismantle government. Without a referent point, usability is a somewhat
shallow normative concept. For example, Mashaw's argument in
favor of rationality review must look outside public choice for normative insights as to when statutes are not public-regarding. While
Mashaw's illustration of how public choice concepts can apply to
institutional design is reasonable, lucid, and often convincing, his
method fails to make explicit the criteria for deeming "usable" the
knowledge public choice arguments yield. As a result, his various
applications of public choice to institutional design, though clear
and insightful in isolation, are tentative and seem somewhat fragmented when placed together in a book. All that seems to tie them
together is their fidelity to public choice ideas, construed broadly to
include the tools of positive political theory, a common theme of
criticism of the legislature, and Mashaw's cynical realism. No normative framework or perspective organizes the various insights of
JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CoNTRAcr 84 (M. Cranston trans., Penguin Books
1968) (1762) (citing the eighteenth-century French philosopher and jurist Montesquieu).
101. Kelman, supra note 98, at 93-94.
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the book; in the parlance of some legal pragmatists, the beliefs
Mashaw's book supports are not woven into a coherent web. 02
For legal scholars, the application of public choice assumptions,
method, and tools raises a special challenge, especially if the scholar
is to understand these ideas and take them seriously. For those who
wish to use public choice ideas to understand public law, adoption
of a unifying intellectual perspective such as neorepublicanism
makes it simpler and more practical to glean usable knowledge
from these tools. The adoption of a unifying perspective also
makes explicit the assumptions of the evaluator's method. A unifying perspective may certainly limit an evaluator's thesis to those
who are convinced by the perspective, but it also can assist in articulating explicit criteria for rendering knowledge usable, as well as
for deriving a normative baseline for evaluation of the political process. 10 3 So understood, a unifying perspective is not a synonym or
furtive excuse for engaging in grand theory, but instead can bolster
a pragmatic approach, such as Mashaw's, by allowing the integration of otherwise disparate interdisciplinary ideas - and the beliefs
they support - into a coherent web.
Of course, Mashaw's realist reluctance to adopt an extrapublic-choice-unifying perspective may be warranted. Understood
on its own terms, public choice theory purports to be nothing more
than a Comptean positive science, deploying assumptions about
human behavior and an economic methodology to generate descriptive and predictive hypotheses, which can be tested empirically. Perhaps Mashaw, like many economists and political
scientists who utilize public choice theory, is simply being true to
the positivist method. Mashaw's bate noire, the dismal orthodoxy
attributed to public choice, provides a clarion normative theme:
government, particularly bureaucracy, is bad. Mashaw's realism,
coupled with his fidelity to public choice method, challenges this
theme but yields little more than fragmented lessons about public
law. Perhaps this is all we can expect from public choice method,
applied on its own terms: rampant pessimism or fragmented lessons. Mashaw's realism would leave us content taking the latter
from public choice ideas.
CONCLUSION

For some, public choice theory has come to be associated with
antigovernment ideology, wholesale critiques of judicial involvement in governance, cramped textualist interpretation of statutes,
102. See Farber, supra note 91, at 1336 ("[A]n interlocking web of belief, in which each
belief is supported by many others rather than by a single foundational 'brick,' is inherently
far sturdier than a tower.").
103. See Elhauge, supra note 45.
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and anti-administrative agency positions. Mashaw's book teaches
us that public choice theory has no necessary alliance with such positions. The book is notable for its careful, studied applications of
public choice, especially its innovative criticisms of the legislature
and its constructive approach towards understanding delegation to
bureaucracy. An appreciation of bureaucracy as an institution in
our system of democratic governance, as Mashaw urges, is necessary before we can "pursue the public interest by attempting to
learn from those who sometimes seem to suggest that it could not
possibly exist" (p. 209). Greed, Chaos, & Governance challenges us

to bring public choice theory to bear on dialogue about publicspirited institutional reform. Hopefully, legal scholars will rise to
this challenge, engaging public choice arguments, including
Mashaw's, in constructive ways to help us understand the complexities of public law and to weave a coherent web of knowledge about
the administrative state.

THE

APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY:

How

THE ETHics WARS

HAVE UNDERMINED AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, BusINEss, AND

SoCIETY. By Peter W. Morgan and Glenn H. Reynolds. New York:

The Free Press. 1997. Pp. xiii, 272. $25.
Rameshwar Sharma needed cash to continue his research on
two proteins, alpha 2Aand alpha2GC, so he turned to the federal government. 1 At the time he submitted his grant application, Sharma
had completed a good deal of work on alpha 2A but very little on
alpha2Gc. At some point while typing his forty-six page grant application, Sharma realized that repeatedly typing alpha 2Aand alpha2Gc
was annoying. To ease his pain, he created macro keys that he
could hit whenever he wished to type either protein. Big mistake.
On page twenty-one he hit the wrong key, inserting alpha2Gc where
alpha 2Ashould have been.
No one on the National Institute of Health (NIH) review panel
was fooled - they all knew that if Sharma really had done the
work on alpha 2GC that his typo seemed to indicate, he would have
trumpeted his progress. In addition, the surrounding discussion
concerned alpha 2A.
Quite apart from the typo, the NIH panel denied Sharma's
grant application. Had this been all that had happened to Sharma,
he would have considered himself lucky. Instead, an anonymous
accuser forwarded his application to the Office of Science Integrity
(later the Office of Research Integrity (ORI)). After investigation,
the ORI determined that his typo constituted scientific misconduct.
The gist of the ORI's position was that Sharma was attempting to
fatten his chances by fabricating his work product.
Three years later an appeals panel vindicated Sharma, concluding that his typo "was the result of a careless error" (p. 130). In the
interim, the federal investigation closed his lab, forcing him to take
an unsalaried position at an optometry college in Pennsylvania. He
lived in a dorm. He made so little money that he had to pull his two
children out of college and he was unable to attend his father's funeral in India. As Sharma himself put it, the entire ordeal had a
"devastating effect" on his reputation and his career (p. 129).
Some Orwellian nightmare? Orwellian maybe, nightmare no.
In the Appearance of Impropriety, Peter W. Morgan2 and Glenn H.
Reynolds3 present Rameshwar Sharma's splintered reputation and
career as what remain after one passes through the enormous buzz
1. This entire story appears in Morgan and Reynolds's book. See pp. 128-30.
2. Member, Dickstein, Shapiro, Morin, & Oshinsky LLP.
3. Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law.
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saw created by the conjunction of the Ethics Establishment - the
bureaucracies that police behavior in several of the largest segments of American society 4 -

and the appearance of impropriety

standard - the ethical standard those bureaucracies apply to individual behavior. Morgan and Reynolds argue that each component

alone has its problems, but that together they are devastating. The
potent combination has affected areas other than science, including

government, business, and academia. Although the authors are not

the first to decry the appearance of impropriety standard,5 they are

the first to analyze it in relation to the institutional context in which
it operates, noting how that context magnifies its imperfections.
Despite the book's ambitious sweep, perhaps it is not ambitious
enough. For example, Morgan and Reynolds fail to provide any
foundation for their discussion by defining what they mean by ethical behavior.6 More specifically, Morgan and Reynolds fail to supply any one ethical yardstick against which society should measure
its members' behavior. The authors flirt with several ethical constructs -

the Golden Rule (pp. 37, 109), what amounts to an

agency-cost definition (pp. 46, 74), and finally a motivational model
or a model that examines the actor's motives (p. 36) - but they
stop short of choosing one.7 To be fair, the authors did not set out
to answer the age-old conundrum of what constitutes ethical behav-

ior. But because they fail to ground their discussion in some ex-

4. Morgan and Reynolds identify Ethics Establishments in several areas of contemporary
society. For example, in government, there is the independent counsel (pp. 75-80); in business, there is the enormous business ethics industry (p. 100); and in the natural sciences, there
is the Office of Research Integrity (p. 127).
5. See CHARLES W. WoFAM.,
MODERN LEGAL E-rmcs § 7.1.4 (1986); Cynthia M.
Jacob, A Polemic Against R.P.C. 1.7(C)(2): The "Appearance of Impropriety" Rule, N.J.
LAw., June 1996, at 23; Alex Kozinski, Teetering on the High Wire, 68 U. COLO. L. REv. 1217,
1226-27 (1997). But see Ann McBride, Ethics in Congress: Agenda and Action, 58 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 451, 466-67 (1990) (arguing in favor of the appearance of impropriety

standard).
6. For an example of an author struggling with this task in the appearance of impropriety
context, see Robert F. Bauer, Law and Ethics in Political Life: Considering the Cranston
Case, 9 J.L. & POL. 461 (1993) (dissecting the concept of self interest - essentially Morgan
and Reynolds's agency-cost model below - in political ethics).
7. It may initially seem possible to shoehorn these three methods into one theory, and, in
fact, many philosophers have attempted to do so. See generally JOHN Hs Si
,Can the
Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality?, A CgrrQuE OF JOHN RAWL'S THEORY in
EssAYs ON Eriucs, SocIAL BEHAVIOR, AND ScIENrnFIc EXPLANATION 37 (Gerald Eberlein
& Werner Leinfellner eds., 1976) (seeking to combine Rawls's "original position" with utilitarianism); HENRY SmGWICK, METHODS OF ETmIcs (photo. reprint 1980) (1874) (attempting
to synthesize utilitarianism with other ethical methods). Most ethical philosophers, however,
now believe that the methods, when developed in detail, lead to very different theories that
can diverge sharply in some cases. See, e.g., J.J.C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AN AGAINST 97-100 (1973) (giving examples of the clash between utilitarianism and Golden Rule-type ethics).
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plicit definition of ethical behavior, their analysis at times feels
superficial."
In the end, the book's analysis inheres largely in its application
of the adage "You get what you pay for" to present-day ethical discourse, in effect restating it to read "Ask for appearances, and appearances are what you will receive." It adorns that analysis with
anecdotes ranging from the humorous to the outright scary. 9 The
book's general argument can be somewhat facile at times 10 and
might occasionally leave those desirous of more searching inquiry
8. For example, occasionally the authors seem to argue for an agency-cost model, see
infra note 14 and accompanying text, by suggesting that inducing ethical behavior is merely a
matter of aligning incentives. At one point they suggest that our legislators' incentives deviate from the collective good as a result of special-interest influence. P. 35. They further
suggest that we should "engage in a meaningful debate as to which sorts of private influences
are acceptable and which are not." Id. But even assuming that an agency-cost model is the
correct basis for divining an ethical construct, it does not follow that "a meaningful debate"
on special-interest influence is desirable or even possible. For in order to distinguish the
good special-interest influence from the bad, one needs to define the "public good" - a very
difficult task. What is the public good if not what emerges from a fight between special
interests? One might argue that even if in general a fight between special interests defines
the public good, the process is distorted by the money they infuse into the system. But is this
necessarily correct? If the special-interest groups raise their funds from individuals, maybe
the dollars they dump into the system are representative of public support. Then again,
maybe not. It is certainly possible that the current system is skewed toward the rich.
Whatever is in fact the case, the point here is that the authors fail to discuss any of this.
9. The story with which I began this Notice, for example, certainly qualifies as scary. On
the lighter side, Morgan and Reynolds recount William Safire's reaction to Senator Biden's
"borrowing" some language from British Labour Party Leader Neil Kinnock in one of his
speeches during the 1988 presidential race. Biden eventually had to withdraw from the race
as a result. That's not the amusing part. What was funny was Safire's account of political
plagiarism in general and his own small part in it. Speaking of Biden's speech, he said:
Maybe my familiarity with rhetorical borrowing has left me insensitive to the shock of
recognition. I remember listening to John F. Kennedy's inaugural, with its stirring line
"In your hands, my fellow citizens, more than mine, will rest the final success or failure
of our course." I had to admire the way Ted Sorensen evoked the rhythm of the line in
the Lincoln first inaugural: "In your hands, my dissatisfied fellow-countrymen, and not
in mine, is the momentous issue of civil war." (Kennedy subtly corrected Lincoln's redundancy of fellow-countrymen; that was especially astute.) What's wrong with such
evocation? Winston Churchill, writing his ringing 1940 speech about defending his island by fighting on the beaches, in the streets, etc., recalled Georges Clemenceau's defiance in 1918: "I shall fight in front of Paris, within Paris, behind Paris." (Clemenceau, in
turn, was paraphrasing marshal Ferdinand Foch on Amiens.) That sort of boosting - a
less pejorative term than lifting and certainly far from plagiarizing, rooted in the Latin
for "kidnaping" - is done all the time.
Pp. 145-46 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Wiliam Safire, No Heavy Lifting,
N.Y. Trams, Sept. 27, 1987, § 6 (Magazine), at 12). Safire then told on himself. Evidently,
when working as a speech writer for Richard Nixon, Safire "boosted" a phrase from Kennedy
that he had taken from Adlai Stevenson that Stevenson had in turn lifted from Franklin D.
Roosevelt. Safire started to feel a little guilty about it, so he called the author of FDR's
speech to apologize. Instead of castigating Safire, the author confessed that he had in turn
"boosted" it from a speech by Robert Ingersoll, nominating James Blaine for President in
1876. So much for originality in politics.
10. For example, the authors suggest that one way to foster personal and governmental
responsibility is to shrink the federal government's responsibilities, both practically and constitutionally. P. 194. While this may be true, given current debates, it does not appear to be a
solution easy, or arguably even possible, to implement.
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dissatisfied. Nevertheless, what the book lacks in academic rigor, it
makes up for in readability and intrinsic interest, and it leaves the
reader with a graphic understanding of the dangers of the combination of the Ethics Establishment and the appearance of impropriety
standard.
Part I of this Notice discusses Morgan and Reynolds's views on
the appearance of impropriety standard. Part II engages in a similar examination with respect to the Ethics Establishment. Part III
outlines the problems the authors identify as springing from the
combination of the two. Finally, Part IV discusses some of the solutions that Morgan and Reynolds propose.
I.

THE APPEARANCE OF ImPROPRIETY STANDARD

A. Subverting the Standard
The appearance of impropriety standard is just what it sounds
like - an ethical standard that focuses on whether behavior appears improper, not on whether it is. At the heart of Morgan and
Reynolds's arguments rests the plausible proposition that "a preoccupation with mere appearances inevitably leads to the concealment of substantive abuses" (p. 15). The problem springs not from
an appearance standard per se but from the misuse that it invites (p.
8). In particular, the authors argue that an appearance standard is
vulnerable to two perversions - Petty Blifil (pronounced Bliff-full)
and Grand Blifi'lI -

both of which distract us from the underlying

substantive behavior.
Morgan and Reynolds use Petty Blifil to "describe the ease with
which unscrupulous individuals use our ethical standards to attack
relatively innocent individuals with accusations of 'impropriety"' (p.
21). According to the authors, one of the most noteworthy examples of Petty Blifil occurred during the Savings and Loan (S&L)
scandal. Federal Home Loan Bank Board Chairman Edwin J. Gray
opposed bank deregulation in direct contravention to the wishes of
several S&L operators, including Charles Keating. In an attempt to
drive Gray out, Keating systematically funneled information on
Gray's expense practices to the Wall Street Journal and the
Washington Post. Despite the fact that Gray was following past
Bank Board practices, the press accused Gray of "being too close to
the savings and loans he was supposed to be regulating" (p. 22).
Sure enough, Gray left office, dragging his tattered reputation behind him. Keating, on the other hand, gave large gifts to Mother
11. Morgan and Reynolds borrow the term "Blifil" from a novel by Henry Fielding. See

HENRY FELDING, THE HISTORY OF TOM JoNEs, A FOUNDLING, 615 (Martin C. Battestin &
Fredson Bowers eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1975) (1749). Fielding wrote the book as an attack
on appearance ethics in England during his own time, the Augustan Age (1660-1750). BUll,
who was adept at manipulating ethical appearances for his own benefit, was Fielding's villain.
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Teresa and waged an antipornography war, all of which won him
high acclaim. After the S&L edifice collapsed and the dust cleared,
however, Keating found himself in jail and the "questions about the
appearance of Gray's expenses [were] supplanted by questions
about exactly how many hundreds of billions of dollars the American taxpayer lost in what has been called the 'worst public scandal
in American history."12
Because the appearance of impropriety standard opens the door
to this type of duplicity, the standard is counterproductive. Rather
than encouraging ethical behavior, it can drive those who are truly
interested in the public welfare - the Grays of the world - from
the process only to make room for those "who are so determined to
acquire power, or adoration, or whatever, that they will endure just
about anything to get it" (p. 24).
Grand Blifil represents the corruption of the appearance standard on a grand scale. Grand Blifil consists of the manipulation of
appearances to create the illusion of institutionalpropriety (p. 27).
It results in two phenomena. First, requiring proper appearances
encourages proper appearances rather than proper substance (p.
28). Second, in an effort to supply the proper appearance, even the
best-intentioned may succumb to hiding unsightly facts (p. 29).
As to the first type of Grand Blifil, the authors point to campaign finance reform as one of the better examples (p. 30). In particular, they recount the Illinois state legislature's attempts to
control its members' receipt of campaign funding. In response to
an episode in which riverboat-gambling lobbyists pulled state representatives off the House floor to give them campaign contributions,
the legislature passed a law making it illegal to give contributions
on state property. The reason? It looked bad. The result? Lobbyists could continue to contribute as before, just not on state property. The authors argue that this case illustrates Grand Blifil's
tendency to "treat[ ] symptoms instead of causes" (p. 35) and to
leave the underlying problems unchanged.
As an example of the second type, Morgan and Reynolds offer
seasoned government bureaucrats' desire to operate government
orally rather than in writing (p. 29). Why do they refuse to write
things down? It allows them to protect appearances by ensuring
that no "less-than-rosy assessments of how things are going" show
up later to splinter the illusion (p. 29). The problem with this practice "is that we cannot fix what we cannot see" (p. 29).
In short, the authors argue, albeit indirectly, that the appearance
standard serves society poorly. Rather than triggering more searching inquiry, the authors contend that the appearance standard shifts
12. P. 23

(quoting MARTIN MAYER, THE GREATEST-EVER BANK ROBBERY:

COLLAPSE OF THE SAVINGS AND LOAN INDUSTRY 1

(1990)).
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our focus away from our underlying substantive problems as we
each expend our time and energy trying to appear ethical and attempting to show that others do not. Consequently, it leaves those
underlying problems unsolved. Finally, as in the case of Edwin
Gray, it has a tendency to drive the truly ethical from the process
because it can provide such a powerful tool to the unscrupulous.
B.

So Why Do We Have It?

If the appearance standard is so counterproductive, why do we
use it? Morgan and Reynolds provide several explanations for our
love of form over substance (pp. 41-46). First, looking at form is
easier than looking at substance. 13 Deciding whether some behavior truly comports with our ethical standards is very difficult. One
must know or learn about the intricacies of the arena in which the
behavior occurred -

say, business - to analyze whether what hap-

pened was in fact unethical. It is much easier to say: "Hmmm...
that looks bad" and be done with it.
Second, it is safer (p. 43). As argued above, determining
whether behavior is ethical is often complicated. One must analyze
the behavior for its substance rather than its appearance. That substance provides others with a foundation from which to attack one's
determination. Appearances are like beauty, however - they are
in the eye of the beholder. I can say that behavior appears improper without fear of someone else substantively proving me
wrong. After all, my determination is nothing more than a statement of how the behavior appears to me.
Third, the relative. nature of the standard rests well within the
comfort zone of many Americans (p. 43). Since World War II,
America's professional and managerial classes have expanded.
Much of the work these individuals do revolves around intangibles
- legal concepts, public relations campaigns, and the like. This
work makes them comfortable with the ephemeral appearance
standard. In addition, even those who are not professionals live in
today's entertainment-oriented world - one that focuses heavily
on appearance rather than substance. "It is hardly surprising that
appearance ethics thrives amid such a culture" (p. 44).
Fourth, it can befriend the truly unethical (p. 44). The appearance standard is double-edged. Not only does it permit an accuser
to magnify minor transgressions into major appearance problems,
13. P. 41. In saying that the appearance standard is easier, the authors do not mean to
suggest that it is any easier for people to agree on what appears improper. Rather, they

mean that it is easier for the critic to form an opinion; in other words, it takes less work and
expertise to decide whether behavior looks improper than it does to determine whether be-

havior is improper.
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but it also allows the unethical to reduce ethical offenses to mere
appearance problems.
Finally, it's comforting (p. 45). Appearance ethics "gives the illusion of control and precision" (p. 45). Substantive analysis is
more complex and therefore more uncertain. Whether one has
committed a true ethical infraction can be difficult to ascertain,
leaving the one doing the analyzing uneasy about her decision. The
analysis -

if one may call it that -

of whether something looks

bad seldom suffers from the same infirmity. In this sense, the fact
that the appearance of impropriety standard is easier to administer,
as argued above, makes it more comforting to those doing the
administering.
C. Problems with the Analysis

While Morgan and Reynolds's account is powerful, it has its
shortcomings. First, the authors fail to provide a foundational definition of ethical conduct. The absence of such a definition glosses
over one of the main reasons why we may have settled for an appearance standard: necessity. We may need a simple, easy-tounderstand, but somewhat superficial theory because we cannot
agree entirely on what behavior is unethical.
Two examples of the authors' own passing dalliance with various
standards illustrate the "necessity" explanation. At one stage in the
book, the authors indicate that they define ethical conduct as that
which comports with the Golden Rule (p. 109), while in another
14
they define it as that which is consistent with a utilitarian-like
agency-cost model 15 (p. 46). The Golden Rule standard is straightforward: "Always treat others as you would like them to treat
you. '"16 The agency-cost model requires a bit more explanation. It
rests on the Millian view that ethical behavior is that which maximizes overall social welfare. Under this view, the individual is entrusted with the task of behaving in ways that maximize societal
welfare. In effect, each individual serves as society's agent. Consequently, when an individual behaves in a way designed to increase
personal welfare at the expense of societal welfare - creates an
agency cost -

he acts unethically.

14. Utilitarianism is "the ethical theory, that the conduct which, under any given circum-

stances, is objectively right, is that which will produce the greatest amount of happiness on
the whole." SIDGWICK, supra note 7, at 411.
15. Agency costs result from a divergence in incentives between an agent and a principal.
In their simplest form, they result when a principal engages an agent to perform some task
for him, but the agent acts with his own interests in mind instead. From the principal's perspective, the agent's failure to perform the task exactly as the principal would have wished
results in costs to the principal. See ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD,
MICROECONOMICS 608 (3d ed. 1995) (discussing the "principal-agent problem").
16. Matthew 7:12.
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These two standards are not necessarily coextensive. Consider

wealth redistribution. The Golden Rule perhaps supports redistribution: if I were poor, I would prefer for a wealthy individual to

share his wealth with me; therefore, if I am wealthy, I should share
my wealth with someone less fortunate. The agency-cost method,

on the other hand, may counsel against redistribution. If I value my
wealth more than a less fortunate individual, even though he may

well, redistribution reduces overall social welfare
value wealth as 17

and is unethical.
It is not at all clear that society has chosen one theory of ethical

conduct over the other.18 Without a unitary definition, there is no
shared substance on which Morgan and Reynolds can center the

reader's attention. Without that substance, we may be relegated to
concerning ourselves with whether something looks bad.
Second, Morgan and Reynolds's analysis fails to respond to
some of the reasons why society might desire an appearance standard. One may think of the appearance standard as a prophylactic
rule. 19 At least in the area of governmental ethics, such a rule

might prove useful for several reasons. As an initial matter, unethical conduct is often hidden from view. As the President's Commission on Federal Ethics Law Reform put it with reference to
honoraria:
17. Indeed, matters are still more complex than this discussion would suggest. Some defenders of views similar to the Golden Rule have sharply criticized redistribution. See
ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974). Meanwhile, some advocates of
utilitarianism and its relatives have supported very extensive redistributive measures. See,
e.g., PETER UNGER, LrviNG HIGH AND Lrrn G Dm (1996).
18. In fact, there exist several possible candidates; we have been able to settle on none of
them as the definitive formulation of ethical conduct. One possibility is Mill's utilitarianism.
See supra note 14. Another is Kant's theory, which considers motives as they relate to the
action an individual takes. His view asks, of that action, whether the rule that the action
embodies could be a universal law; if so, the action is morally right. See IMMANUEL KANT,
FOUNDAnONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Lewis White Beck trans., Robert Paul
Wolff ed., Bobbs-Merrill 1969) (1785). Finally, John Rawls's theory of justice as fairness,
which employs the maximin criterion, is based on certain aspects of Kant's views. See JOHN
RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSrICE (1971); John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory,
in MORAL DIscounsE AND PRACTICE 247 (Stephen Darwall et al. eds., 1997). Indeed, given
this uncertainty, there exists great debate in the legal community concerning the relationship
of the law and morality. Compare Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court 1968 TermForeword: On Protectingthe Poor Through the FourteenthAmendment, 83 HARv. L. REv. 7,
9, 14-19 (1969) (arguing for adoption of the Rawlsian approach in the Fourteenth Amendment context) with Robert H. Bork, The Impossibility of FindingWelfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 695, 699-700 ("The violent disagreements among the legal
philosophers alone demonstrate that there is no single path down which philosophical reasoning must lead.... Under these impossible circumstances, courts - perhaps philosophers,
also - will reason toward conclusions that.appeal to them for reasons other than those expressed. . . . The consequence of this philosophical approach to constitutional law almost
certainly would be the destruction of the idea of law.").
19. See, e.g., George D. Brown, The Constitution as an Obstacle to Government Ethics Reformist Legislation After National Treasury Employees Union, 37 WM. & MARY L. REv.
979, 1006 (1996).
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Honoraria paid to officials can be a camouflage for efforts by individuals or entities to gain the officials' favor. The companies that pay
honoraria and related travel expenses frequently deem these payments to be normal business expenses and likely believe that these
payments
enhance their access to the public officials who receive
20
them.
As Morgan and Reynolds themselves argue, the appearance of impropriety is much easier to see than is the impropriety itself.
In addition, a prophylactic rule may dampen the temptation to
act unethically.2 1 The Supreme Court utilized this rationale in vacating a government contract because of the apparent improprieties
of one of the contract's chief negotiators. 22 In discussing whether
the negotiator's conduct violated 18 U.S.C. § 434,2 the Court
noted:
[T]he statute establishes an objective standard of conduct, and that
whenever a government agent fails to act in accordance with that
standard, he is guilty of violating the statute, regardless of whether
there is positive corruption.... To this extent, therefore, the statute is
more concerned with what might have happened in a given situation
than with what actually happened. It attempts to prevent honest government agents from succumbing to temptation by making it illegal
for them to enter into relationships which are fraught with
temptation.2 4
Prophylactic rules recognize that the wrong circumstances can
tempt even the most well-intentioned individual to engage in unethical behavior. Such standards respond to this reality by limiting the
opportunities for individuals to put themselves in those
circumstances.
Finally, and most important, some have argued that the appearance standard - and prophylactic rules like it - do no less than
ensure the sanctity of our democracy.25 As Professor Dennis
Thompson explained:
[I]n the more impersonal world of politics, reality and appearance
blend together so that we cannot often tell the difference. Not only
can most citizens judge politicians and political institutions only by
what they appear to do, but also for many citizens what they appear
to do is what they actually do.... Citizens have no way of finding out
what the reality is, and therefore every reason to assume the
20. PRESIDENT'S COMMN. ON FED. ETHics LAW REFORM, To SERVE wrrH HONOR 35

(1989).
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
1006.

See, e.g., Brown, supra note 19, at 1006.
See United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520 (1961).
18 U.S.C. § 434 (1948) (repealed 1962).
Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. at 549-50.
See Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. at 561-62; Brown, supra note 19, at
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the appearance of
worst .... There is an ethical obligation to protect 26
propriety almost as great as to produce its reality.

The Supreme Court has agreed. The Court cautioned that the appearance of impropriety is "an evil which endangers the very fabric

of a democratic society, for a democracy is effective only if the people have faith in those who govem .... " 27
II. THE ETHICS ESTABLISHMENT
In Chapters Four through Nine, Morgan and Reynolds chronicle
the explosion of the Ethics Establishment; these bureaucracies

operationalize the appearance standard and give it wide application. The authors trace the origins of the Ethics Establishment to

August 5, 1974 - the day 8the Nixon White House released the
"smoking gun" audio tape. With the tape's release, Americans'
distaste for public institutions reached an all-time high. Within
months a concerted effort was underway to cleanse them of all unethical conduct (p. 47).
Given its origins, it is not surprising that the Ethics Establishment has most pervasively invaded our governmental institutions.

According to the authors, nowhere is this invasion more apparent
than with the Independent Counsel (p. 75). In response to Nixon's

"Saturday Night Massacre,

' 29

Congress created the Independent

Counsel. The Counsel, largely free from political control, and en-

joying an almost unlimited budget, is appointed by the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. This combination
of political unaccountability and fiscal freedom creates a prosecutor
without an off-switch. The Independent Counsel remains free to

dig for the most minor infractions anyone would be guilty.

infractions of which almost

26. CongressionalEthics Rules: Hearings Before the House Bipartisan Task Force on
Ethics, 101st Cong. 1 (1989) (statement of Professor Dennis F. Thompson, Harvard Univ.).
27. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. at 562.
28. P. 47. Morgan and Reynolds track a steadily declining trend in Americans' confidence in their public institutions beginning in 1960. P. 49. They mark as the starting point of
this trend the U-2 spy plane incident over the Soviet Union. Eisenhower initially lied, claiming the U-2 was a weather plane - a story he later recanted. Nevertheless, they place the
birth of the Ethics Establishment with Nixon's release of the "smoking gun" tape - the tape
on which Nixon is heard directing one of his aides to push the CIA to pressure the FBI to
curtail its Watergate investigation.
29. The "Saturday Night Massacre" occurred when President Nixon, in an attempt to
thwart any investigation of the Watergate break-in, fired Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox
and every member of his team. See G. Gordon Liddy, Character,Conscience,and Destiny, 96
MIcH. L. REv. 1975,1979 (1998) (reviewing KEN GORMLEY, ARCHIBALD Cox: CONSCIENcE
OF A NATION (1997)) (discussing the Massacre).
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The Ethics Establishment has also created its own "Iron Triangle," 30 consisting of government officials, interest groups, and the
press. As calls for additional ethics regulations mounted, the government enlisted the help of its bureaucrats to create and operate
new agencies like the Office of Government Ethics and new positions such as Designated Agency Ethics Officials (p. 81). Similarly,
congressional staffers can now support or oppose policies and potential appointees by manipulating alleged ethical violations (p. 96).
In addition, a network of interest groups, such as the Center for
Public Integrity, Common Cause, and Public Citizen, champion ethics in government (p. 90). Finally, after America lionized
Woodward and Bernstein, the press quickly learned that exposing
ethical improprieties paved the way to fame and fortune (pp. 9293). Together, these players constitute a self-perpetuating system:
The relationship between ethics bureaucrats.., and the Congress and
interest groups is marked by constant interaction and trading of favors. Congressional staffers get "dirt" from interest groups who, for
example, oppose the confirmation of a particular judge or the implementation of a particular policy. Then they leak the information to
journalists, and hold hearings that generate more news and that allow
interest groups an opportunity to testify and otherwise get their
message out. Journalists investigating the scandals get still more leaks
from government officials close to the scandal, often in exchange for
not linking those officials to what went wrong - or even occasionally
in exchange for defending those officials in columns or on political
talk shows. [p. 96]
The end result is an Ethics Establishment that runs on a renewable
resource - political opportunism.
The Ethics Establishment did not limit itself to the governmental arena. Rather, it laid down roots in myriad other sectors of society. Beginning with the insider trading scandals of the 1980s,
business spawned its own ethics cottage industry (p. 100). Generally, the ethics-in-business movement manifested itself in company
ethics codes (p. 101). Currently, roughly ninety percent of
America's largest companies have ethics codes. 3 1
Similarly, as Rameshwar Sharma's story suggests, the scientific
community has embroiled itself in its own Ethics Establishment (p.
127). The criminal justice system, on the other hand, has less created its own Ethics Establishment than been co-opted by it. As the
ethics movement has gained steam, we increasingly have criminal30. P. 96. The term "Iron Triangle" was first coined to explain the relationship between
the Pentagon, Congress, and defense contractors. See GORDON ADAMs, THE IRON TRIANGLE (COUNCIL ON EcoNoMIc PiuolrIEs) (1981).
31. P. 103 (citing Patrick E. Murphy, Corporate Ethics Statements: Current Status and

Future Prospects, 14 J. Bus. Ewmcs 727 (1995)).
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ized ethical infractions. 32 Those who just recently would have been
33

subject only to social opprobrium now face jail time.
III. Tim

CoNJUNCTION OF THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY

STANDARD AND THE ETHics ESTABLISHMENT

Morgan and Reynolds argue that the combination of the Ethics
Establishment and the appearance standard results in predictably
problematic outcomes. The Ethics Establishment has injected into
large segments of American society the relentless search for ethical
misconduct. The appearance standard has focused that search on
the ephemeral and insubstantial. This combination has gutted
those segments in which it operates, kicking up appearance
firestorms while leaving the underlying substantive problems
largely untouched. Two examples make the authors' point.
First, as noted above, many of America's largest companies are
adopting ethics and corporate culture codes. While installing these
codes may lead to more ethical companies, the standard practice of
purchasing "off-the-shelf" codes in order to create the appearance
of having improved the ethical culture may have the opposite effect
as these companies spend more precious time and resources on appearing ethical than on being ethical (p. 104). Texaco, for example,
produced a booklet entitled Texaco's Vision and Values in which it
stated "Our employees are our most important resource" and
"Each person deserves to be treated with respect and dignity in appropriate work environments, without regard to race, religion, sex,
age, national origin, disability or position in the company" (p. 105).
Despite these public declarations, Texaco found itself mired in a
discrimination suit for the private statements its executives made
concerning African Americans and other minorities (p. 105). As
Morgan and Reynolds point out, "[i]t's not the code; it's the culture" (p. 105). In other words, it is not the appearance, but the
substance.
Second, the Independent Counsel is particularly troublesome
when combined with the appearance standard. Unlike the normal
prosecutor who is summoned to prosecute a specific crime and who
must exercise prosecutorial discretion as a result of his budgetary

and temporal constraints, the Independent Counsel prosecutes an
32. Pp. 159-60 (citing John C. Coffee, Jr., From Tort to Crime: Some Reflections on the
Criminalizationof Fiduciary Breaches and the ProblematicLine Between Law and Ethics, 19
AM. Cami. L. REv. 117, 119-26 (1981)).
33. For a good example of the results of this trend to criminalize ethics, see David Grann,
ProsecutorialIndiscretion: Espy and the Criminalizationof Politics, NEw REPUBLIC, Feb. 2,

1998, at 18 ("Espy could be facing more than 100 years in prison for the appearance of
impropriety, for simply taking gifts .... The irony is that, before [the independent prosecutor]
stepped in, the democratic system had exacted its own eloquent justice without the blunt
instrument of the independent counsel or the new ethics laws.").
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individual and has almost unlimited resources in trying to uncover
criminal conduct that until recently was simply unethical (p. 171).
Most important, the increasing criminalization of ethical standards
and use of the Independent Counsel appear to have confused the
American public, as individuals increasingly run ethical and legal
imperatives together (pp. 173-74). Instead of strengthening society's ethics, it has led to the widespread belief that whatever is legal
must be ethical (p. 174). As a result, one may successfully defend
oneself against allegations of impropriety with the claim that one's
behavior was not illegal, and our ethical standards erode as people
begin to equate ethical standards with arguably more lenient legal
standards (p. 174).
IV. THE SOLUTIONS
In the last chapter of The Appearance of Impropriety, Morgan
and Reynolds suggest seven rules for righting America's ethics ship.
The authors admit that their suggestions are no quick fix (p. 199);
indeed, they deride the quick-fix mentality as what brought us appearance ethics in the first place (p. 199). Nevertheless, their proposals are somewhat simplistic. In the end, they amount to little
more than: "Quit using the appearance standard." While correct,
the advice fails to provide the reader with much more than broadbrush-stroke guidance.
First, Morgan and Reynolds argue that we should "accentuate
the negative" (p. 201). In short, "seek out and encourage the reporting of bad news. Not scandal, or improper appearances, but
truly bad news about things that aren't working" (p. 201). This way,
those who must make decisions will know whether something needs
additional attention. Second, keep things "crunchy" (p. 202). Create systems where substantive performance is easy to monitor.
"[O]rganizational structures in which someone has to take responsibility for results, and in which results are obvious, produce better
behavior than those in which responsibility is diffused, and results
are difficult to measure" (p. 202).
Third, "keep your eye on the ball" (p. 203). Relegate the appearance standard to those areas in which its application is beneficial. For example, apply it to groups consisting of specialized
individuals who should make nonpolitical decisions, like judges.34
Fourth, "responsibility is for everyone" (p. 205). A strong ethical
34. For an opinion that the appearance standard may impose costs in the judicial arena as

well, see Kozinski, supra note 5, at 1226-27 ("I think there is also a converse danger, and that
is having a judiciary too far removed from contemporary life, too shielded from the everyday
experiences and problems of the community in which they live. Consistent with current notions that judges should avoid even the appearance of impropriety, many of my judicial colleagues tend to cut themselves off from substantial contact with the world around them once

they ascend to the bench. While avoiding conflicts of interest is certainly a good thing, it is
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system should demand as much from accusers as it does from the
accused. Unlike the current system, which is soft on both sides, the
new system should focus a critical eye on the behavior at issue and
its motivations as well as the motivations of the accuser. In this
way, the authors argue, we may be able to avoid stories like
Rameshwar Sharma's.
Fifth, "do [not] call virtuous people chumps" (p. 205). Currently, American society seems to believe that it is better to be
tricky than virtuous. We constantly reinforce in one another the
idea that the way to get ahead is to focus on appearances. In the
end, we are left with only appearances. Instead, we should reinforce the belief that virtuous conduct is our touchstone.
Sixth, "if you focus on appearances, you will fail even at that"
(p. 206). As you concentrate on appearances to the detriment of
substance, the substance erodes, making it impossible to maintain
even the appearance of propriety. 35 Finally, "cultivate virtues,
rather than appearances" (p. 207). "Cultivating virtue does not
simply mean trying to do the right thing. It means trying to be the
kind of person who does the right thing" (p. 207). In effect, Morgan
and Reynolds argue that if we are successful in this, the need for
having ethical standards at all simply will fade away.
CONCLUSION

If the contemporary world of ethics is as Morgan and Reynolds
suggest, we all should be more diligent in watching our backsides
lest we run the risk of ending up like Rameshwar Sharma. One
typo and one enemy could end a career. But while the authors perform admirably in prompting visceral terror in the reader by recounting disturbing anecdote after disturbing anecdote, they are
less successful in satisfying the reader's intellectual demands. The
authors need to attempt to build their arguments on a coherent definition of ethical behavior. They need to address frontally some of
the more legitimate rationales for an appearance standard. Finally,
they should devote more time and effort to their proposed solutions. Altering institutional culture is a daunting task, one which
they afford too little attention and respect. In the end, the book's
shortcomings lie not in what it does, but in what it does not do.
Nevertheless, while Morgan and Reynolds may leave some doubt in
also important to encourage judges to continue living in the real world, rather than sequestering themselves in their chambers.").
35. For instance, during the Watergate investigations President Nixon spent large por-

tions of his time devising plans to ensure that his administration appeared proper. Nixon
advised his chief of staff H.R. Haldeman to "stay close to the p.r." P. 61. Of course, Nixon
failed even at that and his reputation was destroyed as a result.
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the reader's mind about the dangers of the Ethics Establishment
and its sword the appearance standard, they leave no doubt in the
reader's heart.
-

Jordan B. Hansell

